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People v. Tohom |
This case, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a trial court was authorized to allow a "therapeutic comfort dog" to be present on witness stand for a 15-year-old-girl who was the victim in a predatory sexual assault and child endangerment case. Prosecutors sought to allow a Golden Retriever named Rose to accompany the child on the witness stand while she testified at the defendant’s trial. Prosecutors cited Criminal Procedure Law provisions regarding special witnesses and pointed to Executive Law §642-a, which allows a person supportive of a special witness to be “present and accessible” during testimony by such a witness. On appeal, defendant again argued that the dog would prejudice the jury against the defendant and would convey to the jury that the witness was under stress as a result of testifying and that this stress resulted from telling the truth. In finding that the comfort dog did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial, the appellate court agreed that the trial court's interpretation of Executive Law § 642-a "special witness" provision was correct. Further, the defendant failed to show that the dog Rose's presence was inherently prejudicial.
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Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips |
In this case, a landlord brought a summary process action against a tenant who lived in the federally subsidized apartment, based on tenant's keeping of “emotional support dog” in violation of a pet restriction clause in the tenant's lease. The trial court entered judgment in favor of tenant, based on equity, and the landlord appealed. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Court held that: 1) appeal was not rendered moot by landlord's commencement of second summary process action against tenant, which was dismissed; 2) trial court could not rely on “spirit” of Department of Housing and Urban Development in exercising equitable discretion to enter judgment in favor of tenant; 3) trial court abused its discretion in applying doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture; and 4) summary process action was “civil action” to which medical treatment report exception to hearsay rule could be applied to allow for admission of letter from physician and social worker of tenant's niece concerning dog's benefit to niece. Reversed and remanded. |
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Priebe v. Nelson |
A kennel worker who was bitten by a dog while the dog was in the care of the kennel sued the owner of the dog under a theory of strict liability under a statute and under the common law. The court found that the dog owner was not liable to the kennel worker because under the "veterinarian's rule," the kennel owner had assumed the risk of being bitten by the dog.
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Prindable v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua |
Condominium resident filed a complaint alleging the housing authority violated the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act by failing to waive the "no pets" as a reasonable accommodation for his handicap. The court held that where the primary handicap is mental or emotional in nature, an animal "must be peculiarly suited to ameliorate the unique problems of the mentally disabled," and granted the housing authority's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the housing authority's failure to make a reasonable accommodation under the FHA.
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Pruett v. Arizona |
A diabetic woman in Arizona attempted to keep a chimpanzee as an assistance animal in spite of the state’s ape ban. Despite the state’s ban, the diabetic woman imported a chimpanzee with the intention of keeping him as a service animal, claiming that she was entitled to do so under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). In September of 2007, the chimpanzee’s owner sued the State of Arizona, the Game and Fish Commission, and the Director of the Game and Fish Department in federal court claiming that they had violated her rights under the federal disability laws. According to the plaintiff, the ADA requires the state to make “reasonable accommodations” for disabled individuals; and in her case this meant the state must waive its ban on possessing “restricted” apes so that she can keep a chimpanzee in her home as a service animal. The District Court found that the plaintiff’s chimpanzee is “unnecessary” and “inadequate” to meet her disability-related needs and the animal is not a “reasonable” accommodation under the ADA because he threatens the health and safety of the community.
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Reaves v. Immediate Med. Care, P.A. |
The United States District Court adjudicated a claim brought by Erin Reaves, an individual with diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and bipolar disorder, against Immediate Medical Care, P.A., a medical clinic in Jacksonville, Florida. Reaves alleged that the clinic violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when staff refused to allow her service dog, Malia—a trained animal that assisted with her psychiatric disabilities—to accompany her during a scheduled April 2023 medical appointment. The clinic based its refusal on the severe dog allergies of one of its physicians, Dr. Gargin, and offered alternative accommodations, including seeing a different doctor or having the dog wait outside. After a three-day bench trial, the court found that while Reaves was disabled under the ADA and Malia qualified as a service animal, Immediate Medical Care had lawfully excluded the dog under the ADA’s "direct threat" exception. The court credited evidence that Dr. Gargin’s allergy posed a genuine health risk, noted that the clinic had conducted an individualized assessment under 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b), and emphasized that reasonable modifications—such as rescheduling with another provider—had been offered. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of Immediate Medical Care, holding that a public accommodation may exclude a service animal when objective evidence shows it would endanger another’s health and alternative accommodations are available. |
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Reglamento de la Ley 29830, 2017 - Peru |
Este reglamento se aprueba mediante el Decreto Supremo No. 001-2017-MIMP. Su proposito es establecer las disposiciones de la Ley No. 29830, modificada por la Ley No. 30433, que promueve y regula el uso de perros guía por personas con discapacidad visual. Entre otras disposiciones, esta normativa designa al Consejo Nacional para la Integración de la Persona con Discapacidad (CONADIS) como la autoridad responsable de implementar y definir los parámetros para el registro de perros guía en el Registro Nacional de Perros Guía. Además, establece que a las personas con discapacidad visual y sus perros guía se les debe permitir ingresar y permanecer en su lugar de trabajo, estudio y cualquier otro establecimiento en igualdad de condiciones, independientemente de si el lugar es público o privado, y sin costo adicional por llevar al perro. Esto incluye el acceso al transporte público. |
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Regulation of Ley 29830 - Peru |
This regulation is approved through Supreme Decree No. 001-2017-MIMP. The purpose of this regulation is to establish the provisions of Law No. 29830, as amended by Law No. 30433, which promotes and regulates the use of guide dogs by visually impaired persons. Among other provisions, this regulation designates the National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS) as the authority responsible for implementing and outlining the parameters for registering guide dogs in the National Guide Dog Registry. Additionally, it mandates that visually impaired persons and their guide dogs allowed to enter and remain in their place of work, study, and any other business on equal terms, regardless of whether the establishment is public or private, and without any additional cost for bringing the dog. This includes access to public transportation as well. |
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Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association |
Homeowners brought action against thier condominium association and other homeowners, claiming that the association failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for homeowners' disability in the form of emotional support animals, and that the other homeowners interfered with the fair exercise of their fair housing rights, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court of Appeals held that: 1) Fair Housing Act claims survive the death of a party; 2) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on claims association failed to make a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act; 3) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; 4) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's comments about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; and 5) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's blog posts about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
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RI - Assistance Animals - Consolidated Assistance Animal Laws |
The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance/service animal laws. |
