Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panattieri v. City of New York | 53 Misc. 3d 865, 37 N.Y.S.3d 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) | 2016 WL 4691555, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26283 |
Ceasar, a mixed breed dog, was seized by police after he killed another dog and injured the other dogs’ owner. Petitioners, Kristina & Douglas Panattieri, owned Ceasar and demanded his return to their custody. They also challenged the determination by Respondent, Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), to execute Ceasar pursuant to the New York City Health Code (24 RCNY) § 161.07. The Petitioners argued that Ceasar’s execution would be unconstitutional under the City Code because it was preempted by the state statute, Agriculture & Markets Law § 123.The Supreme Court, New York County, denied their petition and held that the New York City Health Code was not preempted by the state statute. The Court reasoned that the Agriculture and Markets Law § 107(5), which governed licensing, identification, and control of dogs, expressly allowed municipalities to enact their own Codes governing dangerous dogs. However the City Codes were to incorporate standards that were as or more protective of public health and safety than those set forth in the state statute. The New York City Code met the requirement and was therefore not preempted by state law. |
Case |
| NV - Endangered Species - Protection and Propagation of Native Fauna (Chapter 503) | N. R. S. 503.584 - 503.589 | NV ST 503.584 - 503.589 | These statutes provide that the Legislature of Nevada has an interest in protecting native species from extinction and sets forth the authority to establish programs to protect designated species. However, if a native species is found to be destructive under the statute, the statute provides for removal if appropriate. Under statute, the ultimate responsibility for management rests with the governor for reviewing state programs and entering into interstate and federal agreements. | Statute |
| Woudenberg v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 794 F.3d 595 (6th Cir., 2015) | 2015 WL 4503212 (6th Cir., 2015) | According to Department of Agriculture regulations promulgated under the federal Animal Welfare Act (with certain exceptions not applicable here), persons who were in the business of buying and selling dogs and cats (i.e. class B dealers) may not obtain dogs or cats from an individual donor “who did not breed and raise them on his or her premises.” Another provision required a dealer in such a case to “obtain [ ] a certification that the animals were born and raised on that person's premises.” The question in this case was whether there was a violation when the dealer obtained the required certification, but the certification was false. The regulatory language was clear that a dealer violated the law by obtaining a dog or cat from an individual donor who did not breed or raise it on the donor's premises and it was still a violation even when the dealer in good faith obtained certifications that the animals had been so bred and raised. The certification requirement was an enforcement mechanism for the prohibition, not an exception. The Department of Agriculture therefore properly entered a cease-and-desist order against the petitioner. | Case |
| AZ - Tucson - Chapter 4: Animals and Fowl (Article 1: In General § 4-3) | Tucson Code § 4-3 |
This Tucson ordinance makes it a misdemeanor to commit a crime of cruelty or neglect on an animal. Anyone found guilty of committing a crime of neglect of cruelty faces fines between $100 to $2,500, up to 6 months in jail or 3 years on probation, restitution for the victim, and may not be able to own or control an animal for up to 3 years. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Settle v. Commonwealth | 55 Va.App. 212, 685 S.E.2d 182 (Va.,2009) | 2009 WL 4030930 (Va.App.) |
The defendant-appellant, Charles E. Settle, Jr., was convicted of two counts of inadequate care by owner of companion animals and one count of dog at large under a county ordinance, after Fauquier County Sherriff's officers were dispatched to his home on multiple occasions over the course of one calendar year in response to animal noise and health and safety complaints from his neighbors. Consequently, all of the affected dogs were seized from Settle and relocated to local animal shelters. The trial court also declared three of the animals to be dangerous dogs pursuant to another county ordinance. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that: (1) because the forfeiture of dogs was a civil matter the Court of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction and was not the proper forum to decide the case; (2) that Settle failed to join the County as an indispensible party in the notice of appeal from conviction for the county ordinance violation; and (3) that the evidence was sufficient to identify Settle as the owner of the neglected companion animals. |
Case |
| Mathis v. Crawford | Not Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2021 WL 3127697 (Ill.App. 5 Dist., 2021) | 2021 IL App (5th) 190012-U | Plaintiff filed this suit in small claims court seeking damages for the destruction of his three dogs, that were mauled to death by dogs owned by defendant over a period of 15 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded him $5,000. Defendant appealed to request that the court of appeals amend the trial court's award of damages to a lesser amount of $500. The court found that, although plaintiff was able to show that he suffered damages at the result of defendant's dogs killing his dogs, the value of the dogs was still unclear. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial solely to discern the issue of the value of the dogs. | Case |
| RI - Hunting - § 20-13-16. Harassment of hunters, trappers, and fishers prohibited | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 20-13-16 | RI ST § 20-13-16 | This law reflects Rhode Island's hunter harassment law. The law provides that no person shall obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person at the location where the activity is taking place with intent to prevent the lawful taking. The language states that the listed actions must be done intentionally or knowingly. Violation results in a "civil violation" with a forfeiture of not less than $100 nor more $500. | Statute |
| Riley v. Bd. of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Cty. | Slip Copy, 2016 WL 90770, 2016 WL 90770 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2016) (unpublished) | The plaintiff filed suit based on violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) after he was denied entrance into the Tippecanoe County Courthouse with his service dog. Initially, defendant's claims were dismissed because the Court did not adequately allege that his dog was a service dog. Defendant then filed an amended complaint with plausible allegations that his dog is a service dog. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, stating that the plaintiff had not established that his dog was a service dog according to the definition listed under rules promulgated under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the plaintiff’s dog was a service dog under the definition because the dog was “individually trained to, among other things, provide [plaintiff] with balance support and assistance during episodes of PTSD.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case was denied. | Case | |
| MT - Horse Slaughter - Chapter 9. Slaughter. | MCA 81-9-240, 241 | MT ST 81-9-240, 241 | This Montana statute limits the ability of a court to issue an injunction aimed at delaying or stopping the construction of an equine slaughter or processing facility. Additionally, the law provides that if a person files an action against the operation of an equine slaughter or processing facility and does not prevail, the person is liable for all financial losses the facility suffers if the court issues an injunction that halts operations while the action is pending. | Statute |
| Tulloch v. Melnychuk | 1998 CarswellAlta 573 |
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks damages from the Defendants for trespass to chattels. She alleged that the Defendants shot her valuable dog. The Defendants countered that they were justified in shooting the dog since it was on their land chasing and worrying their cattle contrary to the Stray Animals Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-23, Part 3. Here, the court found credible the testimony from the defendant cow-operator that the dog was chasing a lame cow to the point where the cow was exhausted. The action by plaintiff was dismissed. |
Case |