Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Posnien v. Rogers | 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975) |
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence in the diagnosis and the treatment of plaintiff's brood mare, which resulted in the mare's infertility. Plaintiff was required to show that Dr. Rogers did not exercise the care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled veterinarians doing the same type of work in the community, and that the failure to exercise the required skill and care was the cause of the injury. Experts testified at trial that the care exercised by Dr. Rogers met the standard of care of veterinarians practicing in the area, and had they been treating the mare, the treatment would not have differed substantially from that of Dr. Rogers. The Supreme Court held that the record is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that the care of Dr. Rogers did not meet the standard of care of other practitioners practicing in the community. |
Case | |
| Powell v. Adlerhorst Int'l, Inc. | 2015 WL 6756126 (D. Or. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished) | The plaintiff in this case brought suit after suffering a dog bite from a service dog that was purchased from defendant. The defendant was a corporation that purchased dogs from Europe and then sold them to police agencies to be used as service dogs. Plaintiff (a police officer with the Sherwood Police Department) filed suit asserting both a strict product liability and negligence claim for injuries sustained from dog bites. At issue here is whether the dog was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time the defendant sold it to the City of Sherwood. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the court denied the motion. The court ultimately held that a reasonable jury could find that defendant should have known about the dog’s aggressive behavior before selling it to plaintiff, thus making it liable for damages. | Case | |
| Powell v. Johnson | 855 F. Supp. 2d 871, 877 (D. Minn. 2012) | Blu, a pit bull was shot in the head and killed after Officer Johnson entered the pit bull’s yard. The Plaintiffs, who were owners of Blu, filed a complaint asserting a: violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by shooting and killing Blu (Count I); violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights due to the City's failure to adequately hire, train, and supervise Johnson (Count II); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III); negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Johnson (Count IV); vicarious liability (Count V); and trespass and conversion (Count VI). The Defendants, Officer Johnson and the City of Minneapolis, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The court held that the Motion would be granted in part. The court reasoned that Blu was property, rather than a person, for Fourth Amendment purposes and the officer's shooting and killing of Blu constituted a “seizure.” However, the court concluded that Officer Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. The court reasoned that it was not unreasonable for the Officer to perceive a threat to his safety when the large pit bull jogged up behind him. The court also held that The Motion for summary judgment was granted as to the remaining claims because the evidence in the record, failed to establish a constitutional violation by Defendants. | Case | |
| Powell v. Johnson | 855 F.Supp.2d 871 (D. Minn. 2012) | While searching for a person involved in a shooting, a police officer happened upon the plaintiff’s home and noticed the garage door and opening to the backyard were open. Upon finding nothing suspicious, he began to leave the area. The plaintiff’s dog caught sight of the officer and began walking toward him, eventually running towards him, the officer claimed. The officer then pulled out his service revolver and fired one shot, killing the dog instantly. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring and supervision on the part of the officer and municipality. The court held that the plaintiff did not meet his burden in defeating the officer’s qualified immunity, as the officer’s account of the incident constituted a reasonable seizure. | Case | |
| PR - Domestic Violence - § 1678 Protection orders | PR ST T. 5 § 1678 |
This Puerto Rico law provides that, in all cases in which a person is accused of domestic violence or child abuse, the court shall, by petition of party, issue a protection order for the petitioner so that he/she be the sole custodian of the animal. The court shall order the accused to keep far away from the animal and prohibit contact of any kind. Violation is a fourth-degree felony. |
Statute | |
| PR - Ordinances - Municipal regulation of domestic animals | PR ST T. 24 § 651 | 24 L.P.R.A. § 651 |
This Puerto Rico statute confers authority to the municipal councils of Puerto Rico to regulate by ordinance, the running at large of domestic animals, destruction and impounding of such animals, as well as the regulation of muzzling and licensing of dogs. In addition, the councils are given authority to enact all needful ordinances to protect the public health as affected by the running at large of domestic animals. |
Statute |
| PR - Ordinances - § 4054 Municipal faculties in general | PR ST T. 21 § 4054 | 21 L.P.R.A. § 4054 |
This Puerto Rico statute provides that each municipality has the general power to order, regulate and resolve whatever is necessary and convenient to attend to its local needs and for its greater prosperity and development. Among these powers is the power to regulate whatever concerns stray domestic animals, including euthanasia and disposal in interest of the public health, establishing rules and conditions under which they can be rescued by their owners, the muzzling and licensing of dogs, and the adoption and implementation of such precautionary measures that are necessary or convenient to protect the public health as it may be affected by domestic stray animals. |
Statute |
| Prasad v. Wepruk | 2004CarswellBC946 | 2004 BCSC 578 |
Plaintiff Prasad, an elderly newpaper-deliverer, was attacked in the street by defendant owner Wepruk's usually chained guard-dog, which escaped due to a rusted chain. The court found the defendant strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter's subjective test: he knew the dog was aggressive, but kept it anyway and it harmed Prasad. He was also liable under the objective test for negligence, for not taking reasonable precautions to ensure the dog's chain was in good repair, in order to prevent foreseeable harm to others. damages of $35,000 were awarded for Prasad's injuries and lost future earnings. |
Case |
| Pratt v. Pratt | 1988 WL 120251 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1998) (unpublished opinion). |
A childless, divorcing couple sought divorce; trial court awarded couple's registered dogs to wife based on the best interest standard used for determination of custody of children. Appellate court held the best interest statute inapplicable to dogs, but stated that the trial court can award dogs based on evidence of mistreatment of the dogs by one of the parties. Because the trial court's determination had a reasonable basis in fact, the appellate court affirmed its decision. |
Case | |
| Pray v. Whiteskunk | 801 N.W.2d 451 (S.D., 2011) | 2011 S.D. 43; 2011 WL 3207821 (S.D.) |
In this South Dakota case, the plaintiff suffered a broken knee after Defendant's Rottweiler brook loose from its owner and ran toward the street, causing plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the dog owner and the city, specifically alleging the the city knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. On appeal of the granting of summary judgment for the city, this court found that plaintiff failed to establish that the action taken by the city caused the harm to Pray or exposed her to greater risks, thereby leaving her in a worse position than she was in before the city took action. While this Court found that the city had actual knowledge of the dog's dangerousness, this alone is insufficient. |
Case |