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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Protection and Rescue League v. California | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 315709 (S.D.Cal.) |
Plaintiffs move for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to compel defendant City of San Diego to place a seasonal rope barrier at the La Jolla Children's Pool Beach to limit human interaction with harbor seals during pupping season. In denying the TRO, the court noted that plaintiffs failed to identify a single incident of harassment occurring since December 15, 2007 (the beginning of the pupping season) or any causal nexus between miscarriages and people walking up to the seals. While the parties agree placement of the barrier would not harm people and act as an effective tool, the court noted that the focus of irreparable harm is on the harm sought to be prevented not on the difficulty in carrying out the task. |
Case | ||
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds | 591 F. Supp. 3d 397 (S.D. Iowa 2022), rev'd and remanded, 89 F.4th 1065 (8th Cir. 2024) | 2022 WL 777231 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 14, 2022) | Plaintiffs, five non-profit organizations dedicated to animal protection, food safety, and other advocacy issues, filed suit challenging Iowa Code § 717.3B, which they contend infringes on their constitutional rights. Specifically, these organizations contend that Iowa's new "ag-gag" law criminalizes their actions in gathering information through undercover investigations at animal production facilities. These organizations must misrepresent or conceal their identities to gather gather evidence of animal abuse and other alleged illegal conduct in day-to-day activities at facilities where they suspect wrongdoing occurs. Iowa Code § 717A.3B is the second in a series of laws passed by the Iowa legislature aimed at criminalizing undercover investigations such as the ones conducted by Plaintiffs. The previous law was challenged by these same plaintiffs and a permanent injunction was passed by the United States District Court. The defendants challenged the injunction in the Eighth Circuit, but before that was decided, the Iowa legislature passed the new section (§ 717A.3B). Here, both parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contend that the new law violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it discriminates based on content and viewpoint and cannot survive strict scrutiny. Defendants argue that the law does not regulate protected speech under the First Amendment or, if it does regulate protected speech, it is content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral and passes intermediate scrutiny. The court first noted that the issue with § 717A.3B, and other laws aimed at prohibiting trespassers at agricultural facilities, is the law seeks to single out specific individuals for punishment based on their viewpoint regarding such facilities. This law operates in a viewpoint discriminatory fashion because it prohibits the deceptive trespasser who gains access or obtain employment at an agricultural facility with the intent to cause “economic harm ... to the agricultural production facility's ... business interest" as opposed to trespassers with an intent to benefit the facility. Thus, Section 717A.3B does not focus solely on the right to exclude, the legally cognizable harm of trespass, but only on the right to exclude those with particular viewpoints. While the court noted that a state legislature may determine whether specific facilities—such as agricultural facilities, nuclear power plants, military bases, or other sensitive buildings—are entitled to special legal protections, the First Amendment does not allow those protections to be based on a violator's viewpoint. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and Defendant's was denied. | Case | |
| Morawek v. City of Bonney Lake | 184 Wash. App. 487, 337 P.3d 1097 (2014) | 2014 WL 6061489 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2014) | A woman filed a complaint with the Bonney Lake animal control authority after her neighbor’s dog killed her cat. The animal control officer served plaintiff with paperwork stating that his dog satisfied the definition of a dangerous dog under the Bonney Lake Municipal Code because the dog had killed a domestic animal without provocation while off his owner's property. Plaintiff appealed the designation to the police chief, the city hearing examiner, and the superior court; all of which affirmed the designation. The Washington Court of Appeals, however, held that the hearing examiner's finding that the owner's dog killed the neighbor's cat without provocation was not supported by substantial evidence, as required to uphold a dangerous dog designation, even though the “location” element of the dangerous dog designation was satisfied. The dangerous dog designation was therefore reversed. | Case | |
| Federal Laws | Policy | ||||
| CA - Slaughter - § 597.3. Live animal markets | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597.3 | CA PENAL § 597.3 | This California statute regulates live animal markets. Operators must ensure that no animal (frogs, turtles, and birds, but not poultry) sold for the purpose of human consumption) is cut, dismembered, butchered, or de-feathered while still alive. Operators must also provide that no animals are confined in such a way that could case injury, starvation, dehydration, or suffocation. Violation may result in a warning for the first offense and an infraction for a second offense. | Statute | |
| Canada - Alberta - Alberta Statutes. Animal Protection Act | R.S.A. 2000, c. A-41, s. 1 | This set of laws from Alberta, Canada comprises the Animal Protection Act. The Act states that no person shall permit or cause an animal to be in distress. Specifically, a person who owns or is in charge of an animal must ensure that the animal has adequate food and water, must provide the animal with adequate care when the animal is wounded or ill, and must provide the animal with reasonable protection from injurious heat or cold as well as adequate shelter, ventilation and space. A person who contravenes this Act is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of not more than $20,000 in addition to restrictions on owning animals for a specified period of time. The Act also outlines the power of both peace officers to take animals in distress into their custody and humane societies to provide care for seized animals. | Statute | ||
| Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, L.L.C. v. Department of Agriculture | 539 F.3d 492 (D.C.Cir., 2008) | 2008 WL 3980533 (C.A.D.C.) | Plaintiff, a supplier of beef products, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), after the USDA denied Plaintiff’s request to purchase Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) testing kits. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that the USDA has authority under the Virus Serum Toxin Act (VSTA) to regulate the use of biological products, the USDA’s interpretation of VSTA allowing the USDA to deny an import permit based on the product’s intended use was not inconsistent with the regulation and was therefore entitled to deference by the Court, the USDA’s interpretation of the word “treatment” as including diagnostic activities was entitled to deference, and that BSE testing is a diagnostic activity for purposes of VSTA. | Case | |
| US - Whales - Notice of Availability of the Draft Revised Recovery Plan for the North Atlantic Right Whale | 2004 WL 1924051 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 04-19775 |
NMFS announces the availability for public review of the draft revised Recovery Plan (Plan) for the North Atlantic Right Whale (Eubalaena glacialis). NMFS is soliciting review and comment from the public and all interested parties on the Plan, and will consider all substantive comments received during the review period before submitting the Plan for final approval. (Note that the specific concern with right whales is collisions with ships.) |
Administrative | |
| Brower v. Evans | 257 F.3d 1058 (2001) |
The district court held that the Secretary's Initial Finding, triggering a change in the dolphin-safe label standard, was not in accordance with the law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the Secretary failed to (1) obtain and consider preliminary data from the congressionally mandated stress studies and (2) apply the proper legal standard to the available scientific information. We affirm. |
Case | ||
| State v. Fay | 248 A.3d 1191 (N.H. Dec. 2, 2020) | 173 N.H. 740, 2020 WL 7051326 (N.H. Dec. 2, 2020) | In this New Hampshire case, Christina Fay appeals her convictions on seventeen counts of cruelty to animals. In 2017, a search warrant executed at her residence resulted in the seizure of over 70 Great Danes. Police learned of the conditions at defendant's residence from defendant's prior employees, who gave accounts of floors covered in layers of feces, dogs being fed maggot-infested raw chicken, and dogs present with injuries/illness. After conducting an investigation, the investigating Wolfeboro's police officer (Strauch) partnered with HSUS because the department did not have the resources to handle a large-scale animal law seizure. Strauch did not include in his affidavit supporting the search warrant's issuance that HSUS would be assisting the police, and the warrant itself did not explicitly state that HSUS was permitted to assist in its execution. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress by violating two of her constitutional rights: her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and her right to privacy. As to the right to privacy argument, the court first noted that defendant grounded her argument in a recently enacted amendment to the state constitution. However, this new amendment, which states that an individual's right to live free from governmental intrusion in private or personal information is natural, essential, and inherent, did not apply retroactively to defendant. As to defendant's second argument that she had a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the court noted that it has not previously considered the extent to which it is constitutionally reasonable for the police to involve civilians when executing search warrants. The defendant argues that Strauch's failure to obtain express authorization for HSUS's aid from the magistrate who issued the search warrant was constitutionally unreasonable. The court found no instance in which a court has held that the failure to obtain express judicial authorization for citizen aid prior to the execution of a warrant rendered the subsequent search unconstitutional. While other courts have opined that is might be a "better practice" to disclose this matter when applying to the magistrate for a search warrant, failure to do so does not itself violate the Fourth Amendment. The pertinent inquiry is whether the search was reasonable in its execution, and any citizen involvement would be held to that scrutiny. The court concluded that the state did not violate the constitution by failing to obtain authorization for HSUS's involvement prior to the warrant's execution. Affirmed. | Case |