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Displaying 81 - 90 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
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| Dillon v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Correction | 211 N.E.3d 746 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., 2023) | 2023-Ohio-942 | Plaintiff-Appellant, Anna Dillon, a certified “senior dog handler” through a rehabilitation program for inmates in Ohio, was attacked by a dog named Roosevelt, a German Shepherd/Husky mix owned by an Ohio Reformatory for Woman (ORW) corrections officer. Dillon had previously interacted with Roosevelt without incident on multiple occasions, but in March 2018, Roosevelt attacked her, causing 16 puncture wounds. On March 19, 2018, while attempting to put on Roosevelt's leash and collar, he displayed signs of anxiety and suddenly attacked Ms. Dillon, biting her multiple times. After the incident, Roosevelt was removed from the program. In August 2018, Ms. Dillon requested records pertaining to Roosevelt but was unable to obtain his handler folder. The dog’s handler folder included the dog’s training history, breed, eating habits, type of collar, preferences, personality, demeanor, and incidents of aggression, and was retained by the handler assigned to that dog. Ms. Dillon filed a civil action against ODRC in 2020, alleging negligence and spoliation of evidence. The trial court found in favor of ODRC in a decision issued in September 2021. Ms. Dillon appealed that decision, asserting several assignments of error. In her first and second assignments of error, Ms. Dillon argues that the trial court's findings in favor of ODRC on her negligence claim were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court evaluated whether there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Roosevelt was not a vicious dog prior to the incident. The court referred to Ohio's statutory definition of a vicious dog, which states that it is a dog that has killed or caused serious injury to a person without provocation. The court found that none of Roosevelt's previous behaviors, such as mouthing, baring teeth, or lunging, met the definition of serious injury as defined by the statute. The trial court concludes that Ms. Dillon failed to prove that Roosevelt met either standard before the incident. The court noted that no evidence or testimony showed that Roosevelt had attacked or seriously injured anyone before March 2018 and Ms. Dillon's reliance on the case of Pickett, which dealt with a traditional negligence claim - a claim that she had abandoned in this case - was not relevant. In her second assignment of error, Ms. Dillon challenged the trial court's finding regarding the negligent keeping of Roosevelt, but since the first assignment of error has been resolved, the second assignment is also overruled. The trial court did not make any findings regarding ODRC's knowledge or negligent keeping of Roosevelt because it found him not to be a vicious dog. As to the spoliation of evidence claim, Ms. Dillon alleged that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) willfully destroyed evidence, specifically the handler folder of a dog named Roosevelt, to disrupt her case. The court outlined the elements of intentional spoliation of evidence, which include pending litigation, knowledge of litigation by the defendant, willful destruction of evidence, disruption of the plaintiff's case, and damages caused by the defendant's actions. The court found that Ms. Dillon failed to prove the willful destruction of the handler folder or that her case was disrupted by its disposal. It was determined that the inmate-secretaries involved in the program managed the handler folders, and there was no evidence that ODRC employees reviewed or accessed them. A failure to follow records retention schedules is separate from a spoliation claim. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support her claim of willful destruction or disruption of her case and that the trial court's findings were supported by credible evidence. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | ||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 10 Núm 4 |
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| United States Association of Reptile Keepers, Inc. v. Jewell | 103 F. Supp. 3d 133 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 2207603 (D.D.C, 2015) | On a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin implementation of the 2015 Rule (80 Fed.Reg. 12702 ), the US District Court for the District of Columbia addressed whether the U.S. Department of Interior acted within its authority when it issued Lacey Act regulations prohibiting the interstate transportation of certain large constricting snakes. The United States Association of Reptile Keepers argued that since the Lacey Act “[did] not encompass transportation of listed species between two states within the continental United States,” the Department of Interior exceeded its authority. Relying on the history of zebra mussels and bighead carp, the Department argued that it did not. The Court, however, found the Department had failed to establish that that history was sufficient to confer an authority on the Department that Congress did not confer when it enacted the controlling statutory text. The Court ruled the preliminary injunction would issue and ordered the parties to appear for a status conference on May 18, 2015 to address the scope of the injunction. | Case | ||||||
| State v. Moore | 2014 WL 1917289 (Wash.App. Div. 2) | --- P.3d ---, 181 Wash.App. 1010 (2014) | Duane Moore appealed his conviction and sentence for second degree assault, domestic violence, after choking his wife during an argument. He argued that (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir dire and closing argument when he argued facts not in evidence, made improper statements about witness credibility, and shifted the burden of proof; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify with a service dog; and (3) the prosecutor improperly testified at the sentencing hearing. With regard to the testimony dog issue, the court found that defendant failed to raise the issue at trial and thus failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Further, defendant failed to prove that any alleged errors were manifest. There is no evidence in the record that the dog's presence made Ms. Moore appear traumatized or victimized, and thereby violated Mr. Moore's due process rights, or acted as a comment on the evidence. The court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed the trial court. | Case | ||||||
| US - AWA - 1976 Public Law 94-279 | 1976 PL 94-279 | The 1976 Amendments of the AWA dealt with several new topics: (1) transportation carriers and intermediate handlers of animals were brought under the provisions of the Act, (2) a number of specific transportation problems were addressed by Congress, (3) a new provision was added which made it a crime to knowingly sponsor, participate in, transport, or use the mails to promote fights between live birds, live dogs or other mammals, (4) the penalty provisions were rewritten, allowing the broad use of civil fines. | Statute | |||||||
| Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 329: Section 6268 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6268 (1918) | Section 6268 of Chapter 329 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers the unlawful injury to certain property of another. Specifically, the statute states the punishment for hurting, maiming, poisoning anther's cattle, ox, horse, and mule. | Statute | |||||||
| Molinari v. Tuskegee University | 339 F. Supp. 2d. 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2004) |
A veterinary student was kicked by a cow while trying to perform a medical procedure. The student brought a personal injury lawsuit against the professor and university for negligently allowing the university-owned cow to kick her and not providing timely medical treatment. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. |
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| U.S. v. Stevens | 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) | 176 L.Ed.2d 435, 78 USLW 4267, 38 Media L. Rep. 1577, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4819, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5779, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 221 |
Defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for being substantially overbroad: it did not require the depicted conduct to be cruel, extended to depictions of conduct that were only illegal in the State in which the creation, sale, or possession occurred, and because the exceptions clause did not substantially narrow the statute's reach. (2011 note: 18 U.S.C. § 48 was amended following this ruling in late 2010). |
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| UT - Domestic Violence - Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 77-36-1. Definitions | U.C.A. 1953 § 77-36-1 | In 2022, Utah amended its statute defining "domestic violence" to include aggravated cruelty to an animal, as described in Subsection 76-9-301(4), with the intent to harass or threaten the other cohabitant. | Statute | |||||||
| NY - Police Dog - § 122-c. Transport of police work dogs injured in the line of duty | NY GEN MUN § 122-c | McKinney's General Municipal Law § 122-c | This New York statutes allows for paramedics or emergency medical service technicians to transport any police work dog that is injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic if there are no persons requiring medical attention or transport at such time. | Statute |