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Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society |
Congress had granted the Secretary the authority to determine whether a foreign nation's whaling in excess of quotas diminished the effectiveness of the IWC, and the Court found no reason to impose a mandatory obligation upon the Secretary to certify that every quota violation necessarily failed that standard.
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Jason v. Parks |
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for veterinary malpractice, the plaintiffs appeal. The court reaffirmed that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent destruction of a dog.
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Jefferson v. Mirando |
In this Ohio case, the defendant was charged with violating ordinance setting maximum number of dogs or cats that a person could "harbor" per family dwelling unit. The court first observed that the village of Jefferson's ordinance benefits from a strong presumption of constitutionality, and defendant Mirando bears the burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality of this ordinance beyond any remaining fair debate on the issue. The court held that ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague and did not conflict with state statutes regulating kennels.
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Jenkins v. State |
Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor animal cruelty. Defendant appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held that he was not entitled to a reversal, because he failed to demonstrate that his counsel failed to render reasonably competent assistance that prejudiced him to such an extent that he was deprived of a fair trial. The Court held that it was not ineffective assistance to 1) fail to object to testimony regarding defendant's arrest and incarceration, and 2) fail to object to defendant's brother testifying while wearing a striped prison suit.
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Johnson v. City of Murray |
An animal control employee lost her job due to the city’s decision to outsource the department to another city. Plaintiff sued the city on eleven counts, but lost due to the district court’s grant of the city’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff lost on her First Amendment, American Disability Act, Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, and breach of contract claims.
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Johnson v. District of Columbia |
Although he has never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the District of Columbia's Animal Control Act, plaintiff, an animal rights activist, challenges a provision that reads: “No person shall knowingly and falsely deny ownership of any animal.” D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff asserts that he desires to give speeches in the District of Columbia about why he opposes treating animals as property, and in such speeches he would like to deny ownership of his dog. However, he alleges that he does not do so because he is deterred by D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff therefore sued the District of Columbia to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the statute violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The District Court, however, found that plaintiff lacked standing because he presented no concrete evidence to substantiate his fears of prosecution, but rather rests his claims on mere conjecture about possible governmental actions. Such hypothetical fears cannot form the basis for standing under Article III of the US Constitution. The defendant's motion to dismiss was therefore granted and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed. |
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Johnson v. Douglas |
Plaintiff appealed an order denying her claim to emotional distress damages presumably for the death of her dog. The court held that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent killing of a dog.
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Johnson v. McMahan |
After a repairman was injured by a dog that grabbed his leg through his jeans and made him fall from a ladder, the victim sued the owners under the dog bite statute, Civ. Code, § 3342. The court held that the statute applied, even though the plaintiff was not wounded by the bite. The word “bite” did not require a puncture or tearing away of the skin.
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Johnson v. Smith |
Scott Johnson and Harlene Hoyt, the plaintiffs, challenge the constitutionality of the Kansas Pet Animal Act (the Act), which authorizes warrantless inspections of their homestead, where Mr. Johnson operates a business housing and training bird dogs. They argue that the Act violates the Fourth Amendment by permitting warrantless inspections and infringes on their constitutional right to travel by requiring premises to be made available for inspection within 30 minutes of an inspector’s arrival. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted the state’s motion to dismiss, prompting the plaintiffs to appeal. The court analyzed the Act, noting that it imposes varying inspection requirements and housing standards on different licensees, with all licensees subject to initial and routine inspections “at reasonable times.” Refusal to permit inspections constitutes grounds for license suspension or revocation. The court then examined whether the Act violates the Fourth Amendment, applying precedent from Burger and subsequent cases. It identified relevant factors for determining whether an industry is closely regulated, including the history of warrantless inspections, the extensiveness of the regulatory scheme, whether similar schemes exist in other jurisdictions, and the potential threat to public welfare if left unregulated. The parties disputed whether Mr. Johnson’s business qualifies as part of a closely regulated industry. The court credited the plaintiffs’ allegation that training kennels are distinct from other animal-related operations, noting that Kansas treats them as a separate category requiring specific licenses. The court concluded that the boarding or training-kennel industry does not qualify as closely regulated under the Fourth Amendment’s narrow exception for warrantless inspections. It emphasized the industry’s lack of a long tradition of regulation and found that the regulatory scheme does not clearly inform industry participants of unannounced warrantless inspections. Applying Patel, the court held that the regulatory scheme must satisfy three criteria for warrantless searches to be reasonable: a substantial government interest, necessity of warrantless inspections to further the regulatory scheme, and a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The court found that dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim was improper, as the complaint did not establish that the closely regulated industry exception applies or that the Burger factors were satisfied. It also reversed the dismissal of the claim that the Act unconstitutionally conditions licensure on waiving Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court affirmed that the 30-minute inspection availability requirement does not violate the constitutional right to travel. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
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Johnson v. Wander |
Petitioner pet owner alleged that respondent veterinarian took her dog to be spayed, and left the animal on heating pads, which resulted in serious burns, so petitioner filed a claim for damages on the basis of gross negligence, damage to property, and emotional distress. The trial court entered partial summary judgments on the claims for punitive damages and emotional distress and, on a subsequent motion, transferred the case to the county court as a claim for less than the circuit court jurisdictional amount. The appellate court held that there remained a jury question on the issues of gross negligence and physical and mental pain and suffering as claimed by petitioner.
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