|Agreement APHIS v. FEI||This agreement was entered into by APHIS and Feld Entertainment, Inc. (FEI). FEI is an exhibitor under the Animal Welfare Act and was issued non-compliance reports after numerous inspections. In this agreement, FEI paid $270,000 to the US Treasurer and had to develop and implement annual training to all of its personnel who worked with animals. The agreement also contains provisions that APHIS would not take action against FEI if FEI followed the agreement.|
|American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals et al v. Ringling Brothers, et al,||
This case involves the Ringling Brothers circus company’s mistreatment of elephants brought by the ASPCA. Plaintiffs alleged that the alleged routine beating, chaining, and other mistreatment amounted to an unlawful taking of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Judge rejects defendants’ motion to dismiss and order the case to proceed.
|AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, et al., Plaintiffs v. RINGLING BROTHERS AND BARNUM & BAILEY CIRCUS, e||
Plaintiffs-ASPCA filed suit against Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus and Feld Entertainment, Inc, under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that FEI routinely beats elephants, chains them for long periods of time, hits them with sharp bull hooks, breaks baby elephants with force to make them submissive, and forcibly removes baby elephants from their mothers before they are weaned. This conduct, plaintiffs contend, violates the "take" provision of the ESA.
|Ammon v. Welty||
Amicus Brief about non-economic damages in case where warden shot a family dog.
|Ananda v. The Village of Glenview||After a dog bite incident, the village of Glenview declared plaintiff's dog "vicious." Plaintiff's dog escaped from his mandated enclosure and was impounded by animal control. Plaintiff moved the Circuit Court of Cook County to enter an order transferring ownership of the dog and limiting impoundment fees. The order also asks the court to void the vicious dog determination and to declare section 365 of the Animal Control Act unconstitutional. This document also includes defendant's answer.|
|Anays Rodriguez-Porras, Plaintiff v. Miami-Dade Animal Services, Miami-Dade Police Department, Miami-Dade County, Defendants||
This Miami-Dade County, Florida case concerns the unauthorized euthanization of the plaintiff's dog, "Cowboy." Cowboy was a beloved family pet who was fitted with an identification microchip in case he was ever lost. In August of 2005, Cowboy got loose after being frightened by a storm and picked up by an animal shelter officer. The plaintiff was inaccurately informed that no dog matching Cowboy's description was at the shelter (records from the shelter showed he was actually picked up the same day he escaped from his home). Five days later, she was informed that Cowboy was at the shelter. After telling the shelter she would be there the next day to pick up Cowboy (since the shelter was closing and would not wait for her to arrive), the shelter euthanized the dog despite assurances to plaintiff that he would be kept safe. Plaintiff sued animal control, the county, and police department for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, wrongful disposition of a body, and negligence.
|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert||This complaint launches the first legal challenge to any ag-gag law in the United States. In it, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Amy Meyer, and others argue that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112 is unconstitutionally overbroad, constitutes content-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, is preempted by the federal False Claims Act, and violates animal protection groups’ equal protection and due process.|
|ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, a California corporation, CHIMPANZEE COLLABORATORY, SARAH BAECKLER, AMAZING ANIMAL ACTORS, INC., a Ca||Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that defendants, individuals and companies who use non-human primates in television and movie productions, engage in physical and psychological abuse of chimpanzees. According to plaintiffs, the abuse has been going on for years and includes violent beatings with sticks and other implements. Plaintiffs raise their first cause of action under the federal Endangered Species Act, contending that defendant's harassment, beating, and brutalization of the chimpanzees constitutes a "taking" under the ESA. Plaintiffs also raise causes of action under California law for specific recovery of property (e.g., the primates), conversion, violations under the California Business Code, and violations under the cruelty provisions of the California Penal Code.|
|ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, COMPLAINT FOR VALERIE BUCHANAN, JANE GARRISON, AND NANCY MEGNA DECLARATORY||This action concerns a lawsuit filed by the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), et al, over the lack of action by the federal agency, the Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to adopt a policy on what constitutes appropriate conditions for primates in federally licensed or registered facilities. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the failure of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United State Department of Agriculture to make a final decision concerning the defendants' proposed “Policy On Environment Enhancement For Nonhuman Primates.” See 64 Fed. Reg. 38,145 (July 15, 1999) (Policy). APHIS determined at least seven years ago that APHIS enforcement officials and the regulated community urgently need such a policy to insure that primates are housed in “physical environments adequate to promote the[ir] psychological well-being,” as required by the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). 7 U.S.C. § 2143. By failing to make a final decision on the proposed Policy, defendants are violating the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143, and are unreasonably delaying and/or unlawfully withholding agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).|
|Animal Legal Defense Fund, Wake County, A North Carolina Body Politic and Kelli Ferris, D.V.M., Plaintiffs v. Janie Conyers, Def||Plaintiffs in this case consist of the Wake County Animal Care, Control, and Adoption Center and the local chapter of the ALDF. They seek preliminary and permanent injunctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Secs. 19A-1 through 19A-4 against Defendant Janie Conyers, who was found to have 106 animals living in her house under deplorable conditions. Specifically, plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendant from acquiring any animals for 10 years after entry of judgment in this action. Plaintiffs also moved for an order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 19A-4 terminating all possessory interests in the animals seized and awarding custody and possessory rights to the ALDF. Most of the animals suffer from severe chronic oral and skin conditions due to neglect. Included in the documents are affidavits from veterinary professionals and the director of Wake County Animal, Care, Control, and Adoption Center concerning both the conditions of the animals seized and the estimated costs of care for those animals during the pendency of the litigation.|
|Animal Legal Defense Fund; Animal Welfare Institute; Valerie Buchanan; Jane Garrison; Nancy Megna, plaintiffs-appellants v. Ann||In this federal action, plaintiffs (ALDF, the AWI, and three individuals) challenged the USDA's decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of on-human primates in order to comply with the Animal Welfare Act. While the district court found that the USDA's decision did not constitute a reviewable final agency decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the lower court did indeed have authority under the Administrative Procedures Act to review the agency's decision not to create a policy. On June 4, 2007, the Court vacated the previous opinion and dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Two judges wrote separate opinions, concurring and dissenting in part.|
|Animal Welfare Institute v. BP America, INC||This complaint is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(2)(A), to bring an immediate halt to defendants’ actions that are killing endangered and threatened sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico as part of defendants’ efforts to contain the catastrophic oil spill that has occurred at defendants’ Deepwater Horizon facility in the Gulf of Mexico. In this complaint, several animal rights organizations allege, in an effort to contain the oil spill by burning the oil, defendants are also corralling and burning alive endangered and threatened sea turtles without a permit from the Department of Commerce, in violation of Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). A motion for temporary restraining order is also included.|
|Anna Guha, Susan Mary Jackson, Christy Ann Morgan, Plaintiffs, v. Cloughery Packing LLC dba Farmer John; Corcpork, Inc., a Calif||This case involves an action by plaintiffs, consumers who have eaten pork from defendant's company, against defendant pork-producers under California's anti-cruelty and unlawful business practices laws. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendant's use of gestation crates for pregnant sows is illegal under California Penal Code Section 597t (a section that requires anyone who keeps an animal confined in an enclosed area must provide it with an adequate exercise area). Thus, defendants' violation of 597t provides a predicate for violation under California's Business and Professions Code Section 17200, better known as the unlawful business or practice act. Further, plaintiffs contend that the Farmer John brand misleads reasonable consumers into believing that such pork products are produced in a humane fashion. Farmer John's parent company, Hormel Foods, states in its annual report that it has a "zero tolerance" for the inhumane treatment of animals.|
|Assal v. Barwick (Kidwell)||A circuit court upheld and enforced a divorce settlement that granted the husband visitation of the couple's dog for one month each summer. After the dog had gotten loose during a past visit and the husband had driven with the dog in the trunk of his car, however, the wife had refused to turn the dog over. The husband later abandoned his fight for visitation with the dog. During the proceedings, however, the Animal Legal Defense Fund filed this amicus curiae brief to urge the court to include in its consideration the needs and interests of the dog. The attached brief sets forth reported case decisions and rulings of other courts that have grappled with the view that companion animals are more than mere chattel.|
|BERNADETTE WOMACK, a single woman; and BERNADETTE WOMACK a Fiduciary, Personal Representative, and Special Guardian over the Sen||In this Washington case, a cat owner sued a minor and his parents after the minor set her cat on fire. While this Court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Ms. Womack's private nuisance, tort outrage, and statutory waste claims, it held that the lower court incorrectly calculated the measure of damages. Noting that the Division 2 Appellate Court left open the question of emotional distress damages where a pet has been maliciously injured in Pickford v. Masion , 124 Wash.App. 257, 262-63, 98 P.3d 1232 (2004), this Court held that the general allegations include sufficient facts to find both malicious conduct toward Ms. Womack's pet and her resulting emotional distress. Thus, "[f]or the first time in Washington, we hold malicious injury to a pet can support a claim for, and be considered a factor in measuring a person's emotional distress damages."|
|Betts v. City of Long Beach Department of Health and Human Services||
This is a petition demanding an administrative hearing before the euthanizing of a dog.
|Brock v. Rowe||Stan Brock, a former NFL star, is suing is neighbor for shooting his two dogs with a bow and arrow. This is an opposition to a motion to dismiss on a claim of emotional distress for loss of family pets. The motion was successful.|
|Burgess v. Taylor||
Taylor v. Burgess is a landmark case in Kentucky allowing non-economic damages for an animal. Judy Taylor's two horses were stolen and sold for slaughter. Taylor then successfully sued for non-economic damages.
|CALIFORNIA VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff & Respondent, v. City of West Hollywood, Defendant & Appellant||This California action concerns the adoption of an ordinance in 2003 by the City of West Hollywood that prohibits the de-clawing of house cats. Amici Curiae Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF" ), the Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights (" A V AR" ), and the Paw Project submitted a brief to assist the Court in its determination of whether the ordinance at issue on this appeal legally prohibits non-therapeutic onychectomies (commonly known as " de-clawing") of domestic animals within the City of West Hollywood. The California Superior Court found that the Business and Professions Code section 460 preempts a municipal ordinance that attempts to regulate veterinarian procedures. The Amici contend that the CVMA examines only one section of the Code and disregards other sections that apply. Further, the amici find that the CVMA’s “. . . members have a pecuniary interest in performing the acts that the City has determined to be cruel.” On Friday, June 22, 2007, the Second District Court of Appeal in Los Angeles ruled 2-1 that a city can regulate the conduct of its professionals provided it does not prohibit procedures that state law expressly allows.|
|Center for Animal Law and Advocacy v. Bryon F. Maggard||The Center for Animal Law and Advocacy based on Dayton, Ohio sued the defendant, Bryon Maggard, for his actions taken against his dog, Sadie. On March 17, 2002, the defendant beat Sadie with a skillet, tried to hang her with an electrical cord, and then set her on fire. The Center, which initiates civil litigation on behalf of companion animals and their guardians in an attempt to elevate the legal status of such animals, sued for compensatory damages in the amount of $25,000 to cover costs of Sadie’s veterinary treatment and rehabilitation, and asked the court to prohibit defendant from owning any animals in the future. It should be noted that, according to news accounts, Maggard (age 19 at the time of the assault) received 30 days in jail, was fined $2,000, and was ordered to receive anger and alcohol counseling.|
|Chimps, Inc., International Primate League, and Marguerite Gordon v. Primarily Primates, Inc.||Plaintiffs Chimps, Inc., International Primate Protection League, and Marguerite Gordon (collectively known as the plaintiffs) file this Complaint for declaratory relief, quantum meruit, and a lien for services against Defendant Primary Primates, Inc. (PPI). In this complaint, plaintiffs allege that PPI had over 700 animals, most of them nonhuman primates, living in abusive, substandard and dangerous conditions.|
|Christine Valpiani and Anthony Valpiani, husband and wife, plaintiffs v. Lisa K. Reising, D.V.M. a Washington State veterinarian||
This King County, Washington motion for summary judgment sought dismissal of several of plaintiff's claims as well as a limitation to the damages that are recoverable. Plaintiffs claim that the negligence of defendant-veterinarian caused the death of their dog (defendant admitted negligence so the issue here centers on damages). The court held that plaintiffs may assert claims for loss of use, but not loss of companionship.
|City and County of Denver, a Home Rule municipal corporation of the State of Colorado; and John W. Hickenlooper, as Mayor of the||In 2004, the Colorado General Assembly passed changes to the state's dangerous dog laws; part of the law prohibited municipalities from adopting any breed-specific dog laws. Denver previously enacted an ordinance that regulated dogs by breed (Section 8-55). In this current action, the City instituted an action seeking declaratory judgment that Section 8-55 preempts the state law under the Home Rule Amendment. The court found that the regulation of dogs by breed on an intra-city basis was purely a matter of local concern, and thus fell under Home Rule authority. The state was permanently enjoined from taking any action against Denver based on the language of the amended state law. The state then filed a notice of appeal, but subsequently withdrew it.|
|CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellant, v. Paul TELLINGS, Appellee||
This Reply Brief of Appellant City of Toledo was filed for the Supreme Court case of Toledo v. Tellings (871 N.E.2d 1152 (2007)). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls.
|CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellant, v. Paul TELLINGS, Appellee.||
This is the City of Toldeo's Appellant Brief filed in the Supreme Court case of Toledo v. Tellings (871 N.E.2d 1152 (2007)). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls.
|CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellant, v. Paul TELLINGS, Appellee.||
This Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellant City of Toledo was filed for the Supreme Court case of Toledo v. Tellings (871 N.E.2d 1152 (2007)). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls.
|CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellant, v. Paul TELLINGS, Defendant-Appellee.||
This is the Ohio Attorney General's amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court case of Toledo v. Tellings (871 N.E.2d 1152 (2007)). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls.
|City of Toledo, Appellee v. Paul Tellings, Appellant||
This Ohio case concerns a Toledo ordinance that limited the ownership of Pit Bull dogs to only one dog per household (respondent had three pit bulls). Essentially, the ordinance classifies a Pit Bull as a “vicious dog” under the vicious dog ordinance even if the dog has not engaged in aggressive or vicious behavior. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District found that the ordinance as written was constitutionally vague. The Supreme Court overturned that decision in 2007, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls.
|Clark v. Cardinal Animal Care||This is a complaint for veterinary malpractice. The cat had been checked in for a routine flea treatment. The cat ended up with a severe problem, which the veterinarian lied to the owner about. The veterinarian performed an unauthorized surgery on the cat. The cat died.|
|Colleen Harrington v. David Hovanec, and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive||This California complaint for damages raises five causes of action: (1) gross negligence; (2) trespass to chattel; (3) conversion; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) violation of California Civil Code Section 3340 (related to damage to animals as property). The lawsuit arose from the negligent and/or intentional shooting of plaintiff's dog by defendant in May of 2004. According to the complaint, plaintiff's dog was shot at least thirteen times by defendant's two different guns.|
|COMPASSION IN WORLD FARMING LIMITED v.THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS||
Plaintiff organization suggest that the UK government has not adopted adequate regulations for the protection of broiler chickens, under the obligations of EEC Directives or under UK law.
|COMPASSION IN WORLD FARMING LIMITED, Claimant, v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Defendant||
Complaint regarding the care and breeding of broiler chickens and the resulting animal welfare problems.
|Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor (2015)||The attached document is the Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief in the case of Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor, Michigan for the protection of natural resources. Plaintiff Sally Daniels challenged the City of Ann Arbor's current "deer cull" of 100 deer from public parks and nature areas in the City by marksmen from APHIS. Plaintiff contends that this cull of deer, a natural resource held in the public trust, violates state law (the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) and the DNR's Wildlife Conservation Order (WCO)). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that there has been no showing under NREPA that the deer have caused damage to horticultural or agricultural crops under either act contrary to state law. Plaintiff also states that the methods used - firearms with silencers, deer baiting, and the shooting of deer from vehicles - also violate the NREPA and/or WCO.|
|Deanna Wilson, the guardian of her beloved Avain companions v. PETCO Animal Supplies, INC. and DOES 1-10||PETCO and plaintiff met for a settlement conference by order of the Superior Court before the Bar Association of the San Francisco Early Settlement Program. In this settlement, PETCO agreed to pay $7,000 for the dismissal of the suit and the plaintiff agreed to accept this sum with the knowledge that she will be barred from proceeding against PETCO for this incident in the future. PETCO also reaffirmed that is had discontinued selling the bird cage that was the subject of this action and that it will not reinstate this product in its stores with zinc levels that exceed the nationally accepted standard for avian toxicology.|
|DeSanctis v. Pritchard||
Plaintiff seeks enforcement of contract with ex-spouse for sharing possession of dog. Lower court refused to enforce agreement saying that dogs were just property and shared possession was not possible.
|Dixon v. City of Woodland||This is an order for a settlment regarding police shooting a dog.|
|DR. ELLEN LEVINE et al., Plaintiffs, v. MIKE JOHANNS, Defendants||This action challenges the exclusion of chickens, turkeys, and other birds from the protections of the federal Humane Slaughter Act (HSA). The Levine plaintiffs’ complaint challenges a USDA Notice issued on September 28, 2005, titled “Treatment of Live Poultry Before Slaughter.” The Notice states that there is no federal statute governing the humane slaughter of poultry, but recommends that the poultry industry adopt voluntary measures to improve slaughter practices. Plaintiffs all contend that by excluding these animals from the protections of the Act exposes them to greater risk of food-borne illness. The inhumane methods of slaughtering the birds have been linked in scientific studies to greater incidence of food-borne pathogens in the meat. In their complaint, Plaintiffs request an order finding the act of excluding poultry from the HSA is arbitrary and capricious, and enjoining the USDA from excluding poultry species from the HSA. In its order regarding defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found that plaintiffs credibly alleged that they face an imminent exposure to heightened risk that they will become ill from consuming inhumanely slaughtered animals. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss the consumer claims was denied.|
|Empacadora De Carnes De Fresnillo v. Tim Curry||
Plaintiff seeks an injunction against state of Texas to stop the enforcement of a law prohibiting the slaughter of horses in Texas as the law is improper on a number of bases.
|ERIC SANDLE, plaintiff v. JEFRI DAVIS, and DOES 1-20 inclusive, defendant||This complaint arose from the intentional shooting of plaintiff's dog by defendant. Plaintiff was on his property pruning a tree when defendant shot plaintiff's dog, who was in the street at the time approximately three feet away from defendant. As a result of the shooting, plaintiff's dog is paralyzed in the back half of his body and suffers from bladder and bowel difficulties. Three causes of action were raised in the complaint: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) conversion; and (3) violation of California Civil Code of Procedure Section 3340 (relating to damage to animals).|
|Friedman v. Souther California Permanente Medical Group||
Amicus Curae brief arguing for veganism to be viewed as a religion in wrongful termination case.
|Gregg and Linda Schumacher, and Gregg Schumacher Furs, LLC dba as Schumacher Furs and Outerwear, Plaintiffs v. City of Portland,||In this Opinion, the judge granted the defendants a total of $96,870.85 in attorneys fees. The action stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the Schumachers for $ 6.6 million dollars against the City of Portland and the named defendants seeking damages for alleged illegal protest activities in front of their fur store. The defendants all prevailed on their Motion to Strike. The court observed that awarding of attorney fees is mandatory under Oregon law when a party prevails in an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit. Thus, the issue at hand was the amount of the attorney fees. The court went through the factors under Oregon law in analyzing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. When examining each factor, the court determined that the evidence either was in favor of defendants or was neutral. Notably, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants were not objectively reasonable because the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that the prevailing defendants did anything illegal.|
|Habeas Corpus para Chimpanzé - Íntegra (portuguese)||Heron J. de Santana e Luciano R. Santana ajuizar ação nos termos do art. 5 °, LXVIII, Constituição do Brasil. E, art. 647, Código de Processo Penal. Os peticionários buscar a Grande Writ em nome de Suíça, Chimpanzé (nome científico Pan Troglodytes), que é um prisioneiro no Zoológico de Getúlio Vargas, para alívio de ato ilegal e abusivo perpetrado por o diretor da Secretaria de Governo para a Biodiversidade, Meio Ambiente e da Água Recursos. Este é o primeiro caso de considerar que um chimpanzé pode ser uma pessoa jurídica de vir perante o tribunal no âmbito de um pedido de Habeas Corpus.|
|Hair v. Quail Corners Animal Hospital||
Standard veterinary malpractice case for a show dog. Includes Interrogatories. Veterinarian negligently treated show dog after she was shot by a hunter. In addition, another vet then left a needle inside the dog. Vets failed to take the needle out, causing the dog's death.
|Hoaward Stein, Susan Stein, Steven Glasser, Gail Glasser, Joel Hodes, Netiva Caftori, Eric Cooper, Norman Cooper v. Dr. Todd Pri||This Illinois action brings forth the claims of four sets of plaintiffs for various claims against defendant-veterinarian. While the specific facts concerning the alleged wrongdoings are not provided, it appears that defendant was a veterinarian who operated a medical center and animal boarding facility. Plaintiffs all raise four counts against defendant (breach of contract, negligence, malpractice, and bailment) for the deaths of their dogs. From each set of facts, the various plaintiffs allege that their dogs were in good health prior to boarding their dogs at defendant’s facility, and each dog subsequently died in its cage. In the negligence and malpractice counts, the plaintiffs note that defendants failed to provide an adequate environment to ensure the dogs’ safety, failed to provide adequate ventilation, failed to sterilize the boarding area after sick animals had been housed there, and then failed to properly preserve the companion animals to ensure accurate necropsies, among other things. All plaintiffs sought both actual damages for the loss of their companions as well as damages related to their “reasonable sentimental value.”|
|In re Estate of Howard Brand, Late of Essex Junction, Vermont||
This Vermont case considers the effectiveness of a clause in a testator’s will that directs his executor to destroy any animals that he owns at the time of his death. The testator, Howard Brand, was believed to have owned four horses and one mule at the time of his death. An unincorporated association entitled, “The Coalition to Save Brand’s Horses” was formed in response to this unusual post-mortem request, and sought to intervene in the lawsuit. In a clear case of first impression in Vermont, the Chittenden County Court held that the clause as set forth in Brand’s last codicil mandating the destruction of his animals is void as contrary to public policy.
|In re Estate of Ronald W. Callan, Jr.||This Tennessee order appoints a guardian ad litem for the custody and care of decedent, Ronald W. Callan Jr.'s, dog. According to the order, the guardian ad litem (an attorney in this case) acts not as an advocate for the dog, but rather has a duty to determine what is in the dog's best welfare. Further, the guardian is given unlimited access to the dog and has the right to inspect where the dog is being sheltered. He can also inspect all veterinary records and speak with the dog's veterinarian.|
|In re Farm Sanctuary, Inc. and Gene Bauston, President||In 2002, the Florida Elections Commission received a sworn complaint alleging the Farm Sanctuary, Inc. (a non-profit organization dedicated to rescuing and protecting farm animals) violated Chapter 106, Florida statutes. The Commission staff investigated the allegations and based on the facts and conclusions of law contained in the Complaint, the Report of Investigation, and this statement, the staff recommends that there is probable cause to charge the Respondent with 210 separate counts of violating Section 106.021(1), Florida Statutes, prohibiting a person from making contributions to or receiving contributions on behalf of a political committee except through the campaign treasurer. This document is the order of probable cause.|
|In Re Jackie King||This is a petition for a Writ of Mandamus ordering Potter County Sheriff to revoke all certificates to Charles Azzopardi, doing business as Texas Wildlife Center, due to violations of the Dangerous Wild Animal Act. Also included are exhibits and affidavits.|
|In the Matter of a Protective Order for Jean Marie Primrose - Cat Champion Corporation, Appellant v. Jean Marie Primrose, Respon||This series of actions stemmed from the seizure of 11 cats from Jean Marie Primrose from her Linn County, Oregon home. The cats were neglected, thin, and missing patches of hair when they were removed from Ms. Primrose's home and placed in the custody of Cat Champion, a non-profit rescue organization. Ms. Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree, but the trial court dismissed those charges because she was found incompetent due to a cognitive impairment. Because the case was dismissed, the cats were not forfeited by law and Primrose remained the rightful owner. Further, Cat Champion had incurred a $32,510 debt in caring for the animals. In lieu of returning the cats to Ms. Primrose, who Cat Champions felt was incapable of adequately caring for them, Cat Champions filed a petition for a limited protective order as a fiduciary for the care and placement of the cats. The probate court ruled against Cat Champions, finding that nothing in the relevant chapter allowed the court to permanently divest Ms. Primrose of her personal property (the cats). On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's order and held that the probate court did indeed have authority to enter a limited protective order under ORS 125.650 as a "fiduciary necessary to implement a protective order."|
|Iris Lewis v. Al DiDonna, Pharmacist; James DiDonna, Pharmacist; Eckerd Drug Store of Stone Ridge, New York; Eckerd Corporation||
In this case, the plaintiff brought her dog of nine years to a veterinarian and was given a prescription for an anti-inflammatory drug called Feldene to treat the dog’s condition. After the dog died of renal failure complications, plaintiff discovered that the Feldene prescription was mislabeled by the pharmacist. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division for the Third Judicial Department held that the allegations in plaintiff’s verified complaint sufficiently allege defendant’s wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights to survive a motion to dismiss. Further, the court noted that while plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of her cause of action for loss of companionship, the court made it clear that loss of companionship is not cognizable cause of action in the state of New York.