Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. 3,210 crusted sides of Caiman crocodilus yacare | 636 F.Supp. 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1986) |
The plaintiff, the United States of America, seeks forfeiture of the defendant, 10,870 crusted sides of Caiman crocodilus yacare, an endangered species of wildlife (hides) transported from Bolivia to the U.S. in violation of the Lacey Act, among other statutes. The court found that the testimony concerning the shrinkage of the crocodile hides during tanning did not meet the buren of the claimed owners showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the hides, which were shipped from Bolivia under the size limit imposed by Bolivian law, were not subject to the forfeiture provisions of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3374(a)(1) (1985). The provision of the Lacey Act at issue prohibits the interstate or foreign commerce of any wildlife taken in violation of any foreign law. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Clucas | 50 F.Supp. 609 (D.C. Va. 1943) |
Defendant and several individuals went on a duck hunt in and were charged with exceeding the limit for migratory birds under Virginia law. The game wardens testified that the defendant, Clucas, admitted in the presence of the other parties that they had killed more than the 'bag', meaning thereby that they had killed more than ten ducks allowed for each person. The government held the position that the other individuals were hired for the reason of taking or killing the ducks. The court held that in view of the fact that January 6, 1943, was not the first day of the season the possession of twenty-six ducks by the two defendants did not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Virginia regulation. The possession being legal, the burden of proof did not shift to the defendants. |
Case | |
| AK - Unalaska - Title 12: Animal Control (Chapter: 12.04: Animal Control) | Unalaska Code of Ordinances §§ 12.04.020, 12.04.150, 12.04.160 | Under this Unalaska, Alaska ordinance, a person who owns a seeing-eye dog, a hearing aid dog, or other aid dog is exempt from the license fees. Furthermore, this ordinance exempts such dogs from provisions that prohibit animals from entering certain places as long as the owner carries proper documentation certified by a recognized aid dog institution. | Local Ordinance | |
| IN - Spay, neuter - Chapter 4. Spay-Neuter Requirement for Animal Care Facilities | IC 15-20-4-1 - 5 | IN ST 15-20-4-1 - 5 | This Indiana chapter added in 2016 concerns the spay-neuter requirements for animal care facilities. Beginning July 1, 2021, except as provided in this chapter, a companion animal shall be spayed or neutered before adoption from an animal care facility. | Statute |
| WI - Fur - 100.35. Furs to be labeled | W. S. A. 100.35 | WI ST 100.35 | This law represents Wisconsin's fur labeling law. The law states that no person shall sell or offer or display for sale any coat, jacket or other garment made wholly or partially of fur without a label that states in English the species of fur or pelt used. This section does not apply to such garments displayed, offered, or sold at a price of less than $50. | Statute |
| PA - Cruelty - Chapter 37. Humane Society Police Officers. | 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 - 3718 | PA ST 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 - 3718 | These statutes enable and regulate Pennsylvania's grant of police powers to humane society agents. Topics within these statutes include the appointment, termination, powers granted to, and training of humane society police officers. | Statute |
| Kollman Ramos v. U.S. Dept. Of Agr. | 322 Fed.Appx. 814 (C.A.11) | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 922661 (C.A.11) |
Petitioner sought to have the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, set aside a Default Decision and Order of a United States Department of Agriculture Judicial Officer concluding that Petitioner had willfully violated multiple provisions of the AWA, including knowingly operating as a dealer without a license by delivering for transportation, or transporting, two lions for exhibition without a valid license to do so, causing injury to two lions that resulted in the death of one of the lions, and lying to investigators about Petitioner’s actions. The Court affirmed the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order, finding, among other things, that the USDA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to admit or deny any material allegations in the complaint and was thus deemed to have admitted all allegations, the Judicial Officer did not abuse his discretion by revoking Petitioner’s AWA license on a finding of willfulness, and that that the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order did not violate fundamental principles of fairness as embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and the USDA’s rules. |
Case |
| SuiÁa | impetraram este HABEAS CORPUS REPRESSIVO, em favor da chimpanzÈ "SuiÁa" (nome cientifico anthropopithecus troglodytes), macaca que se encontra enjaulada no Parque Zoobot‚nico Get˙lio Vargas (Jardim ZoolÛgico de Salvador), situado na Av. Ademar de Barros | Case | ||
| Hill v. Coggins | 867 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1003 (2018) | 2017 WL 3471259 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) | In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded. | Case |
| UT - Hunting - § 23-20-29. Interference with hunting prohibited--Action to recover damages--Exceptions | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-321 - 322 (formerly U.C.A. 1953 § 23-20-29, 23-20-29.5) | UT ST § 23A-5-321 - 322 (formerly UT ST § 23-20-29, 23-20-29.5) | This section reflects Utah's hunter harassment provisions. A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor who intentionally interferes with the right of a person, licensed and legally hunting, to take wildlife by driving, harassing, or intentionally disturbing any species of wildlife for the purpose of disrupting a legal hunt, trapping, or predator control. A person adversely affected, or the state, may bring a civil action for damages resulting from the violation or a seek a restraining order. This section does not apply to incidental interference with a hunt caused by lawful activities including, but not limited to, ranching, mining, and recreation. | Statute |