United States
Displaying 4661 - 4670 of 4783
Title |
Summary |
|---|---|
| WI - Slaughter - 95.80. Humane slaughtering | Under this Wisconsin statute, livestock may only be slaughtered by humane methods, such that they are rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or shot of a mechanical instrument or by electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut. Religious ritual slaughter practices whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument, are also considered to be “humane.” |
| WI - Trust - 701.0408 Trust care for an animal | This statute represents Wisconsin's pet trust law. The former law was not a specific pet trust law, but the new law is. The new provisions allows for a trust to be created for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. |
| WI - Vehicle - 895.484. Civil liability exemption; entering a vehicle to render assistance | This Wisconsin law enacted in 2015 makes a person immune from civil liability for property damage or injury resulting from his or her forcible entry into a vehicle to rescue an animal or person. Immunity is provided only if certain conditions were met. The person must have a "good faith belief" that the person or domestic animal was in imminent danger of suffering bodily harm and used no more force than necessary to remove the person or animal. That person must have first determined the vehicle was locked and forcible entry was necessary, and that person must have dialed 911 or other emergency services prior to this action. In addition, the person must have waited with the person or animal until emergency services arrived or left information on the vehicle's windshield as described in the law. |
| WI - Veterinary - Chapter 89. Veterinary Examining Board | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. |
| WI - Wildlife - Subchapter XII. Wildlife Damage | Under these Wisconsin statutes, wild animals that are causing damage or a nuisance may be removed. These statutes also establish a wildlife damage abatement program and venison processing and donation program. Wildlife control measures in urban communities and management of double-crested cormorants are also provided. |
| Wiederhold v. Derench | A dog owner had purchased a Newfoundland dog from a breeder and signed a contract that stated she would return the dog to the breeder if she could no longer care for it. After the dog attacked another dog, the owner had the obligation to return the dog to the breeder. A third party, the owner’s friend attempted to help the owner and contacted the breeder to notify her about the owner's intention to return the dog. The breeder was busy on that particular day. She was with another dog delivering another litter of puppies and could not come to pick up the owner's dog. The owner then sold the dog to the defendant, a dog breeder and co-chair of the Newfoundland Club of New England Rescue. The rescue worker had prepared a bill of sale, which the owner signed, and the rescue worker then handed the owner $100 to help with expenses. The trial court held that the transfer to the rescue worker was not a bona fide sale. The rescue worker took possession of the dog in her capacity as a member of the rescue organization and not as a bona fide buyer. The court also found that the original breeder had not given up her contract rights to the dog. The breeder was handling an emergency delivery of puppies with a different dog, which made it reasonable that she could not pick up the owner's dog that day. The defendant rescue worker knew the breeder had not relinquished her contractual ownership right to the dog and so the court held that the plaintiff was the sole owner and entitled to sole possession. |
| WILCOX v. BUTT'S DRUG STORES, Inc. |
|
| Wild Horse Observers Ass'n, Inc. v. New Mexico Livestock Bd. | This case dealt with a determination made by the New Mexico Livestock Board that a group of undomesticated, unowned, free-roaming horses (the Placitas horses) were “livestock” and “estray” rather than wild horses under the Livestock Code. The Wild Horse Observers Association filed suit against the Board, but their claim was dismissed by the District Court. The Court of Appeals held that 1) the horses were not “livestock”, as they had never been domesticated and therefore could not be “estray”; 2) the Board had a statutory duty to test and relocate wild horses captured on public land; and 3) the Plaintiffs did state a claim that was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings |
| Wild Horse Observers Ass'n, Inc. v. New Mexico Livestock Bd. | Plaintiff Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. (Association) appealed the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. The Association claimed that Defendant New Mexico Livestock Board (the Board) had unlawfully treated a group of undomesticated, unowned, free-roaming horses near Placitas, New Mexico as “livestock” and “estray,” rather than as “wild horses” under the Livestock Code. The Appeals Court concluded that “livestock” did not include undomesticated, unowned animals, including undomesticated and unowned horses; therefore, undomesticated, unowned horses could not be “estray.” The court also concluded that the Board had to DNA test and relocate the Placitas horses, and that the Association pleaded sufficient facts in its complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss. |
| Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. v. New Mexico Livestock Board | This appeal examines the protection afforded to New Mexico's free-roaming horses under NMSA 1978, Section 77-18-5 (2007). The New Mexico Livestock Board (the Board) appeals from a district court order granting declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. (WHOA). WHOA brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board and others regarding the status of horses corralled by a private citizen on private property. The citizen had initially complained to the Board about the free-roaming horses on her property and was told that the Board only takes possession of horses corralled by citizens. The citizen did so and the Board took possession of the herd, where it then posted on its website that the horses would be sold at auction. WHOA filed the instant emergency action, stating that the Board exceeded its authority and unlawfully treated the subject horses as estray livestock. The group sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the Board from impounding or selling the subject horses. The district court granted WHOA's request for a TRO, thereby prohibiting the Board from taking any action with the horses. After a bench trial on the merits, the district court determined that the Board's actions to take possession and sell the subject horses were contrary to the Board's statutory authority, enjoined the Board from “further unlawful possession and selling” of the subject horses, and awarded WHOA costs and attorney fees. The Board appeals here, arguing that the horses were captured on private, rather than public land, and the district court erred in concluding them to be “wild horses." The Board also contends that the district court made findings of fact that are unsupported by substantial evidence, issued a vague injunction, erred in awarding attorney fees, and erred in refusing to impose an injunction bond upon WHOA. This court found no error with the lower court concluding that the horses should be protected as “wild horses” because the definition of that term does not depend on whether, at the moment of their capture, the horses were on land that is private, but instead depends on whether the horses generally roam public land. Therefore, the horses were not estrays. As to whether the Board should have conducted its statutory duties with respect to horses including history and DNA testing, this court held that duty does not extend testing of a wild horse if it is captured on private land. Thus, the district court erred in determining that the Board failed to follow its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5(B). In fact, the Board has no authority to test the conformation, history, and DNA of such horses found on private land any more than it does to take possession of and remove the wild horses from those lands. The court also found the injunction was not vague or impracticable and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order an injunction bond. Ultimately, this court affirmed the district court's order to the extent that it correctly determined that the subject horses are wild horse rather than estray, but reversed the district court's determination that the Board should have acted according to its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and further consideration of attorney fees. |