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Johnson v. City of Murray |
An animal control employee lost her job due to the city’s decision to outsource the department to another city. Plaintiff sued the city on eleven counts, but lost due to the district court’s grant of the city’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff lost on her First Amendment, American Disability Act, Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, and breach of contract claims.
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Johnson v. District of Columbia |
Although he has never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the District of Columbia's Animal Control Act, plaintiff, an animal rights activist, challenges a provision that reads: “No person shall knowingly and falsely deny ownership of any animal.” D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff asserts that he desires to give speeches in the District of Columbia about why he opposes treating animals as property, and in such speeches he would like to deny ownership of his dog. However, he alleges that he does not do so because he is deterred by D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff therefore sued the District of Columbia to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the statute violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The District Court, however, found that plaintiff lacked standing because he presented no concrete evidence to substantiate his fears of prosecution, but rather rests his claims on mere conjecture about possible governmental actions. Such hypothetical fears cannot form the basis for standing under Article III of the US Constitution. The defendant's motion to dismiss was therefore granted and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed. |
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Johnson v. Smith |
Scott Johnson and Harlene Hoyt, the plaintiffs, challenge the constitutionality of the Kansas Pet Animal Act (the Act), which authorizes warrantless inspections of their homestead, where Mr. Johnson operates a business housing and training bird dogs. They argue that the Act violates the Fourth Amendment by permitting warrantless inspections and infringes on their constitutional right to travel by requiring premises to be made available for inspection within 30 minutes of an inspector’s arrival. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted the state’s motion to dismiss, prompting the plaintiffs to appeal. The court analyzed the Act, noting that it imposes varying inspection requirements and housing standards on different licensees, with all licensees subject to initial and routine inspections “at reasonable times.” Refusal to permit inspections constitutes grounds for license suspension or revocation. The court then examined whether the Act violates the Fourth Amendment, applying precedent from Burger and subsequent cases. It identified relevant factors for determining whether an industry is closely regulated, including the history of warrantless inspections, the extensiveness of the regulatory scheme, whether similar schemes exist in other jurisdictions, and the potential threat to public welfare if left unregulated. The parties disputed whether Mr. Johnson’s business qualifies as part of a closely regulated industry. The court credited the plaintiffs’ allegation that training kennels are distinct from other animal-related operations, noting that Kansas treats them as a separate category requiring specific licenses. The court concluded that the boarding or training-kennel industry does not qualify as closely regulated under the Fourth Amendment’s narrow exception for warrantless inspections. It emphasized the industry’s lack of a long tradition of regulation and found that the regulatory scheme does not clearly inform industry participants of unannounced warrantless inspections. Applying Patel, the court held that the regulatory scheme must satisfy three criteria for warrantless searches to be reasonable: a substantial government interest, necessity of warrantless inspections to further the regulatory scheme, and a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The court found that dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim was improper, as the complaint did not establish that the closely regulated industry exception applies or that the Burger factors were satisfied. It also reversed the dismissal of the claim that the Act unconstitutionally conditions licensure on waiving Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court affirmed that the 30-minute inspection availability requirement does not violate the constitutional right to travel. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
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Johnson-Schmitt v. Robinson |
Seeking compensatory and injunctive relief, Plaintiffs commenced a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants County of Erie, Erie County Sheriff's Department, and John Does 1 and 2; Defendants Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("SPCA") and a SPCA peace officer; and a dog control officer based on alleged searches of Plaintiffs' property and seizure of animals purportedly belonging to Plaintiffs. After reviewing the defendants moved for summary judgment, the district court granted and dismissed the motion in part.
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Jones v. Butz |
This action involves a challenge, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, to the Humane Slaughter Act and in particular to the provisions relating to ritual slaughter as defined in the Act and which plaintiffs suggest involve the Government in the dietary preferences of a particular religious (e.g., Orthodox Jews) group. The court held that there is no violation of Establishment Clause because no excessive governmental entanglement and by making it possible for those who wish to eat ritually acceptable meat to slaughter the animal in accordance with the tenets of their faith, Congress neither established the tenets of that faith nor interfered with the exercise of any other.
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Jones v. Gordon |
A permit was authorized to Sea World to capture killer whales. No environmental impact statement was prepared. Plaintiffs allege that the issuance of the permit without preparation of an environmental impact statement violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Court holds that the permit must be reconsidered after an environmental impact statement is prepared.
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Jurewicz v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture |
Using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the United States Humane Society requested that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) disclose a certain Animal Welfare Act form. Arguing that two FOIA exemptions prevented the USDA from releasing certain information on this form (the number of dogs that they buy and sell each year and their annual revenue from dog sales), three Missouri dog breeders and dealers sought to prevent this information’s disclosure. After finding that the public interests in disclosing the information outweighed the privacy concerns for the breeders, the district court granted the USDA's and the U.S. Humane Society's motion for summary judgment.
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Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown |
The plaintiffs, including retail pet stores and a USDA-licensed breeder, challenged Maryland's 2021 Pet Store Statute, which prohibits retail pet stores from selling or transferring dogs and cats, alleging it conflicts with the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause. The Pet Store Statute aims to curb the sale of dogs from "puppy mills" by banning retail pet stores and brokers from selling dogs, while exempting breeders who sell animals born at their establishments. Plaintiffs argued that the statute effectively shifts dog sales from regulated retail pet stores sourcing from out-of-state breeders to unregulated internet sales and local breeders, undermining the AWA's regulatory framework. The AWA establishes federal standards for the humane treatment of animals, including licensing requirements for breeders and brokers, but explicitly allows states to enact additional animal welfare regulations. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the AWA preempts the Pet Store Statute, finding no conflict because the AWA does not occupy the field of animal welfare regulation and permits concurrent state laws. Plaintiffs also argued that the statute obstructs the AWA's objectives by eliminating USDA-licensed brokers from the Maryland market, but the court found no evidence that the statute impedes federal licensing or inspection processes. The court dismissed plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claims, finding no discriminatory purpose or effect against out-of-state breeders, as the statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state entities and does not prohibit interstate sales. The statute allows out-of-state breeders to sell directly to Maryland consumers, either in person or online, and does not regulate sales occurring wholly outside Maryland. The court upheld the statute's legitimacy, recognizing Maryland's interest in addressing puppy mills, protecting consumers from unhealthy animals, and reducing shelter populations, which are valid state police powers. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the Pet Store Statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause, as it regulates animal welfare within Maryland's traditional authority. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
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Just Puppies, Inc. v. Frosh |
The State of Maryland passed a “No More Puppy-Mill Pups Act” which went into effect January 1, 2020. The Act prohibits retail pet stores in Maryland from offering for sale or otherwise transferring or disposing of cats or dogs. Four pet stores, a dog breeder, and a dog broker filed suit against Brian Frosh, the Attorney General of Maryland, the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (CPD), the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee, and the Maryland State Senate Finance Committee seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act as well as a declaration that it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Defendants were all entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, unless an exception were to apply. Under the Ex parte Young exception “private citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court to obtain prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” The CPD and Committee Defendants were not State officials and, therefore, they did not fall within the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception, however, applied to Mr. Frosh as he was the Attorney General of Maryland since he had some connection with the enforcement of the Act. In Counts I, II, and III, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the Act discriminated against out-of-state breeders and brokers in its text, in its effect, or in its purpose. Count IV alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act was preempted by the AWA. The Court found that prohibiting Maryland pet stores from selling dogs or cats had no effect on the operation of the AWA. The Puppy-Mill Act's impact on pet stores did not clash with the AWA, because pet stores were explicitly exempt from the AWA. Count V alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to the equal protection of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court found no merit in this argument. Count VI asserted that the Act created a monopoly prohibited by Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found that the Puppy-Mill Act did not constitute an exclusive right to sell cats and dog in Maryland. Although the Act prohibited brick and mortar stores from participating in the sale of cats and dogs, consumers still had a plethora of choices when seeking to obtain a pet, including rescue shelters, animal control units, USDA licensed breeders and brokers, and unregulated hobby breeders. The Court ultimately dismissed all claims against the CPD and the Committee Defendants and allowed the claims against Brian Frosh to proceed. |
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Kanoa Inc., v. Clinton |
Plaintiff cruise company filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt scientific research of the defendant government, alleging standing under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
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