Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tulloch v. Melnychuk | 1998 CarswellAlta 573 |
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks damages from the Defendants for trespass to chattels. She alleged that the Defendants shot her valuable dog. The Defendants countered that they were justified in shooting the dog since it was on their land chasing and worrying their cattle contrary to the Stray Animals Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-23, Part 3. Here, the court found credible the testimony from the defendant cow-operator that the dog was chasing a lame cow to the point where the cow was exhausted. The action by plaintiff was dismissed. |
Case | ||
| Newport v. Moran | 721 P.2d 465 (Or.App.,1986) | 80 Or.App. 71 (Or.App.,1986) |
In this Oregon case, an action was brought to recover damages for injuries after defendant's dog ran into plaintiff and knocked her down. The lower court entered a verdict against the defendant and she appealed. The Court of Appeals held that, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there was find no evidence that would put defendant on notice that the dog had a potentially dangerous propensity to run into people. Further, without some reason to foresee that the dog was likely to run into people, there was no common-law duty to confine the dog. The evidence also did not warrant submission of the case to the jury on the theory of negligence per se for violation of the dog control ordinance because this risk was not one anticipated by the ordinance. Reversed. |
Case | |
| Matter of S. A. B. | 531 P.3d 718, review denied sub nom. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. T. B., 371 Or. 476, 537 P.3d 939 (2023) | 326 Or.App. 192 (Or.App., 2023) | In this Ohio juvenile dependency case, a father appeals a juvenile court judgment ordering him to transfer the his dog to his child, claiming that the court lacked the authority to transfer possession of the dog. He also claims the dog is his personal property and not the child's. The child, who does not live with the father, suffers from panic attacks and has difficulty sleeping at night. The child's therapist testified that the child's mental health symptoms are exacerbated by "missing and worrying about the dog." The therapist testified that, because of the bond that child shares with the dog, the child's emotional support dog should be this particular dog. In contrast, the father claims the dog is legally his and provides a household benefit for him by keeping raccoons away from his chickens and deterring thieves from entering the property. The lower court found that the child shares a bond with the dog and having the dog as an emotional support animal would benefit the child. On appeal, the father argues that an emotional support animal does not fall within the statutory definition for "counseling" and, thus, the court's order was tantamount to giving away his property. In looking at the statute, the court noted that "counseling" is undefined and so looking at the plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate. As a result, the court found that the dictionary definition read with the policy goals of the chapter on jurisdiction of the juvenile court allowed the court to conclude that the term "counseling" includes the use of emotional support animals. The evidence in this case also shows that this particular dog is necessary as ". . . this particular dog is not just a pet, but rather is an emotional support animal for child, as evidenced by child's strong emotional bond with this particular dog and various testimony demonstrating that this particular dog will contribute to child's well-being by providing child with emotional stability and security." As to the property issue raised by the father, the court observed that courts routinely order parents to provide support for their children and this transfer of property did not abuse the court's discretion. Affirmed. | Case | |
| VA - Horse Transport - Chapter 160. Rules and Regulations Governing the Transportation of Horses (repealed 2016) | 2 VA ADC 5-160-10 to 90 | 2 VAC 5-160-10 to 90 | [Note: these regulations were repealed in 2016 and are provided for historical context only.] These previous Virginia regulations address the transportation of loads of more than six horses being transported to a commercial slaughter facility in a vehicle. Vehicles that have more than one tier holding horses are allowed only if the tier is designed, constructed, and maintained to withstand the weight of the horses held by it. | Administrative | |
| OR - Initiatives - Measure 100, Save Endangered Animals (2016) | Measure 100 (2016) | Official Summary: Existing Oregon law does not prohibit sale of wildlife parts/products for non native species, except shark fins. Existing federal law does not prohibit intrastate sales of wildlife parts, with exceptions. Measure amends ORS 498.022 to prohibit purchase, sale, or possession with intent to sell of parts/products from elephant, rhinoceros, whale, tiger, lion, leopard, cheetah, jaguar, pangolin, sea turtle, shark, ray. Imposes civil penalties. Creates exceptions: law enforcement activities; activities authorized by federal law; fish managed under federal plan; certain antiques (over l00 years old) and musical instruments with less than 200 grams of parts; noncommercial transfers through estates, trusts, gifts; possession by tribal members. Other exceptions. Fish and Wildlife Commission may adopt rules, including prohibiting purchase/sale of parts "closely" resembling listed species parts. A "Yes" vote prohibits purchase/sale of parts/products from certain wildlife species; exceptions for specified activities, gift/inheritances, and certain antiques/musical instruments; civil penalties. A "No" vote maintains current Oregon law which does not prohibit purchase or sale of parts or products from species not native to Oregon, except for shark fins. | Statute | ||
| Maps of States that have Laws to Protect Animals in Parked Cars |
Thirty-one (31) states and the District of Columbia have laws that concern companion animals left unattended in parked vehicles under dangerous conditions as of 2023. In some states, leaving an animal in an unattended vehicle under dangerous conditions is a crime. Many states also give immunity to law enforcement or other first responders who forcibly enter vehicles to rescue animals. Recently, several states (AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, IN, KS, LA, MA, OH, OR, TN, VT, and WI) enacted laws giving civil immunity to any individuals who break-in to vehicles to remove pets (or vulnerable persons like children or incapacitated individuals) in imminent danger, provided they meet other conditions under these laws. To view these laws, click on the teal states. For more detailed information on these laws, please visit our comparative table on the topic. |
State map | |||
| US - Marine Mammals, Endangered - Establishment of Species of Concern List, Addition of Species to Species of Concern List, Desc | 2004 WL 791908 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 04-8593 |
NMFS establishes a species of concern list, places 45 species on this list, describes the factors it will consider when identifying species of concern, and revises the candidate species list. NMFS also solicits information and comments concerning the status of, research and stewardship opportunities for, and the factors for identifying species of concern. |
Administrative | |
| NY - Enforcement, Conservation - Article 71. Enforcement. | McKinney's ECL § 71-0101 to 71-0927 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 71-0101 to 71-0927 | This set of statutes outlines the procedures and penalties for violations of New York's Environmental Conservation Law. | Statute | |
| MI - Trapping - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.42501 - 42507 | MI ST 324.42501 - 42507 | These sections describe the regulations for trapping for furs, hides and pelts. This includes the requirement for a fur dealer's license and for a monthly report of all pelts on hand. | Statute | |
| DILLON v. O'CONNOR | 412 P.2d 126 (Wash. 1966) | 68 Wash.2d 184 (1966) |
As the court stated, "This is ‘The Case of the Costly Canine.' ‘Bimbo,’ an acknowledged ‘tree hound' but without pedigree or registration papers, lost a bout with defendant's automobile. For ‘Bimbo's' untimely demise, his owner, plaintiff, brought suit against defendant alleging that ‘Bimbo’ was killed as a result of defendant's negligent operation of his automobile." Ultimately, the court used a market value approach in determining damages. However, based on subsequent caselaw, it should be noted that Washington uses the market value approach only for negligent injury, and not intentional injury. |
Case |