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Titlesort descending Summary
Smith v. State Defendant Jonas Smith was convicted of aggravated assault and appealed. He argued that the trial court (1) erred by denying his motion to suppress his warrantless arrest; (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial after the Plaintiff referenced the Defendant’s previous incarceration; and (3) abused its discretion by allowing a child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog. The Court of Appeal of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.)., held that: 1. The police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an act of family violence, which justified his warrantless arrest; 2. any prejudice resulting from the Plaintiff’s reference to Defendant's prior incarceration was cured by prompt jury instruction to disregard reference; 3. allowing the child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was not likely to prejudice the jury in evaluating the child's testimony; and 4.any error in allowing the witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was harmless. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant did not present any argument during the trial about the jury being prejudiced by the presence of the service dog. Therefore, there was nothing present for review at the appellate level. Also, the Defendant did not identify any harm from the use of a service dog. The Defendant’s conviction was affirmed.
Smith v. Wisconsin Mut. Ins. Co. This case concerns the measure of damages for injury to companion animals in Wisconsin. It arises from the incident between the plaintiff’s 11-year-old dog and the neighbor's dog. Plaintiff’s dog sustained severe injuries that resulted in veterinary bills and related expenses for the amount of $12,235. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to recover all veterinary and related expenses. Additionally, the plaintiffs contended that their damages were entitled to doubling under § 174.02(1)(b) as there were records that showed that the dog’s owner had knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities. Defendants’ insurer sought declaratory ruling arguing that under Wisconsin law, plaintiffs’ maximum recovery was the lesser amount between the dog's "cost of repair" and the dog's pre-injury fair market value, as it was the measure for personal property damage. The circuit court limited damages to $2,695, which was the amount conceded by the parties to be the replacement cost of plaintiff’s dog. In addition, that amount was doubled pursuant to § 174.02(1)(b). The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and declined to extend Wisconsin's "keepsakes" rule to pets to provide different damages for pets that only have value to the owner. The court found there were “significant differences between an unrepairable and lost forever keepsake and an injured but "repairable" pet.” The court was also not persuaded by other states' precedent about allowing or denying veterinary treatment as part of damage awards and decided to continue to treat dogs the same as other personal property. On the additional expenses allegations, the court found them to be “expenses incurred by the Smiths to facilitate "repairing" their dog” that were subject to property damage limitations.
Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller


The Court struck down an Iowa law that banned certain producers from owning or controlling livestock in Iowa based on the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania


This Pennsylvania case involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which defendant SPCA, was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff Snead, who was awarded damages in the amount of $154,926.37, including $100,000 in punitive damages. The facts stemmed from a seizure several dogs at a seemingly abandoned property owned by Snead where Snead was arrested on dog fighting charges, which were then dropped the next day. However, Snead was not aware that the charges were dropped and that the dogs were therefore available to be reclaimed. The dogs were ultimately euthanized

after

Snead went to reclaim them. On appeal, this court first held that the SPCA does not operate as a branch of the Commonwealth and therefore, does not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity or protection under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The court held that there was sufficient evidence presented for Snead's Sec. 1983 to go to the jury that found the SPCA has inadequate procedures/policies in place to safeguard Snead's property interest in the dogs. As to damages, the court found the there was no evidence to impute to the SPCA evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of Snead sufficient for an award of punitive damages.  
Snyder v. Bio-Lab, Inc.


Plaintiffs sought damages after having to slaughter dairy cows that were injured by defendant’s defective machine. The Court held that plaintiffs could recover 1) the fair market value less salvage value of the cows, 2) the loss of profit during the period after the incident when cows of comparable quality became available on the market, and 3) the calculable loss in milk production caused by the incident's negative impact on the milk production level of the remaining cows.
Soldal v. County of Cook


Fourth Amendment protections apply regardless of the specific reasons for why a seizure may have occurred.
SOME TENANTS HAVE TAILS: WHEN HOUSING PROVIDERS MUST PERMIT ANIMALS TO RESIDE IN “NO-PET” PROPERTIES
SOME THOUGHTS ON ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION
Soucek v. Banham


Dog owner brought action for damages against city and police officers that shot his dog, seeking punitive damages.  The court observed that under Minnesota law dogs are personal property, and thus, the proper measure of compensatory damages for destroying an animal is the fair market value of the animal.  The court further held Soucek cannot recover punitive damages for the loss of his pet because he only suffered property damage. Compensatory damages for the loss of Soucek's pet are limited to the fair market value of the animal. 
Southall v. Gabel


This case resulted from the alleged negligent transport of a horse that resulted in a drastic change in the horse's temperament (to a "killer horse"), which ultimately led to its destruction by its owner.  Before trial, defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition on the ground that the action was barred under R.C. s 2305.11, the act being 'malpractice' and therefore required to be brought within one year after the termination of treatment.  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's decision overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's petition was correct, 'the petitioner is based on negligence for the transporting rather than malpractice.'  Further, the Court held that until the Supreme Court speaks, veterinarians are not included in the definition of malpractice (reversed and remanded -

See

,

293 N.E.2d 891

(Ohio, Mun.,1972).

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