Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AK - Zoo - § 09.65.180. Civil liability of zoos | AS § 09.65.180 | AK ST § 09.65.180 | The Alaska law provides that, except as provided in (b), a person who owns or operates a zoo is strictly liable for injury to a person or property if the injury is caused by an animal owned by or in the custody of the zoo. | Statute | |
| Roos v. Loeser | 183 P. 204 (Cal.App.1.Dist.,1919) | 41 Cal.App. 782 (Cal.App.1.Dist.,1919) |
This is an action for damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff by reason of the killing of her dog, of the variety known as Pomeranian, by an Airedale belonging to the defendant. In 1919, a California court determined damages to be limited to the veterinary expenses connected with the injury to the animal. In the opinion, the court lovingly discusses the value of the animal. Notwithstanding these words of praise for the small animal, the court decided that the value was limited to the fair market value and related expenses. |
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| HI - Wildlife - Chapter 124. Indigenous Wildlife, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, and Introduced Wild Birds | Haw. Admin. Rules (HAR) § 13-124-1 to § 13-124-13 | HI ADC § 13-124-1 to § 13-124-13 | The purpose of this chapter is to conserve, manage, protect, and enhance indigenous wildlife; and manage introduced wild birds. | Administrative | |
| Kitchin ex rel. Kitchin v. Halifax County | 665 S.E.2d 760 (N.C.App.,2008) |
In this North Carolina case, defendant dog owners appealed from a decision of the County Board of Health that ruled their dog could not be returned home because of the dog's potential exposure to rabies as result of attacking a raccoon (the dog was scheduled for euthanization). After the Board denied the owners' appeal, they filed a complaint against county which contained motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent dog's quarantine and for class certification. The Court of Appeals held that the owners' appeal of Board's decision to quarantine dog was moot because dog had already been returned home. The action against the animal control officers was dismissed because the officers were shielded by governmental immunity. |
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| State v. Hershey | 401 P.3d 256 ( Or. Ct. App.,2017) | 286 Or.App. 824 , 2017 WL 3045807 | In this Oregon case, defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree animal neglect. Specifically, defendant argues the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The evidence was obtained when the local sheriff (Glerup) entered defendant's property to administer emergency aid to defendant's cattle. During testimony in the motion to suppress, Glerup testified that he first received a call from defendant's neighbors who reported that the cattle appeared to be "starving." That neighbor even called defendant, who assured her that the cattle "were okay" and being cared for by a hired person. Sheriff Glerup called that individual who stated he had not been hired and defendant had been gone a week. The sheriff subsequently received a call that the cattle were in need of immediate aid and in poor condition. These conditions prompted the warrantless search. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress where the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. In doing so, defendant contends that the case establishing that the emergency aid doctrine applies to animals (Fessenden) was wrongly decided. This argument was dispensed by the court because it was not properly preserved at trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that the state failed to satisfy the requirements for the emergency aid exception. In reviewing defendant's claim, the court noted that in Fessenden, the emergency aid doctrine justifies warrantless activity, “when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals . . ." In this case, the court found that the officer's belief that immediate aid was necessary where the cattle appeared to be "near death" was reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress; defendant's conviction was affirmed. | Case | |
| United States v. Hess | 829 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 3878221 (8th Cir.,2016) | This case stems from a United States Fish and Wildlife Service's investigation into illegal trafficking of rhinoceros horns and ivory called "Operation Crash." Defendant James Hess, a taxidermist in Maquoketa, Iowa, agreed to sell a pair of lack rhinoceros horns in 2011 to another individual involved in the trafficking operation. As a result of his role, he was charged with one count of Lacey Act Trafficking for knowingly engaging in conduct involving the sale and purchase of wildlife with a market value exceeding $350 that was transported and sold in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Hess was ultimately sentenced to 27 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Hess first argued that the District Court made an “unsustainable finding on the record presented” when it stated that Hess "helped establish a market for these black rhino horns, and that is a serious offense against the planet." Because Hess failed to object at sentencing, this issue was reviewed for plain error. This court found no plain error, as the record supported the statement that Hess' action contributed to furthering a market for black rhinoceros horns. As to defendant's argument that his sentence was unreasonable, the court found that he failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness in his bottom of the guidelines sentencing range. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case | |
| Canada - Manitoba Statutes. The Animal Liability Act | S.M. 1998, c. 8 [C.C.S.M., c. A95], as am. S.M. 2002, c. 24, s. 4; 2002, c. | This set of laws comprises the Manitoba Animal Liability Act. Under the Act, the owner of an animal is liable for damages resulting from harm that the animal causes to a person or to property, but the damages awarded can be reduced depending upon the contributory fault or negligence of the plaintiff. In addition, no animal may run at-large under this law. Any person who finds a dog,wild boar, or prescribed animal worrying, injuring or killing livestock on the premises of the owner or possessor of the livestock that person may destroy the dog, wild boar or prescribed animal. | Statute | ||
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth | 177 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (2001) |
Environmental groups challenge implementations of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act ("IDCPA") which amended the MMPA and revised the criteria for banning tuna imports. |
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| Volosen v. State | 192 S.W.3d 597(Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2006) | 2006 WL 349713 (Tx. 2006) |
In this Texas case, the trial court found Appellant Mircea Volosen guilty of animal cruelty for killing a neighbor's dog. The sole issue on appeal is whether the State met its burden of presenting legally sufficient evidence that Volosen was "without legal authority" to kill the dog. By statute, a dog that "is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked ... fowls may be killed by ... any person witnessing the attack." The court found that no rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog was not attacking or had not recently attacked chickens in a pen in Volosen's yard; thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that Volosen killed the dog "without legal authority" as required to sustain a conviction for animal cruelty. Judgment Reversed by Volosen v. State , 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex.Crim.App., 2007). |
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| State v. Cloutier | 2003 ME 7 (Sup.Ct. Maine Jan. 21, 2003) |
Defendant appealed from his conviction for "driving deer" under Maine statute § 7458(10) (among other convictions), contending that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The Court rejected defendant's argument, finding the version at issue here plainly tells people that if they participate in a group hunt and they organize or plan the hunt so that several people move in a coordinated fashion toward other members of the hunting party who by predesign are standing or moving toward the first group, in a planned effort to flush out the deer, they are hunting illegally. With regard to the entrapment defense for the illegal transporting of deer, the Court found that although another hunter may have created the opportunity for Cloutier to commit the illegal transportation violation, "more is required for the entrapment defense than providing the opportunity to commit the crime." |
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