Euthanasia

Displaying 71 - 80 of 99
Titlesort descending Summary
Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept.


These are detailed briefs on why an administrative hearing is required before a "dangerous" dog is euthanized.
Rabon v. City of Seattle (II)


This Washington case constitutes plaintiff's second appeal in extended litigation aimed at preventing the City of Seattle from destroying his dogs after a jury convicted him of the criminal charge of owning vicious dogs. The case began when Rabon filed a civil suit seeking an injunction against having his dogs destroyed.  This present appeal is from an order dismissing his constitutional claims against the City on summary judgment.  In affirming the order of summary judgment, this court held that a person's interest in keeping a vicious dog as a pet is not so great as to require a more careful procedure than is provided by Seattle's administrative and hearing process. The fact that plaintiff did not have a right to an immediate pre-deprivation hearing before the dogs were seized and impounded is justified by the strong public interest in prompt action to prevent more attacks. 
Repin v. State

In this case, Robert Repin sued Washington State University (WSU) and WSU veterinarian, Dr. Margaret Cohn-Urbach after his dog suffered complications while being euthanized. Repin argued that Cohn-Urbach was grossly negligent in performing the euthanasia which caused his dog pain and prolonged her death. Ultimately, Repin sued for breach of contract, reckless breach of contract, professional negligence, lack of informed consent, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and conversion. The trial court dismissed all of Repin’s claims and Repin appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that Repin was unable to provide sufficient evidence to establish that a reasonable jury may be able to find in his favor. As a result, the Court of Appeals dismissed Repins claims. 
Rescue Me: Legislating Cooperation Between Animal Control Authorities and Rescue Organizations


Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence that shows how important pets are to many people in the United States, the leading cause of death for dogs and cats in this country is euthanasia because of the lack of homes. Although progress has been made, conservative estimates are that between three and four million dogs and cats are euthanized each year. A successful program for implementing non-lethal strategies to control the pet population incorporates three prongs: (a) increasing adoptions, (b) increasing the number of animals sterilized and (c) increasing the number of animals retained in homes. This Article focuses on the legislative actions that should be taken immediately to implement these non-lethal strategies so that this needless euthanization can end.
RI - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws These statutes comprise Rhode Island's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, which are specified by county or town, vicious dog laws, and euthanasia provisions.
RI - Impound - § 4-13-15. Collaring of dogs--Impoundment and disposition of uncollared dogs This Rhode Island statute provides that every owner of a dog must collar his or her dog around its neck and distinctly marked with its owner's name and its registered number. Interestingly, it states that "any person" may cause any dog not so collared to be impounded in the public pound of the town or city where the dog is found. Further, if the dog is not claimed by its owner within a period of five days after the impoundment, the dog may be disposed of or destroyed. This statute also provides additional specific provisions for the towns of Glocester, West Warwick, and Exeter.
Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough


This case concerns the proper measure of damages for the death of a pet dog caused by a municipality's negligence after the Fairbanks North Star Borough Animal Shelter violated a Borough ordinance and mistakenly killed the Richardsons' pet dog, Wizzard.  The court indicated it is willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate case.  However, the court held that in this case, the Richardsons made an offer of proof regarding their emotional distress and the evidence in the record indicates that the trial judge properly made a threshold determination that the severity of the Richardsons' emotional distress did not warrant a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Roach v. Jackson County


This is an appeal of a county board and circuit court decision ordering destruction of a dog for chasing livestock.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision and held that the dog must be killed in a humane manner.
Robinson v. City of Bluefield An Animal Control Officer responded to a complaint about two dogs at defendant's residence. While investigating the complaint at defendant's residence, the animal control officer was attacked by one of defendant's dogs. The officer sought medical treatment following the incident. The City of Bluefield subsequently brought charges against defendant in its municipal court, charging her with having a dangerous animal in violation of city ordinances. The municipal court ordered the dog killed. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Mercer County affirmed the municipal court's decision. Defendant then appealed the Circuit Court's decision arguing that that Circuit Court erred in concluding that the municipal court had the authority to order the destruction of her dog. After review, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia agreed with defendant and found that under the plain language of W.Va.Code § 19–20–20, the City of Bluefield was required to set forth satisfactory proof that defendant’s dog was “vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons” before a circuit court or a magistrate, not a municipal court. The court therefore found that ordinance was void to the extent that it allowed a municipal court to order the destruction of the dog. The circuit court's order affirming the municipal court's order to kill Ms. Robinson's dog was therefore reversed. Justice Loughry dissents.
Roper v. Greenway


The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in

Greenway v. Northside Hosp., Inc

., 317 Ga.App. 371, 730 S.E.2d 742 (2012), to determine if the Court erred in finding that the deputy involved in that case was entitled to official immunity in connection with the euthanization of two dogs. The plaintiff-dog owner sued a hospital, animal control officers, and sheriffs after he was pressured to sign a release form to euthanize his dogs when he was admitted to the hospital. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling of summary judgment for Roper, the hospital, and the animal shelter operator. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of official immunity insulated Roper from liability from his decision to ask Greenway to sign the form, but not from the actual execution of that decision. In the instant action, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court noted that whether Roper's actions were malicious were beyond the scope of this writ of certiorari.


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