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Sentencia C-045/19 |
This Constitutional Court's decision declares sport hunting illegal in the entire territory. In its reasoning, the court stated that sport hunting is not an exception to the duty to protect animals against cruelty, as it does not satisfy any objective or purpose compatible with the Constitution. "It is not an expression of religious freedom, nor intended for food or medical or scientific experimentation. It is not done to control the species population and is not a deeply rooted cultural manifestation."
The court further stated, "The sacrifice of an animal by humans is an extreme form of mistreatment as it eliminates its very existence and is an act of annihilation. When it is unjustified, an animal's death is cruel because it means understanding that the animal is exclusively a resource available to humans. Sport hunting, in short, is a harmful act insofar as it is aimed at capturing wild animals, either by killing, mutilating or catching them alive."
"What happens here is an example of how the content and scope of constitutional norms adapt to a changing society. It is about the concept of a Living constitution, in which its scope and content take shape with the political community's economic, social, political, and cultural changes."
Other forms of hunting, such as subsistence hunting, hunting for scientific and research purposes, and controlled hunting, continue to be allowed under the circumstances delineated by laws and regulations and with prior authorization of the natural resources managing authority. |
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Shoot First, Talk Later: Blowing Holes in Freedom of Speech |
Ms. Tresl examines the constitutionality of hunter harassment laws. When a five-step doctrinal analysis is applied to hunter harassment statutes, it is clear that the statutes are content-based and subject to the strictest of scrutiny. Because the statutes fail the strict scrutiny test, they therefore violate the American citizenry's First Amendment right to free expression.
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Sierra Club v. Clark |
The Government issued regulations which allowed for the sport hunting of the Eastern Timber Wolf (otherwise known as the gray wolf) in Minnesota, where the wolf was listed as threatened. The court held that such regulations were invalid because the Endangered Species Act, Section 4(d) required that such regulations must be "for the conservation" of the wolf, which means for the best interest of the wolf. The court found that the hunting of the wolf in this manner did not have the motive of the best interest of the wolf in mind.
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Simpson v. Department of Fish and Wildlife |
Game ranch owners sought a declaratory ruling from the Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) as to whether their animals were property of the state. DFW ruled that the state had only a regulatory interest in the game animals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State's property interest in the animals was not proprietary or possessory. The State's interest was regulatory, based on a state statute and a regulation adopted by the State Fish and Wildlife Commission. It also held that the State's interest in wild game is that of a sovereign.
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South Africa |
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South Africa - Biological Diversity - Regulations |
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State v. Cloutier |
Defendant appealed from his conviction for "driving deer" under Maine statute § 7458(10) (among other convictions), contending that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The Court rejected defendant's argument, finding the version at issue here plainly tells people that if they participate in a group hunt and they organize or plan the hunt so that several people move in a coordinated fashion toward other members of the hunting party who by predesign are standing or moving toward the first group, in a planned effort to flush out the deer, they are hunting illegally. With regard to the entrapment defense for the illegal transporting of deer, the Court found that although another hunter may have created the opportunity for Cloutier to commit the illegal transportation violation, "more is required for the entrapment defense than providing the opportunity to commit the crime."
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State v. Kuenzi |
Defendants Rory and Robby Kuenzi charged a herd of 30 to 40 deer with their snowmobiles, cruelly killing four by running them over, dragging them, and leaving one tied to a tree to die. The two men were charged with a Class I felony under Wisconsin § 951.02, which prohibits any person from “treat[ing] any animal ... in a cruel manner.” The Court concluded that the definition of “animal” included non-captive wild animals and rejected the defendants’ argument that they were engaged in “hunting.” The court reinstated the charges against the men.
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State v. Mallory |
Defendant was charged with a violation of Arkansas law when he hunted squirrels and took fish from a pond on his own land. The trial court found defendant not guilty. On appeal, the court held that the acquittal was justified. The court rejected the state's argument that it had a proprietary right to all of the wild life in the state. The court found that a property owner had a special property right to take fish and hunt wild game upon his own land, which inured to him by reason of his ownership of the soil. However, the court noted that such a right must yield to the state's ownership and title of the fish and game in the state, which it held for the purposes of regulation and preservation for the public use. The court found that those two rights did not conflict. Therefore, the court held that defendant should have had the same right to hunt and fish on his own land that resident owners of property in the state had to hunt and fish on their own lands. Since the Act differentiated between residents and nonresidents, the court held it was violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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State v. Overholt |
Defendant was convicted of several counts of second degree unlawful hunting of big game after a game agent (“agent”) followed vehicle tracks to Defendant’s home upon finding fresh cow elk gut piles, and Defendant showed the agent two cow elk carcasses hanging in Defendant’s shed.
On appeal, the
Court
of Appeals of Washington, Division 3 found that because the agent was in fresh pursuit of criminal activity and did not enter Defendant’s property with the intent to obtain consent to search in order to evade a search warrant, the agent was not obligated to issue
Ferrier
warnings, and that suppressing the seized carcasses from evidence would not have altered the outcome of the case in light of the substantial evidence obtained prior to seizing the carcasses.
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