Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IL - Pet Trusts - Chapter 760. Trusts and Fiduciaries. | 760 I.L.C.S. 3/408; 760 ILCS 3/1223 | This Illinois law represents the state's pet trust law. The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. A trust instrument shall be liberally construed to bring the transfer within this Section, to presume against a merely precatory or honorary nature of its disposition, and to carry out the general intent of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in determining the transferor's intent. | Statute | ||
| IN - Law enforcement - Chapter 42.5. Burial with Law Enforcement Animals or Service Animals | IC 23-14-42.5-1 - 7 | This chapter allows the cremated remains of a deceased law enforcement or military animal of a deceased owner to be scattered, placed, or interred in a manner described in this subsection before, after, or in conjunction with the interment of the remains of the deceased owner. The deceased animal's cremated remains may be scattered or placed on top of the deceased owner's burial plot or interred on top of the deceased owner's burial plot as long as the interment of the deceased animal's cremated remains does not encroach on a neighboring burial plot, involve disinterment of the owner, or involve digging greater than one foot of depth. The person owning the deceased animal must consent in writing and give this consent to the cemetery owner. If the deceased owner does not own the animal at the time of the deceased animal's death, the deceased owner may provide written notice in his or her last will, in a written designation to the cemetery, or in a funeral planning declaration. | Statute | ||
| IN - Trust - 30-4-2-18. Trust to provide for care of an animal alive during settlor's lifetime | I.C. 30-4-2-18 | IN ST 30-4-2-18 | Indiana's pet trust law was enacted in 2005. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or upon death of last surviving animal alive during settlor's lifetime. Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to the trust's intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the trust's intended use. | Statute | |
| In re Capers' Estate | 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121 (Pa.Orph.) (1964) | 15 Fiduc.Rep. 150, 1963 WL 6573 (Pa.Orph.) (1964) |
In this Pennsylvania case, the testatrix directed in her will that her Irish setter dogs to be destroyed in a humane manner. The executors were unsure of what action to take and sought declaratory relief. In attempting to construe the testatrix's intent, the court found that she "evidently feared that either they would grieve for her or that no one would afford them the same affection and kindness that they received during her life." The court found that the intent of testatrix would be carried out if her two favored Irish setters were placed in an environment where they are given the same care and attention that she she gave them during her life. The final question the court grappled with was whether it was against public policy to hold valid a clause in a will directing the summary destruction of certain of decedent's property after her death. The court held that the clause was void as not being within the purview of the Wills Act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and being against the public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. |
Case | |
| In re Estate of Howard Brand, Late of Essex Junction, Vermont |
This Vermont case considers the effectiveness of a clause in a testator’s will that directs his executor to destroy any animals that he owns at the time of his death. The testator, Howard Brand, was believed to have owned four horses and one mule at the time of his death. An unincorporated association entitled, “The Coalition to Save Brand’s Horses” was formed in response to this unusual post-mortem request, and sought to intervene in the lawsuit. In a clear case of first impression in Vermont, the Chittenden County Court held that the clause as set forth in Brand’s last codicil mandating the destruction of his animals is void as contrary to public policy. |
Pleading | |||
| In re Estate of Ronald W. Callan, Jr. | This Tennessee order appoints a guardian ad litem for the custody and care of decedent, Ronald W. Callan Jr.'s, dog. According to the order, the guardian ad litem (an attorney in this case) acts not as an advocate for the dog, but rather has a duty to determine what is in the dog's best welfare. Further, the guardian is given unlimited access to the dog and has the right to inspect where the dog is being sheltered. He can also inspect all veterinary records and speak with the dog's veterinarian. | Pleading | |||
| In re Kulka's Estate | 18 P.2d 1036 (1933) | 142 Or. 104 |
This action relates to a court order in an estate case. The decedent left a legacy in the form of some timber reserves to the Human Society of Portland Oregon "to be used solely for the benefit of animals." The executor refused to pay the legacy. This is an appeal from a circuit court decision directing and authorizing Andrew Hansen, executor of the estate of Otto Kulka, deceased, to pay the petitioner a legacy from proceeds in the executor's hands. The court affirmed the payment of the legacy. |
Case | |
| In re Searight's Estate | 87 Ohio App. 417 (1950) | 95 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio App., 1950) | This Ohio case dealt with a deceased testator's will that bequeathed his dog to a certain person, including $1000 to be used for the care of the dog. The issues in this case were whether the testamentary bequest for the care of the dog was valid in Ohio as a proper subject of a "honorary trust," whether the bequest violated the rule against perpetuities, and whether the bequest was subject to the inheritance tax laws of Ohio. Ohio's Ninth District Court of Appeals held: 1) the testator's purpose was not capricious or illegal, and that such gift, whether designated as an 'honorary trust' or a gift with a power which is valid when exercised, is lawful; 2) such a bequest does not, by the terms of the will, violate the rule against perpetuities; and 3) a succession tax based on the amount of money expended for the care of the dog cannot lawfully be imposed, since the money is not property passing for the use of a "person, institution or corporation." | Case | |
| In the Matter of the Application of Richard M. COPLAND, as an Executor of the estate of Lenore Lewis Abels, Deceased | 988 N.Y.S.2d 458 | 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24172 | Co-executor of an estate petitioned the Westchester County Surrogate's Court for a decree in accordance with EPTL 7–8.1[d] reducing the amount of money to be transferred from the estate to the trustees of a testamentary pet trust established under the decedent's will. Since the decedent gave very specific instructions as to how she wanted her cats to be cared for and the petition was in opposition to the decedent’s wishes, the court denied the reduction. | Case | |
| INCORPORATING ANIMAL LAW INTO PRIVATE PRACTICE | Holly Anne Gibbons | 16 Animal L. 207 (2010) |
This introduction to Volume 16, part 2 is an author-based account of her experience incorporating animal law into her private law practice. |
Article |