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Jon H. Hammer v. The American Kennel Club and Brittany Club of America, a/k/a The American Brittany Club, Inc. |
Plaintiff, the owner of a Brittany Spaniel dog with an undocked tail, sought to enter his dog into AKC competitions. However, AKC standards stated that any tail substantially over four inches long would be "severely penalized." Plaintiff contended the practice of docking a dog’s tail (which oftentimes occurs without anesthesia or even under the proper care of a veterinarian) constituted an act of cruelty in violation of Agriculture and Markets Section 353 and was an arbitrary and capricious discriminatory standard. Plaintiff sought both declaratory relief declaring that the practice is illegal and discriminatory, and injunctive relief to enjoin the practice form being applied in New York and elsewhere.
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IN - Beech Grove - Title IX: General Regulations (Chapter 90: Animals) |
In Beech Grove, Indiana, a dog's ears may only be cropped by a licensed veterinarian and only if a licensed veterinarian signs a certificate stating that the operation is necessary for the dog's health or comfort. Any person convicted of violating this provision shall have his or her permit to own a dog revoked and shall not be issued a new permit for a period of 1 year. This person shall also be fined anywhere between $10 and $200
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IL - Cruelty - Horse Mutilation Act |
This act text prevents the docking of horses' tails. Violation results in a Class A misdemeanor. |
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Hammer v. American Kennel Club |
Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a pure-bred Brittany Spaniel which has a natural, undocked tail approximately ten (10) inches long. He contends that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and that the practical effect of defendant American Kennel Club's tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from meaningfully competing shows unless he complies with what he perceives as an unfair and discriminatory practice. Specifically, his amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the complained-of standard (1) unlawfully discriminates against plaintiff by effectively precluding him from entering his dog in breed competitions, (2) is arbitrary and capricious, (3) violates Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and (4) is null and void as in derogation of law; he further seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from applying, enforcing or utilizing the standard. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to obtain any of the civil remedies he sought for the alleged violation of Agriculture and Markets Law Section 353. The Legislature's inclusion of a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions precludes the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well. The dissent disagreed with the majority's standing analysis, finding that plaintiff's object is not to privately enforce § 353, insofar as seeking to have the defendants' prosecuted for cruelty. Rather, plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the AKC's standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel deprives him of a benefit of membership on the basis of his unwillingness to violate a state law and, thus, he wanted to enjoin defendants from enforcing that standard against him. The dissent found that whether tail docking for purely cosmetic reasons violates § 353 is solely a question of law and entirely appropriate for a declaratory judgment. Cosmetic docking of tails was wholly unjustifiable under the law in the dissent's eyes. While plaintiff pointed out that docking may serve some purposes for hunting dogs, it is not a justification for docking the tails of non-hunting dogs, such as plaintiff's, for purposes of AKC competitions.
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Hammer v. American Kennel Club |
Plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the American Kennel Club (AKC) for use of standards in dog show competitions for Brittany Spaniel dogs that require the docking of their tails. The issue in this appeal is whether Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 grants plaintiff, who wishes to enter his dog and compete without penalty in breed contests, a private right of action to preclude defendants from using a standard that encourages him to "dock" his Brittany Spaniel's tail. The Court of Appeals concluded that it would be inconsistent with the applicable legislative scheme to imply a private right of action in plaintiff's favor because the statute does not, either expressly or impliedly, incorporate a method for private citizens to obtain civil relief. In light of the comprehensive statutory enforcement scheme, recognition of a private civil right of action is incompatible with the mechanisms chosen by the Legislature.
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England - Dogs - The Docking of Working Dogs' Tails (England) Regulations 2007 |
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Elisea v. State |
Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals and practicing veterinary medicine without a license after cropping several puppies' ears with a pair of office scissors while under no anesthesia. Defendant maintained that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for cruelty to an animal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut and overcome his defense that he engaged in a reasonable and recognized act of handling the puppies. The court held that the evidence supported conviction for cruelty under the definition of "torture." Further the evidence supported conviction for unauthorized practice where defendant engaged in a traditional veterinary surgical procedure and received remuneration for his services. |
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Detailed Discussion of Non-Therapeutic Procedures for Companion Animals |
A discussion on four specific unnecessary medical surgeries in companion animals, including tail docking, ear cropping, devocalization, and declawing. This paper will examine the justifications and legal arguments both for and against the procedures. Finally, it will discuss recent efforts to ban these types of surgeries both at the city and state level, with a brief comparison of tail docking and ear cropping bans in the European Union. |
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CT - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws |
These Connecticut statutes comprise the state's dog law. Among the provisions include licensing, kennel, and rabies regulations. With regard to damage by dogs, the law provides a form of strict liability that states if any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper shall be liable for such damage, except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. The law also contains a unique "dogs on highway" provision that provides that any person owning or having the custody of any dog which habitually goes out on any highway and growls, bites, or snaps at, or otherwise annoys, any person or domestic animal lawfully using such highway or chases or interferes with any motor vehicle so using such highway, shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor. Further, among the nuisance provisions, the law states that no person shall own or harbor a dog which is a nuisance by reason of vicious disposition or excessive barking or other disturbance. These laws also contain provisions on reporting neglected or cruelly treated animals. Finally, Connecticut has an anti-ear cropping measures that prohibits cropping by anyone who is not a registered veterinary surgeon, and who performs the operation when the dog is under an anesthetic.
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Cropping and Docking: A Discussion of the Controversy and the Role of Law in Preventing Unnecessary Cosmetic Surgery on Dogs |
This article describes the procedures of tail docking and ear cropping, the history of the procedures, their place in modern veterinary care, and discuss the positions of advocates both for, and against these procedures. Additionally, this article explains the ways in which the law is being used internationally in preventing these unnecessary procedures, and the ways that current and future American anti-cruelty laws can be used to put a stop to this epidemic. |
