Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| White v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company | 106 A.3d 1159 (N.H., 2014) | 167 N.H. 153 (2014) | This is an appeal brought by Susan and Peter White to a declaratory judgment that her son, Charles Matthews, was not covered under Susan's homeowner's insurance policy with the respondent.The incident that led to this case involved Matthews' dog causing injury to Susan while at the home covered by the policy. The policy covered the insurer and residents of their home who are relatives, so Susan attempted to collect from Vermont Mutual for the damage done by the dog. However, her claim was denied because Matthews was deemed to not be a resident of the home. This court affirms. | Case | |
| Whiteaker v. City of Southgate | 651 F. Supp. 3d 893 (E.D. Mich. 2023) | 2023 WL 317457 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2023) | The plaintiff (“Whiteaker”) filed this action against Defendant, the City of Southgate, Michigan for violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PDCRA”). Specifically, Whiteaker contends that the City violated the FHA by denying Whiteaker's request for an exemption from City Ordinance 610.13, which prohibits City residents from maintaining chickens (or other typical farm animals) on their property. The events underlying this action began after Whiteaker moved to Southgate in early March 2021. On March 24, 2021, Whiteaker was issued a citation by the City for a violation of Ordinance 610.13. Whiteaker appeared in district court to defend himself, claiming he had a right to keep the chickens under Michigan's Right to Farm Act. However, it turned out the Right to Farm law was inapplicable because Whiteaker's chicken coop was within 250 feet of a dwelling. Thus, Whiteaker was issued a second citation in May and was denied a permit to keep the chickens by the city. Since Whiteaker was a longtime sufferer of depression and anxiety, he sought a waiver from the ordinance as a reasonable accommodation for his disability and presented a letter from his mental health provider as support. Again, his request was denied by the City. In the instant motion for summary judgement by the City, the court examined the "reasonableness" of Whiteaker's request for a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. The court found that the balancing test required under the FHA, to wit, weighing Whiteaker's disability-related need to keep the chickens as a source of comfort and support against the City's claims that the chickens pose a threat to public health, is a triable issue of fact. Indeed, the court observed that the City's citation of documentation from the CDC only lists the "potential dangers" chickens can pose to public health without sufficient evidence to supports its claim that the chickens will burden the City financially and administratively. In contrast, Whiteaker claims a disability and has provided evidence of his disability. Likewise, as to the remaining elements of necessity and equal opportunity for a reasonable accommodation claim, the court again cites Whiteaker's evidentiary support for his claim of disability and need for the chickens to alleviate those symptoms against the fact the City has not presented any testimony, affidavits, or "evidence of any kind" to support its claim. Thus, the court denied the motion for summary judgment. | Case | |
| Whitman v. State | 2008 WL 1962242 (Ark.App.,2008) |
Appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of four counts of cruelty to animals concerning four Arabian horses. On appeal, appellant raised a sufficiency of the evidence challenge and a Rule 404(b) challenge to the admission of testimony and pictures concerning the condition of appellant's dogs and her house. The court found the photographic evidence was admissible for purposes other than to prove appellant's character, e.g., to show her knowledge of neglect of animals within her house, and thereby the absence of mistake or accident concerning the horses that lived outside. |
Case | ||
| Whittier Terrace Associates v. Hampshire | 532 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1989) |
Defendant was a person with a psychiatric disability and living in public housing. Defendant claimed to have an emotional and psychological dependence on her cat. The court held that the housing authority discriminated against defendant under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to waive the no pets policy as a reasonable accommodation for the mental disability. The court noted that there must be a narrow exception "to the rigid application of a no-pet rule, involving no untoward collateral consequences," because the handicapped person could fully receive the benefits of the program if provided the accommodation. |
Case | ||
| Who Let the Dangerous Dogs Out? The German State's Hasty Legislative Action, the Federal Law on Dangerous Dogs and the "Kampfhunde" Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court | Claudia E. Haupt | 2 Journal of Animal Law 27 (2006) |
The article examines the legislative measures taken at the state and federal level in Germany to address the issue of dangerous dogs and the related decision of the Federal Constitutional Court which upheld an import ban on dangerous dogs while striking down a breeding ban and parts of a newly introduced section to the Criminal Code. |
Article | |
| Who Speaks for the Animals? | Wendy Anderson | ABA Animal Law Committee Newsletter |
This article examines the public policy debate over control of stray animal populations, in particular, feral cat colonies. The author, director of a feral cat advocacy group, explains that many of the individuals who act as caretakers for feral cat colonies are caught in a conundrum as to whether they should come "out" as caretakers or remain in secrecy. Much of the current legal policy for animals stems from antiquated animal control laws that do not accurately reflect the attitude of the country toward companion animals. |
Article | |
| WHO THE JUDGE ATE FOR BREAKFAST: ON THE LIMITS OF CREATIVITY IN ANIMAL LAW AND THE REDEEMING POWER OF POWERLESSNESS | Matthew Liebman | 18 Animal L. 133 (2011) |
Drawing upon various schools of legal thought, this Essay explores how ideological and non-legal factors influence the adjudication process in animal law cases. The Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies movements highlighted the indeterminacy present in legal doctrine and undermined trust in judges’ ability to arrive at “correct” answers to legal questions. In the midst of such indeterminacy, where legal texts do not predetermine legal outcomes, judges tend to render decisions that are consistent with pervasive societal norms and existing distributions of political power. Starting from these premises, the Author questions whether innovative and creative impact litigation by the animal law movement can succeed in fundamentally challenging speciesism through a legal system that is pervasively hostile to the interests of animals. Although incremental and meaningful gains are possible through litigation, we must recognize the limits of legal reform in the short-term. Although such limitations are typically seen as cause for despair, the Author argues that recognizing our powerlessness can be a source of compassion and an opportunity to experience our shared existential vulnerability with animals. |
Article | |
| Why Can't I Know How The Sausage Is Made?: How Ag-Gag Statutes Threaten Animal Welfare Groups And The First Amendment | Daniel L. Sternberg | 13 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y & Ethics J. 625 | The purpose of this Note is to investigate this clash and analyze the constitutionality of the five Ag-Gag statutes that specifically target surreptitious investigative techniques. Part I provides an overview of these state Ag-Gag statutes enacted around the United States. Part II summarizes the first constitutional challenge to an Ag-Gag statute - Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hebert, which is pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of the provisions of Ag-Gag statutes that (a) provide a cause of action for civil restitution for the actual and consequential damages resulting from a violation of the statutes; or (b) implicate third parties by triggering state criminal laws such as aiding and abetting or conspiracy. Finally, Part IV summarizes the author's conclusions about the extent to which the First Amendment shields journalists and newsgathering organizations from prosecution under an Ag-Gag statute. | Article | |
| Why Context Matters: Defining Service Animals Under Federal Law | Rebecca J. Huss | 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 1163 (2010) |
The Article begins with a brief history of service animals. It continues with an analysis of the proposed changes to the ADA rules and selected case law that illustrates the need for clarification in this area of the law. The Article then evaluates the way service animals are handled under the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) because of recent regulatory activity interpreting that law. The Article concludes by arguing that there are rational reasons to have an expansive definition of service animal under the ADA and, in the alternative, if there is a restrictive definition under the ADA, the broader protections under the FHA and ACAA should remain in place. |
Article | |
| Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish -- Harm, Victimhood and the Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses | Luis E. Chiesa | 78 Miss. L.J. 1 (Fall 2008) |
Part I provides a brief recount of the history of Anglo-American statutes prohibiting harm to animals. In Part II, the notions of victimhood, consent and harm are explored in order to lay the groundwork for the claims that will be put forth in the remainder of the article. Part III examines five different theories advanced to explain the interest society seeks to promote by punishing acts that are harmful to animals. Part IV explains why it is not necessarily the case, as some animal law scholars have argued, that because animal cruelty statutes allow for the infliction of harm to animals as a result of hunting, scientific activities and farming, the interest primarily sought to be protected by these laws is something other than the protection of animals. |
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