Hunting Issues
Displaying 91 - 100 of 362
Title |
Summary |
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| GA - Hunting - Article 6. Interference with Lawful Taking. | These Georgia laws comprise the state's hunter harassment provisions. Under the section, it is unlawful for any person to interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person by intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent such person from such lawful taking of wildlife; engage in activity tending to disturb wildlife for the purpose of intentionally preventing the lawful taking of such wildlife; or fail to obey an order of a law enforcement officer to desist from prohibited conduct. The section also allows the superior court of a county to enjoin prohibited conduct and imposes civil liability on violators. |
| GA - Hunting - § 27-3-12. Use of drugs, poisons, chemicals, smoke, gas, explosives | This Georgia law prohibits computer assisted remote hunting or providing or operating a facility that allows others to engage in computer assisted remote hunting if the wild animal or wildlife being hunted or shot is located in this state. The law also makes it unlawful to hunt hunt any wild animal, game animal, or game bird by means of drugs, poisons, chemicals, smoke, gas, explosives, recorded calls or sounds, or recorded and electronically imitated or amplified sounds or calls. Violation is a misdemeanor (high) with a fine of $1,000 to $5,000 and/or a term of imprisonment up to 12 months. |
| GA - Hunting, Canned - Article 4. Shooting Preserves. | Under the Georgia canned hunting statute, it is unlawful for any person to release pen raised game birds, unless the person has first obtained a license. It it unlawful to hunt pen raised game birds, other than ringed-neck pheasants, on a shooting preserve except between October 1 and March 31, and except from one-half hour before sunrise to sunset. It is unlawful for any person to propagate, possess, or release on any shooting preserve any bird or animal except game raised pen birds unless the person has received prior written approval from the department. Licensees must maintain a complete record of all pen raised game birds propagated, released, or taken on the preserve. |
| GA - Initiatives - Georgia Amendment 2 (right to hunt) | This Georgia constitutional amendment was presented to voters on the 2006 ballot. The measure preserves the state's tradition of hunting and fishing for the public good. Amendment 2 passed by a margin of 81% to 19%. |
| GA - Wildlife, transportation - Article 3. Transportation | This GA statute pertains to transporting wildlife. It is unlawful to transport any wildlife taken in this state without a license or permit. It is unlawful to transport wildlife by a carrier unless the person files with the carrier a written statement giving his name and address and the number of wildlife to be transported and specifying that he lawfully took the wildlife. It is unlawful to transport any wildlife (or parts) for propagation or scientific purposes without a valid scientific collecting permit. |
| HI - Hunting - Chapter 183D. Wildlife | This law reflects Hawaii's hunter harassment provision. The law states that no person shall intentionally prevent or attempt to prevent the lawful taking of game by a licensed person. Such prohibited acts include placing oneself in the line of fire; creating a visual, aural, olfactory, or physical stimulus to affect the behavior of game to be taken; affecting the condition or placement of personal property used in the taking of animals; and obstructing a person's access where the person intends to lawfully take game. Violation of this law incurs a fine of $500, thirty days imprisonment, or both. |
| HI - Wildlife - Chapter 183D. Wildlife. | These statutes comprise Hawaii's wildlife provisions. |
| Hill v. Missouri Department of Conservation |
This case concerns the regulatory authority of the Missouri Conservation Commission ("Commission"), which has authority over the control, management, restoration, conservation, and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the state. The respondents in this case operate different selective breeding and private hunting facilities that rely on captive bred deer and elk (“cervids”). Respondent Hill co-owns the Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch which is a large hunting preserve and white-tailed deer breeding operation. Respondent Broadway owns a hunting preserve which offers three-day guided hunts of a variety of animals, including elk. Broadway also has a deer breeding operation. Respondent Grace owns a breeding facility for white-tailed deer, sika, and red deer. The respondents cannot operate their hunting preserves and captive breeding facilities without permits from the Missouri Department of Conservation, which all respondents have. Cervids can be infected with a fatal neurodegenerative disease known as chronic wasting disease (CWD). The first detection of the disease in Missouri was at Heartland Wildlife Ranches, which was eventually purchased by Respondent Broadway and renamed Winter Quarters Wildlife Ranch. Due to this, the Missouri Conservation Commission set up surveillance within 25 miles of the facility. From 2010 to 2013 the Commission found 10 free-ranging deer infected with CWD out of the 14,000 tested in the surveillance zone. Over the next three years the Commission detected CWD in 14 free-ranging deer, several of which were found near closed or currently operating captive cervid facilities. Attempting to eradicate CWD, the Commission proposed a series of regulatory amendments that were to take effect in January of 2015. The amendments were aimed at the captive cervid industry. The regulations relevant to this case banned the importation of cervids, imposed more rigorous fencing requirements, and imposed more rigorous recordkeeping and veterinary inspection requirements. Respondents brought an action suing the Appellants (the Missouri Conservation Commission) to prevent these regulations from going into effect. At trial, the circuit court declared that the regulations were invalid and enjoined the Commission from enforcing them. On appeal, the Commission raised three arguments. First, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because Respondents’ cervids are “game” and “wildlife resources of the state” and, therefore, can be regulated by the Commission under the Missouri Constitution. Second, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because the Commission’s authority to promulgate the regulations does not implicate or infringe on the Respondents’ rights to farm. Third, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred by enjoining the Commission’s enforcement of the new regulations against all people in Missouri, rather than only against the Respondents. The Respondents contend that captive cervids are not wildlife or game even though they are wild by nature because they are too domesticated and, therefore, akin to livestock. The Court rejects this contention and looks at the plain meaning of the terms “game” and “wildlife” and concludes that both terms plainly include all species that are wild by nature. The terms are not ambiguous. The Court points out that it would be unreasonable to hold that the Commission has constitutional authority to regulate individual cervids that are born free and still free-roaming but take away that authority when an individual cervid is considered domesticated. “The Court will not give a law a construction which would render it unreasonable when it is susceptible to a reasonable one.” Furthermore, historically, the term “game” was broad enough to embrace all kinds of deer whether tame or wild. Captive cervids are therefore considered “game” and “wildlife” and the Commission has authority under the Missouri Constitution to regulate Respondents’ captive cervids. Respondent’ second contention is that they own the captive cervids and, therefore, the cervids are not resources of the state. The Court rejects this contention. The Commission has always regulated deer and elk owned by private parties. The Court holds that the phrase “resources of the state” unambiguously refers to resources within the entire geographical boundaries of the state. Therefore, Respondents’ cervids are considered resources of the state. The Court agrees with the Commission’s second contention that the regulations did not infringe on Respondents’ right to farm. Respondents failed to show that they are engaged in farming and ranching practices and, therefore, cannot invoke the guarantee of the Missouri Constitution. The Court did not reach the Commission’s third contention. Ultimately the Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Respondents and entered judgment in favor of Appellants on both counts. |
| Hulsizer v. Labor Day Committee, Inc. |
This Pennsylvania case involves an appeal by allowance from orders of Superior Court which affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County and imposed counsel fees and costs upon the appellants, Clayton Hulsizer and the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (PSPCA). Hulsizer, an agent of the PSPCA, filed this action in equity seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the appellee, Labor Day Committee, Inc., for their role in conducting an annual pigeon shoot. Hulsizer sought to have appellee enjoined from holding the shoot, alleging that it violates the cruelty to animals statute. At issue is whether Hulsizer has standing to bring an enforcement action in Schuylkill County. This court found no inconsistency in reading Section 501 and the HSPOEA (Humane Society Police Officer Enforcement Act) together as statutes that are in pari materia. Since the HSPOEA does not limit the jurisdiction of humane society police officers by requiring them to apply separately to the courts of common pleas in every county in Pennsylvania, the officer had standing to bring an enforcement action. The lower court's orders were reversed. |
| Humane Soc. of the U.S. v. Hodel |
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