Fish and Wildlife Dept

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Titlesort descending Summary
US - Conservation - Fish & Wildlife Conservation Act The Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, approved September 29, 1980, authorizes financial and technical assistance to the States for the development, revision, and implementation of conservation plans and programs for nongame fish and wildlife. The original Act authorized $5 million for each of Fiscal Years 1982 through 1985, for grants for development and implementation of comprehensive State nongame fish and wildlife plans and for administration of the Act. It also required the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to study potential mechanisms for funding these activities and report to Congress by March 1984.
US - Conservation - Fish & Wildlife Improvement Act of 1978 The Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act of 1978 authorizes the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to establish, conduct, and assist with national training programs for State fish and wildlife law enforcement personnel. It also authorized funding for research and development of new or improved methods to support fish and wildlife law enforcement. The law provides authority to the Secretaries to enter into law enforcement cooperative agreements with State or other Federal agencies, and authorizes the disposal of abandoned or forfeited items under the fish, wildlife, and plant jurisdictions of these Secretaries.
US - Conservation - Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 The Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. 742a-742j, not including 742 d-l; 70 Stat. 1119), establishes a comprehensive national fish, shellfish, and wildlife resources policy with emphasis on the commercial fishing industry but also with a direction to administer the Act with regard to the inherent right of every citizen and resident to fish for pleasure, enjoyment, and betterment and to maintain and increase public opportunities for recreational use of fish and wildlife resources. Among other things, it directs a program of continuing research, extension, and information services on fish and wildlife matters, both domestically and internationally.
US - Conservation - Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. 661-667e) of 1934 authorizes the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce to provide assistance to and cooperate with Federal and State agencies to protect, rear, stock, and increase the supply of game and fur-bearing animals, as well as to study the effects of domestic sewage, trade wastes, and other polluting substances on wildlife. In addition, this Act authorizes the preparation of plans to protect wildlife resources, the completion of wildlife surveys on public lands, and the acceptance by the Federal agencies of funds or lands for related purposes provided that land donations received the consent of the State in which they are located.
UT - Wolves - Chapter 29. Wolf Management Act Under the Utah Wolf Management Act, the division shall manage wolves to prevent the establishment of a viable pack in all areas of the state where the wolf is not listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act until the wolf is completely delisted under the act and removed from federal control in the entire state.
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n


The United States initiated an action seeking an interpretation of Indian fishing rights under treaties with Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest.  The Court held that the language of the treaties securing a "right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory" was not intended merely to guarantee the Indians access to usual and accustomed fishing sites and an "equal opportunity" for individual Indians, along with non-Indians, to try to catch fish, but instead secures to the Indian tribes a right to harvest a share of each run of anadromous fish that passes through tribal fishing areas.  Thus, an equitable measure of the common right to take fish should initially divide the harvestable portion of each run that passes through a "usual and accustomed" place into approximately equal treaty and nontreaty shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser amount.  The Court also held that any state-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause, and the State Game and Fisheries Departments, as parties to this litigation, may be ordered to prepare a set of rules that will implement the court's interpretation of the parties' rights even if state law withholds from them the power to do so.
WildEarth Guardians v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service In 2007, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (The Service) issued regulations implementing the CITES Program for certain Appendix II species that are in the United States which include bobcats, gray wolves, river otters, Canada lynx, and brown grizzly bears. Under the regulations, certain requirements must be met prior to the species exportation from the Unites States. The Service annually distributes export tags to approved states and tribes which are then distributed to trappers, hunters, and other individuals seeking to export furbearer species. The Service drafted an incidental take statement setting a cap on the amount of Canada lynx that are allowed to be killed or injured while bobcats are hunted. Plaintiffs brought this action claiming that the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by not adequately analyzing the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of the CITES Program and by not preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). It is further alleged that the 2001 and 2012 Biological Opinions and Incidental Take Statement referenced and incorporated in the Environmental Assessment that the Service conducted is deficient under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Center for Biological Diversity filed a separate action raising similar NEPA claims. The two actions were consolidated into one and the WildEarth case was designated as the lead case. The Service and the intervenors challenged the Plaintiff's standing to bring their claims. The District Court found that the plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims. As for the NEPA claims, the Court held that the only time an EIS is necessary is when a specific agency action alters the status quo. In this case, the Court found no identifiable agency action that would alter the status quo. The Service has administered the CITES Export Program since 1975 and it does not propose "any site-specific activity nor call for specific action directly impacting the physical environment." As for the EPA claims, in the Incidental Take Statement drafted by the Service, the authorized level of take is set as follows: "two (2) lynx may be killed and two (2) injured annually due to trapping over the 10-year term of th[e] biological opinion." The Plaintiffs argued that the use of the word "and" in the "Two and Two" standard was ambiguous. The District Court agreed and held that as currently worded, the "two and two" fails to set an adequate trigger for take because it is not clear whether one or both are necessary to exceed the trigger. The Plaintiffs also argue that the terms "annually" and "injury" are ambiguous. The District Court held that "annually" was ambiguous, however, it was not enough to independently make the statement arbitrary and capricious. The Court also held that the Service's use of the word "injury" was both overbroad and underinclusive. The Service's interpretation and use of the term is arbitrary and capricious in the context of this case. The Court found that the reporting requirements were arbitrary and capricious and that the take statement does not set forth reasonable and prudent measures to minimize the impact of incidental taking on the species. The Service provides states and tribes with a brochure with information on lynx identification and other information every time bobcat tags are issued, however the brochures are not required to be given out by states and tribes, it is merely recommended. The District Court ultimately Denied the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to their NEPA claims and granted it as to their ESA claims. The incidental take statement was remanded to the Service for further review and clarification.
Young v. California Fish and Game Commission Kele Young operated a wildlife preserve called Magic Jungle. Young received her first permit from the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in 1990 which was renewed each year thereafter. On August 8, 2013, Young filed her restricted species permit renewal application. On the application, Young stated that she was exempt from payment of the permit fee, application fee, and the inspection fee. Young’s permit was set to expire on November 9, 2013. The Department notified Young on July 14, 2014 that her renewal application was incomplete because the fee had not been paid. The Department agreed to waive the $56.14 permit fee and the $56.65 application fee, but the Department stated that she still had to pay the $227.91 inspection fee. Young was given 30 days to pay the fee. The Department ultimately denied Young’s renewal application. Young appealed to the Commission. The Commission found for the Department. Young then sought a writ of mandate to require the Department to perform its duty to determine whether justified reasons existed to grant or deny Young’s request for a waiver of certain restricted species permitting fees. The trial court denied Young’s writ and this appeal followed. Young failed to support many of her arguments by reference to the record or legal authority, therefore, the only issues that were reviewed were whether the Wildlife Agencies could refuse to waive the inspection fee without consideration of the justified reasons or whether it was in the best interests of the public to waive the fee and if reversal was warranted due to the trial court failing to issue a statement of decision. The Court of Appeals found that no statement of decision was required by the trial court because a statement of decision is only required as to issues of fact and the trial court stated that it was only deciding issues of law and that there was no dispute as to the facts. As for the inspection fee, the Court found that the regulations specifically provided for a waiver of the permit fee but did not contain any other language that would allow for a waiver of the inspection fee. The permit fee was separate from the inspection fee and nothing in the regulations entitled her to a waiver of the inspection fee nor granted the Department the authority to waive such fee. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition for writ of mandate.

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