Anti-Cruelty: Related Cases
| Case name |
Citation |
Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Erie County Society ex rel. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Hoskins | 91 A.D.3d 1354 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2012) |
In this action, plaintiff animal society appeals from an order to return 40 horses to defendant after they were seized pursuant to a warrant. The issue of whether the Court has the authority to order return of animals to the original owner was raised for the first time on appeal. Despite the procedural impropriety, the Court found plaintiff's contention without merit. The Court held that the return of the horses is based on principles of due process, not statutory authority. |
| Price v. State | 911 N.E.2d 716 (Ind.App.,2009) |
In this Indiana case, appellant-defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor Cruelty to an Animal for beating his 8 month-old dog with a belt. Price contended that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the statute's exemption of “reasonable” training and discipline can be interpreted to have different meanings. The court held that a person of ordinary intelligence would also know that these actions are not “reasonable” acts of discipline or training. Affirmed. |
| Celinski v. State | 911 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App. 1995). |
Criminal conviction of defendant who tortured cats by poisoning them and burning them in microwave oven. Conviction was sustained by circumstantial evidence of cruelty and torture. |
| Pitts v. State | 918 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App. 1995). |
Right of appeal is only available for orders that the animal be sold at public auction. The statutory language does not extend this right to seizure orders. |
| People v. Hock | 919 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct., 2011) |
Defendant was denied his motion to set aside convictions under New York animal cruelty statute. The Criminal Court, City of New York, held that the 90 day period for prosecuting a Class A misdemeanor had not been exceeded. It also held that the jury was properly instructed on the criminal statute that made it a misdemeanor to not provide an animal with a sufficient supply of good and wholesome air, food, shelter, or water. It would be contrary to the purpose of the law and not promote justice to require that all four necessities be withheld for a conviction. |
| Savage v. Prator | 921 So.2d 51 (La. 2006) |
After being informed by the Caddo Sheriff's Office that a 1987 Parish ordinance prohibiting cockfighting would be enforced, two organizations, who had held cockfighting tournaments since the late 1990s and the early 2000s, filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. After the trial court granted the organizations' request for a preliminary injunction, the Parish commission appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon granting writ of certiorari and relying on the home rule charter, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that local governments may authorize or prohibit the conduct of cockfighting tournaments within municipal boundaries. The case was therefore reversed and remanded to the district court with the injunction being vacated.
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| Savage v. Prator | 921 So.2d 51 (La., 2006) |
Two Louisiana "game clubs" filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against parish commission and parish sheriff's office after being informed by the sheriff that an existing parish ordinance prohibiting cockfighting would be enforced. The clubs contended that the ordinance was violative of the police power reserved explicitly to the state (the state anti-cruelty provision is silent with regard to cockfighting). The First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo granted the clubs' request for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the injunction and remanded the matter, finding that the parish ordinance prohibiting cockfighting did not violate general law or infringe upon State's police powers in violation of Constitution. |
| Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania | 929 A.2d 1169 (Pa.Super., 2007) |
This Pennsylvania case involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which defendant SPCA, was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff Snead, who was awarded damages in the amount of $154,926.37, including $100,000 in punitive damages. The facts stemmed from a seizure several dogs at a seemingly abandoned property owned by Snead where Snead was arrested on dog fighting charges, which were then dropped the next day. However, Snead was not aware that the charges were dropped and that the dogs were therefore available to be reclaimed. The dogs were ultimately euthanized after Snead went to reclaim them. On appeal, this court first held that the SPCA does not operate as a branch of the Commonwealth and therefore, does not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity or protection under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The court held that there was sufficient evidence presented for Snead's Sec. 1983 to go to the jury that found the SPCA has inadequate procedures/policies in place to safeguard Snead's property interest in the dogs. As to damages, the court found the there was no evidence to impute to the SPCA evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of Snead sufficient for an award of punitive damages. |
| Bartlett v. State | 929 So.2d 1125, (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,2006) |
In this Florida case, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for felony cruelty to animals after the defendant shot an opossum "countless" times with a BB gun after the animal had left defendant's home. As a result, the animal had to be euthanized. The court wrote separately to observe that the felony cruelty section (828.12) as written creates a potential tension between conduct criminalized by the statute and the lawful pursuit of hunting. The commission of an act that causes a "cruel death" in Section 828.12 applies to even the unintended consequence of a lawful act like hunting. |
| State v. Peck | 93 A.3d 256 (Me. 2014) | Defendant appealed a judgment entered in the District Court after a bench trial found she committed the civil violation of cruelty to animals. Defendant contended that the court abused its discretion in quashing a subpoena that would have compelled one of her witnesses to testify; that the cruelty-to-animals statute is unconstitutionally vague; and that the record contains insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of cruelty to animals and to support the court's restitution order. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, however, disagreed and affirmed the lower court's judgment. |
| Porter v. DiBlasio | 93 F.3d 301 (Wis.,1996) |
Nine horses were seized by a humane society due to neglect of a care taker without giving the owner, who lived in another state, notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The owner filed a section 1983 suit against the humane society, the county, a humane officer and the district attorney that alleged violations of substantive and procedural due process, conspiracy, and conversion. The district court dismissed the claims for failure to state a viable claim. On appeal, the court found that the owner had two viable due process claims, but upheld the dismissal for the others. |
| Granger v. Folk | 931 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App. 1996). |
The State allows for two methods of protecting animals from cruelty: through criminal prosecution under the Penal Code or through civil remedy under the Health & Safety Code. |
| Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue | 940 F.3d 387 (7th Cir., 2019) | The Plaintiff, Jamie and Sandra Swartz, acquired several horses, goats, and a donkey to keep on their farm in Indiana. In April of 2013, the county’s animal control officer, Randy Lee, called a veterinarian to help evaluate a thin horse that had been observed on the Swartzes’ property. Lee and the veterinarian visited the Swartzes’ on multiple occasions. The veterinarian became worried on its final visit that the Swartzes’ were not properly caring for the animals. Lee used the veterinarian’s Animal Case Welfare Reports to support a finding of probable cause to seize the animals. Subsequently, the Superior Court of Indiana entered an order to seize the animals. On June 20, 2014, the state of Indiana filed three counts of animal cruelty charges against the Swartzes. However, the state deferred prosecuting the Swartzes due to a pretrial diversion agreement. The Swartzes filed this federal lawsuit alleging that the defendants acted in concert to cause their livestock to be seized without probable cause and distributed the animals to a sanctuary and equine rescue based on false information contrary to the 4th and 14th amendments. The district court dismissed the Swartzes' claims to which, they appealed. The Court of Appeals focused on whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Swartzes’ claims. The Court applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by those who lose in state court challenging state court judgments. Due to the fact that the Swartzes’ alleged injury was directly caused by the state court’s orders, Rooker-Feldman barred federal review. The Swartzes also must have had a reasonable opportunity to litigate their claims in state court for the bar to apply. The Court, after reviewing the record, showed that the Swartzes had multiple opportunities to litigate whether the animals should have been seized, thus Rooker-Feldman applied. The case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine at the outset. The Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. |
| People v. Curtis | 944 N.E.2d 806 (Ill.App. 2 Dist., 2011) |
Defendant owned five cats and housed 82 feral cats in her home. One of her pet cats developed a respiratory infection and had to be euthanized as a result of unsanitary conditions. Defendant was convicted of violating the duties of an animal owner, and she appealed. The Appellate Court held that the statute requiring animal owners to provide humane care and treatment contained sufficiently definite standards for unbiased application, and that a person of ordinary intelligence would consider defendant's conduct toward her pet cat to be inhumane. |
| Chambers v. Justice Court Precinct One | 95 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 2006) |
In this Texas case, a justice court divested an animal owner of over 100 animals and ordered that the animals be given to a nonprofit organization. The owner sought review of the forfeiture in district court. The district court subsequently dismissed appellant's suit for lack of jurisdiction. Under the Texas Code, an owner may only appeal if the justice court orders the animal to be sold at a public auction. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the statute limiting right of appeal in animal forfeiture cases precluded animal owner from appealing the justice court order. |
| Commonwealth v. Epifania | 951 N.E.2d 723 (Mass.App.Ct.,2011) |
Defendant appealed his conviction of arson for setting fire to a dwelling house, and wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person. The Appeals Court held that testimony that the cat belonged to the victim was sufficient to support a conviction of wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person. |
| People v. Land | 955 N.E.2d 538 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2011) |
In 2009, Jenell Land was found guilty by jury of aggravated cruelty to a companion animal, a Class 4 felony under Illinois’ Humane Care for Animals Act. Specifically, Land placed a towing chain around the neck of her pit bull, which caused a large, gaping hole to form in the dog’s neck (the dog was later euthanized). The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the defendant’s conviction and, in so doing, rejected each of Land’s four substantive arguments on appeal. Among the arguments raised, the appellate court found that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that the State had to prove a specific intent by Land to injure her dog did not rise to the level of "plain error." |
| Com. v. Linhares | 957 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.App.Ct., 2011) |
Defendant intentionally hit a duck with his car and was convicted of cruelty to animals. The conviction was upheld by the Appeals Court because all that must be shown is that the defendant intentionally and knowingly did acts which were plainly of a nature to inflict unnecessary pain. Specific intent to cause harm is not required to support a conviction of cruelty to animals. |
| People v. Robards | 97 N.E.3d 600 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 12, 2018) | This case is an appeal from an animal cruelty conviction against defendant Ms. Regina Robards. She seeks appeal on the grounds that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Robards was charged with aggravated animal cruelty when her two dogs, Walker and Sparky, were discovered in her previous home emaciated, dehydrated, and dead. She had moved out of the home and into Ms. Joachim’s home in July 2014, telling Joachim that she was arranging for the dogs to be taken care of. However, when Joachim went over to the prior home in November 2014, she discovered Walker’s emaciated body on the living room floor. She called the police, who discovered Sparky’s body in a garbage bag in the bedroom. Robards’ conviction required that it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally committed an act that caused serious injury or death to her two dogs, and failing to seek adequate medical care for them. On appeal, Robards concedes that the dogs both died from dehydration and starvation, and that she was the only person responsible for the dogs’ care. However, she argues that for her conviction to stand, the prosecutor must prove that she intended to cause serious injury or death to the dogs. The court disagrees, stating that for conviction only the act need be intentional, and that the act caused the death or serious injury of an animal. Notably, the court observed that "defendant is very fortunate to have only received a sentence of 12 months' probation for these heinous crimes," and criticized the circuit court for its "unjustly and inexplicably lenient" sentence simply because defendant only caused harm to an animal and not a human being. |
| Com. v. Kneller | 971 A.2d 495 (Pa.Super.,2009) | Defendant appealed a conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals after Defendant provided a gun and instructed her boyfriend to shoot and kill their dog after the dog allegedly bit Defendant’s child. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction, finding the relevant animal cruelty statute to be ambiguous, thus requiring the reversal under the rule of lenity. Concurring and dissenting opinions were filed, in which both agreed that the statute is unambiguous as to whether a dog owner may destroy his or her dog by use of a firearm when that dog has attacked another person, but disagreed as to whether sufficient evidence was offered to show that the dog in fact attacked another person. (See Supreme Court order - Com. v. Kneller, 978 A.2d 716, 2009 WL 5154265 (Pa.,2009)). |
| Duncan v. State | 975 N.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. Ind. 2012) |
A complaint regarding the welfare of horses led to the defendant being convicted of 6 charges of animal cruelty, all of which were class A misdemeanors. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, that Indiana’s animal cruelty law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was no sufficient evidence to overcome a defense of necessity. The appeals court agreed that the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial and therefore reversed and remanded the case on that issue; however, the appeals court disagreed with the defendant on the other issues. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
| State v. Cleve | 980 P.2d 23 (N.M. 1999) |
Defendant was convicted of two counts of cruelty to animals, two counts of unlawful hunting, and negligent use of firearm. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "any animal," within meaning of animal cruelty statute, applied only to domesticated animals and wild animals previously reduced to captivity, and thus, the animal cruelty statute did not apply to defendant's conduct in snaring two deer. The court also held that even if the Legislature had intended to protect wild animals in Section 30-18-1, New Mexico's laws governing hunting and fishing preempt the application of Section 30-18-1 to the taking of deer by Cleve in this case. |
| Com. v. Kneller | 987 A.2d 716 (Pa., 2009) |
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took up this appeal involving the defendant's criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals after the defendant provided a gun and instructed her boyfriend to shoot and kill their dog after the dog allegedly bit the defendant’s child. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the Superior Court (--- A.2d ----, 2009 WL 215322) in accordance with the dissenting opinion of the Superior Court's order. The Court further observed that the facts revealed no immediate need to kill the dog and that there was "unquestionably malicious beating of the dog" prior to it being shot. |
| Mississippi State University v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | 992 So.2d 595 (Miss., 2008) |
PETA, an animal rights group, sought disclosure of records pursuant to the Public Records Act from Mississippi State University regarding the IAMS's company care of animals used in research, which was conducted at university. After the lower court granted the request, the University and company appealed. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that substantive portions of company's Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee protocol forms were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act. The court found that PETA failed to rebut the evidence presented by MSU and Iams that the data and information requested in the subject records constituted trade secrets and/or confidential commercial and financial information of a proprietary nature developed by MSU under contract with Iams. Therefore, the data and information requested by PETA is exempted from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act. |
| Commonwealth v. Kneller | 999 A.2d 608 (Pa., 2010) |
Kneller appealed from a conviction of criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals after she gave an acquaintance a gun and asked him to shoot a dog. The Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that “The Animal Destruction Method Authorization Law” (ADMA) and the “Dog Law” are not ambiguous. In addition, the deadly weapon enhancement applies to an owner who is convicted of cruelty to animals and used a firearm to kill it. |
| Causa No. 09209202301263 - Ecuador | Causa No. 09209202301263, Unidad Judicial de Familia, Mujer, Niñez y Adolescencia Norte con Sede en el Cantón Guayaquil, Provincia del Guayas (2023) | Plaintiffs filed a Habeas Corpus claiming the violation of the rights to freedom, life, integrity, the free development of animal behavior, and the right to health of all animals housed at Narayana Aventura Park. Plaintiffs argued that the animals were in a malnourished and in inadequate captivity conditions. The Narayana Aventura Park sells itself as a rescue center and keeps various exotic, endemic, and domestic animals. They denied any violations to the rights of the animals, stating that the animals were provided the minimum welfare conditions required by the law. In addition, they contended that the park was acting in accordance to the law and had all the permits required by the authorities to keep the animals. After thorough examination of the case and careful consideration of applicable laws and jurisprudence, the judge granted the habeas corpus. This ruling acknowledges the significant impact on the rights of exotic, endemic, and even the farm animals under the park's care. Grounded in Article 89 of the Constitution of Ecuador, as well as jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Judgment No. 253-20-JH/22, the judge arrived at this conclusion. However, attending to the recommendations issued by the experts, the court decided to let the animals stay at the park, instructing the enhancement of the enclosure and diets of all animals within a three-month period after the judgment. This decision was appealed by the defendant, and it is currently under review. |
| Incidente de apelación en autos G. B., R. s/inf. ley 14346 | Causa Nº 17001-06-00/13 | This is an appeal of a decision in first instance where the lower court gave the custody of 68 dogs to the Center for Prevention of Animal Cruelty. The 68 dogs were found in extremely poor conditions, sick, malnourished, dehydrated under the custody of the Defendant. Various dogs had dermatitis, conjunctivitis, otitis, sparse hair and boils, lacerations, pyoderma and ulcers. The officers that executed the search also found the decomposing body of a dead dog inside the premises. The lower court determined the defendant had mental disabilities, which did not allow her to comprehend the scope of her acts, for which she was not found guilty of animal cruelty. However, the court determined that she was not suited to care for the dogs. The Defendant appealed the decision arguing that the authorities were not entitled to seize the animals. |
| Bandeira and Brannigan v. RSPCA | CO 2066/99 |
Where a person has sent a dog into the earth of a fox or sett of a badger with the result that a confrontation took place between the dog and a wild animal, and the dog experienced suffering, it will be open to the tribunal of fact to find that the dog has been caused unnecessary suffering and that an offence has been committed under section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911. |
| R. v. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Tesco Stores Ltd. | CO/467/93 |
Although a local authority may not adopt a policy of not enforcing certain laws or not enforcing them against certain types of parties, it may nevertheless make rational choices with respect to the use of its enforcement powers in order to deploy its limited resources in the most efficient and effective manner. |
| Commonwealth v. Thorton | Commonwaelth v. Thorton, 113 Mass 457 (1873) |
The defendant was convicted of causing his dog to be bitten, mangled and cruelly tortured by another dog. The defendant appealled and the Supreme Court affirmed. |
| Commonwealth v. Brown | Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Pa. Super. 519 (1917). |
The defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals for the use of acid on some horses' feet. The defendant appealed the descision because the lower court had found the Commonwealth's circumstantial evidence to be enough to submit the question of quilt to the jury. The Superior Court found that some of the evidence was improperly admitted by the lower court. Thus, the Superior Court reversed the judgement. |
| Commonwealth v. Turner | Commonwealth v. Turner, 14 N.E. 130 (Mass. 1887). |
Defendant released a fox from his possession and a number of other people then released various dogs, which pursued and killed the fox. Defendant was charged and brought to trial. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that there was no such crime, which the trial court denied. Defendant also moved to dismiss for lack of evidence, which the trial court also denied. Defendant was convicted and he appealed. The court found that there was a statutory basis for the charge and that the word "animal" in Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 207, § 53 encompassed wild animals in the custody of a man. The court denied the exceptions brought by defendant and affirmed the order of the trial court, which convicted defendant of willfully permitting a fox to be subjected to unnecessary suffering. |
| Resolution N° 07, 2023, Caso Kira - Peru | CUARTO JUZGADO PENAL UNIPERSONAL TRANSITORIO SEDE CARABAYLLO, Resolucion No. 7, 2023 | The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant, arguing the defendant committed a crime against his patrimony and cruel acts against animals under the criminal code. The plaintiff attended a social gathering with her children and left their two dogs, Kira and Logan, playing outside. The plaintiff returned to their home to find that their neighbor, the defendant, had committed an act of bestiality against Kira. The court discussed several constitutional questions and theories of punishment. It weighed the factors of what the defendant had done to Kira with his lack of prior record and low chance of recidivism. The court decided that the defendant was to serve 17 months of incarceration and was required to pay civil fines for the suffering of both the plaintiff and Kira. Rooted in the issue of animal welfare, too, was its holding in prohibiting the defendant from “keeping” animals to further reduce the risk of recidivism. Ultimately, the court based its decisions on grounds of animal welfare and condemnation of cruelty towards animals. |
| Davis v. A.S.P.C.A. | Davis v. A.S.P.C.A. 75 N.Y. 362 (1873). |
Plaintiff hog slaughterers challenged the trial court (New York) judgment in favor of defendants, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and director, in an action seeking to enjoin defendants from arresting them for cruelty to animals pursuant to 1867 N.Y. Laws 375. The hog slaughterers asserted that they were innocent of the alleged statutory violations. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of defendants, denying the request of the hog slaughterers for an injunction to prevent defendants from arresting them for violating a statute prohibiting cruelty to animals. |
| R (on the application of Patterson) v. RSPCA | EWHC 4531 | The defendants had been convicted of a number of counts of animal cruelty in 2011, to include unnecessary suffering pursuant to Section 4, and participation in a blood sport under Section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Mr Patterson was found to have breached an attached disqualification order under Section 34 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, on which this appeal is based. The order covered all types of animals for a period of five years. This prohibited him from owning, keeping, participating in the keeping of, or being a party to an arrangement under which he would be entitled to control or influence the way in which animals are kept. A number of animals were found and seized at the home. The appeal was allowed on the basis that Mr Patterson was not entitled to control or influence the way in which the animals were kept by his wife on the facts. |
| Decision No. 11, 2024 - Zorro Run Run (Peru) | EXPEDIENTE : 04921-2021-0-1801-JR-DC-03 | In this case, the city of Lima was keeping a wild Andean fox, Run Run, in a zoo, after he had been seen around neighborhoods in the area. Biological welfare groups, as well as civilians, were upset to hear about Run Run’s poor treatment and filed a suit against the city for his release. The court discussed ideas of one's duty to respect nature, national character and biodiversity, and natural preservation. In this landmark decision, Peru granted Run Run his autonomous rights. |
| C., M. M. M. s/ Denuncia Maltrato Animal; seguidos contra E. P. S., D.N.I. N° X- Causa Tita | Fallo 481/2021 | This court decision has two important aspects, where the judge recognizes families as multispecies, and non-human animals as sentient beings and subjects of rights. The facts of this case arose from a fatal encounter between the police officer and "Tita," a Pitbull-mix family dog, in March 2020 in the Province of Chubut in Argentina. "Tita" attacked an on-duty police officer, and, when Tita was walking away, the officer shot her in front of her family. The injury was so severe that Tita had to ultimately be put down. The judge, in this case, found that Tita was a non-human person and a daughter to her human family, as she and other companion animals had adapted so well to the family life, that it had turned the family into a multispecies one. Therefore, the loss of Tita was an irreparable one. The judge further stated that in today's world animals are not "things," they are sentient beings and they have the right that their life is respected. The holding of the court was also based on the case of Sandra, the orangutan, and the Universal declaration of animal rights. The police officer was sentenced to one year of suspended imprisonment, professional disqualification for two years, and to pay the attorney and court fees for the crimes of abuse of authority and damages. However, he was acquitted of the animal cruelty charges. Update: In September 2022, the Chubut's criminal chamber of the Superior Court of Justice (the highest tribunal in the province) heard the case on appeal. The court affirmed the verdict of the Trelew’s criminal chamber that set aside the guilty verdict entered against the police officer. The highest tribunal found that, at the incident, Tita was unleashed and unmuzzled. Also, she was aggressive toward the officer, barking and charging at him before he shot her. The tribunal concluded that the officer found himself in imminent danger, which justified his actions, and therefore, he was not guilty as he acted to defend himself. The tribunal found that Sandra's case and the Universal declaration of animal rights did not apply to Tita's case because there were circumstances in which it is necessary to end the life of an animal, and Sandra’s case was brought up as a habeas corpus on behalf of a hominid primate. The recognition of “subject of rights” was granted to Sandra based on the genetic similarity of her species to humans, which is 97%, as opposed to canines’ which is only 75%. It is important to note that the tribunal did not say anything in regard to the status of Tita as a member of her multispecies family. |
| Freel v. Downs | Freel v. Downs, 136 N.Y.S. 440 (1911) |
Cleveland H. Downs and Walter Smith were informed against for cruelty to animals, and they move to quash complaints. Complaint quashed against defendant Smith, and defendant Downs held to answer.
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| F. c/ Sieli Ricci, Mauricio Rafael s/ maltrato y crueldad animal | FUNDAMENTOS DE SENTENCIA Nº1927 | "Poli" was a mutt dog that was tied to the bumper of a car by the defendant and dragged at high speed for several miles. Poli sustained severe injuries as a result of being dragged by the car. After the incident, the defendant untied her and left on the road to die. The defendant was found guilty of the crime of animal cruelty, under "ley 14.346." the judge held that this law "protects animals as subjects of rights, and the defendant's conduct was not against an object or a "thing," but rather against a subject deserving of protection." The defendant was sentenced to 6 months of suspended imprisonment for the crime of "animal mistreatment and cruelty." In addition, the judge ordered the defendant to provide food weekly for the animals in A.M.P.A.R.A (The ONG that filed the police report), with the purpose of giving the defendant the opportunity to learn firsthand that “all animals in general, and dogs, in particular, are sentient beings, that have feelings, suffer, cry, and that their right to live, freedom, and integrity has to be respected…” this, with the purpose to prevent the defendant from committing animal cruelty crimes in the future. |
| Griffith v. State | Griffith v. State, 43 S.E. 251 (G.A. 1903). |
Defendant was indicted under Ga. Penal Code § 703, which prohibited one from instigating, engaging in, or doing anything furtherance of the an act or cruelty to a domestic animal. Ga. Penal Code § 705 defined cruelty as every willful act, omission or neglect, whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the law provided that a domestic animal, such as a horse, should be sheltered and cared for by his owner. The jury was authorized to find that the defendant willfully abandoned the horse by turning the horse out to the elements, and failing to feed, shelter, or care for the animal. Such conduct was "willful." The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court on the jury's conviction of defendant for cruelty to animals. |
| Grise v. State | Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 (1881). |
The Defendant was charged under the Arkansas cruelty to animal statute for the killing of a hog that had tresspass into his field. The Defendant was found guilty and appealed. The Supreme Court found that the lower court commited error by instructing the jury that all killing is needless. The Court reveresed the judgment and remanded it for further consideration. |
| Hodge v. State | Hodge v. State, 79 Tenn. 528 (1883). |
The indictment charged that the defendant unlawfully and needlessly mutilated a dog by setting a steel-trap in a bucket of slop and catching the dog by the tongue, and that great pain and torture were unlawfully and needlessly inflicted upon the dog. Defendant argued that a dog had been invading his property and destroying hens' nests for a long time. Witnesses testified that the dog had a bad character for prowling about through the neighborhood at night. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that defendant had a right to protect his premises against such invasions, and to adopt such means as were necessary for that purpose. There was no evidence that the slop used by defendant was such as was calculated or likely to lure dogs away from the premises where they belonged on to his premises or within his enclosures. If the dog was in the habit of committing the depredations, defendant had a right to set a steel-trap for the purpose of capturing him, and if, while committing the nightly depredations the dog was thus caught and mutilated, it was not needless torture or mutilation within the meaning of the Act, and the jury should have been so instructed. The indictment charged that the defendant unlawfully and needlessly mutilated a dog by setting a steel-trap in a bucket of slop and catching the dog by the tongue, and that great pain and torture were unlawfully and needlessly inflicted upon the dog. Defendant argued that a dog had been invading his property and destroying hens' nests for a long time. Witnesses testified that the dog had a bad character for prowling about through the neighborhood at night. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that defendant had a right to protect his premises against such invasions, and to adopt such means as were necessary for that purpose. There was no evidence that the slop used by defendant was such as was calculated or likely to lure dogs away from the premises where they belonged on to his premises or within his enclosures. If the dog was in the habit of committing the depredations, defendant had a right to set a steel-trap for the purpose of capturing him, and if, while committing the nightly depredations the dog was thus caught and mutilated, it was not needless torture or mutilation within the meaning of the Act, and the jury should have been so instructed. The court reversed defendant's conviction for cruelty to animals and granted a new trial. |
| Horton v. State | Horton v. State, 27 So. 468 (Ala. 1900). |
The defendant was charged under the Alabama cruelty to animal statute killing a dog. The trial court found the defendant guilty of cruelly killing the dog. The defendant appealed the descision to the Supreme Court for the determination if the killing of the dog with a rifle was cruel. The Supreme Court found that the killing of a dog without the showing of cruelty to the animal was not a punishable offence under the cruelty to animal statute. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's descision and remanded it. |
| T. , J. A. s/ infracción Ley 14.346 | Id SAIJ: FA12340061 | The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court that sentenced the Defendant to eleven months of imprisonment after finding him criminally responsible for acts of cruelty in violation of Article 1 of Ley 14.346 against a stray dog. The Defendant was found guilty of sexually abusing a dog, who he forced into his premises. The dog’s genital area was sheared and she had serious injuries, which the veterinarian concluded were clear signs of penetration. The Supreme Court referred to the Chamber of Appeals on Criminal Matters of Parana "B.J.L. s/ infracción a la Ley 14.346", of October 1, 2003, where the referred court stated that “the norms of Ley 14.346 protect animals against acts of cruelty and mistreatment, is not based on mercy, but on the legal recognition of a framework of rights for other species that must be preserved, not only from predation, but also from treatment that is incompatible with the minimum rationality." Further, "the definition of ‘person’ also includes in our pluralistic and anonymous societies a rational way of contact with animals that excludes cruel or degrading treatment." |
| Robledo, Leandro Nicolás y otros s/ resistencia o desobediencia a la autoridad | Id SAIJ: FA21370027 | Coco was a 6-year-old male howler monkey (an endangered species) that was found in the defendant's house in a neglected condition. He had bone deformities, was malnourished, and had restricted mobility as his limbs were not moving properly. His canines were extracted to keep him from injuring humans, he had no light or ventilation, and no visible access to food or water. His health was so deteriorated that the veterinarians recommended that he was not reinserted as he would not have the ability to survive in the wild. The judge, in this case, held that the defendants had taken Coco from his natural habitat without a proper permit or authorization, causing Coco unnecessary suffering. In the same line as other courts in Argentina, the judge also held that Coco was a non-human animal, subject of rights based on "Ley 14.346" which grants animals the status of victims. The judge ordered his "total and absolute freedom," ordering Coco’s relocation to a facility specializing in treatment and rehabilitation, “Proyecto Carayá.” regarding standing, the judge stated that “as animals cannot file a lawsuit by themselves and therefore, it is the duty of human beings to represent them in court when their rights are violated.” The court found in this particular case the prosecutor to be the right person to reestablish Coco’s rights. |
| Decision lPP 149744/2022-0, Lola Limon, the cougar - Argentina | IPP 149744/2022-0 | In this case, Argentine Environmental Protection Agency members found a puma cub, “Lola Limon,” tied up in the garden of the defendant’s home. It was determined that the defendant was in possession of the cub, and was prosecuted for abuse or acts of cruelty. The prosecutor argued that Lola, being in good health and well cared for, should be released back into nature. The court held that Lola’s protection and conservation are of national interest, as she is part of Argentine wildlife. Most importantly, however, is that the court held that Lola, a puma, is the subject of rights and therefore, non-human subjects are holders of rights as is necessary for their protection. Lola was granted her freedom from the defendant and released to an ecopark dedicated to ecological conservation. |
| Fallo lPP 149744/2022-0, Lola Limon, la puma - Argentina | IPP 149744/2022-0 | En este caso, miembros de la Agencia de Protección del Medio Ambiente de Argentina encontraron un cachorro de puma, “Lola Limón”, atado en el jardín de la casa del acusado. Se determinó que el acusado estaba en posesión del cachorro, y fue procesado por maltrato o actos de crueldad. El fiscal argumentó que Lola, al estar en buen estado de salud y bien cuidada, debía ser devuelta a la naturaleza. El tribunal sostuvo que la protección y conservación de Lola son de interés nacional, ya que forma parte de la fauna salvaje argentina. Lo más importante, sin embargo, es que el tribunal sostuvo que Lola, un puma, es sujeto de derechos y, por tanto, los sujetos no humanos son titulares de los derechos necesarios para su protección. A Lola se le concedió la libertad del acusado y fue liberada en un ecoparque dedicado a la conservación ecológica. |
| Judgement Rol N°7880-11, Donnkan and Káiser - Chile | Judgement Rol N°7880-11, Donnkan and Kaiser - Chile | Defendant was found guilty of animal cruelty for killing Donnkan y Kaiser, two German Shepherds that were attacking a calf belonging to defendant's neighbor. The lower court sentenced him to 21 days of imprisonment and, suspension from public office during this time, and a fine of two monthly tax units. Defendant appealed, but the appeal was rejected. However, he was granted a suspended sentence. This decision talks about the victims of animal cruelty. The court states that under the criminal code, victims are those offended by the crime. "Although it is true that it can be considered that much progress has been made in the legal protection of animals and, fundamentally, in the protection of those, it has not come to be considered that they have the quality of victims as such of a criminal act because they are not people, and continue to be controlled by human beings who, as their owner, is the one who can be considered the victim." |
| Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader | LCA 1684/96 | The petitioner, an organization for the protection of animal rights, petitioned the magistrate court to issue an injunction against the respondents, which would prohibit the show they presented, which included a battle between a man and an alligator. The magistrate court held that the battle in question constituted cruelty to animals, which was prohibited under section 2 of the Cruelty to Animals Law (Protection of Animals)-1994. The respondents appealed this order to the district court, which cancelled the injunction. The petitioners requested leave to appeal this decision to this Court. The Court held that the show in question constituted cruelty against animals, as prohibited under section 2 of the Cruelty to Animals Law (Protection of Animals)-1994. |
| Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreation Enterprises | LCa 1684?96 |
Court held that holding a fighting match between a human and an alligator was a violation of the Israel Anti-Cruelty laws. |