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Displaying 31 - 40 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ley N° 371 de 2023 | Law 371, 2023 | Law 371, 2023 | Ley 371, enacted in March 2023, is the law by which Panama promotes the conservation and protection of Sea Turtles and their habitat. Relying on Law 287, 2022 (which recognized Nature as a subject of Rights), this law recognizes sea turtles are subjects of rights in Panama. More specifically, Article 29, "Protection of the Rights of Turtles and their Habitat," establishes that sea turtles have "the right to live and have free passage in a healthy environment, free of pollution and other anthropocentric impacts that cause physical damage and damage to their health, such as climate change, contamination incidental capture, coastal development, and unregulated tourism, among others." | Statute |
| Houk v. State | 316 So. 3d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) | 2021 WL 1685627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2021) | Appellant Crystal Houk challenges her convictions and sentences for animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty on several grounds. Appellant contends her dual convictions for those crimes violate double jeopardy because animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are degree variants under section 775.021(4)(b)2. The conviction stems from Houk leaving her dog Gracie May in a car in a Walmart parking lot with the windows closed on a hot, humid day in Florida for over an hour. Apparently, Appellant had pressed a PVC pipe against the accelerator to keep the car accelerating since there was something wrong with the air conditioner. When employees gained entry to her vehicle, they discovered the A/C was actually blowing hot air and the dog was in great distress. Gracie died soon thereafter from heat stroke. A postmortem examination revealed her internal temperature was above 109.9 degrees. Houk was charged with aggravated animal cruelty and animal cruelty, tried by jury, and convicted. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty-six months of probation on Count 1 and twelve months of probation on Count 2, each with a condition that she serve thirty days in jail. On appeal here, this court first found that the offenses of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty satisfy the Blockburger same elements test and do not fall under the identical elements of proof or subsumed-within exceptions. However, as to the degree variant exception, the court agreed with Appellant that the offense of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are not based on entirely different conduct and a violation of one subsection would also constitute a violation of the other. Additionally, while another statutory section allows the charging of separate offenses for multiple acts or acts against more than one animal, the section does not authorize "the charging of separate offenses or the imposition of multiple punishments when a single act against one animal satisfies both subsections." Accordingly, the court agreed with Appellant and reversed her conviction for animal cruelty (while keeping the higher degree conviction of aggravated cruelty). | Case |
| Keith v. Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania, Department of Agriculture | 116 A.3d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 2214849 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2015) | This case focuses on the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture's preliminary objection that Petitioners' had taxpayer standing to request injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that regulations promulgated by the Department were in conflict with the mandates set forth in the Pennsylvania Dog Law Act. Petitioners asserted that the Department was not authorized to exempt nursing mothers from the statutory ban on metal strand flooring and from the statutory requirement of unfettered access to exercise areas. Department argued that Petitioners had not pled sufficient facts to show that those directly and immediately affected by the regulations were beneficially affected. The court found Petitioners were at least as well inclined and situated as any other entities to challenge regulations that might be in conflict with those provisions. The court therefore overruled the Department's preliminary objections to Petitioners' standing. | Case |
| Sri Lanka - Cruelty - Chapter 573 Cruelty to Animals (English) | Ordinances Nos 13 of 1907, 19 of 1912, 43 of 1917, Y of 1919, 33 of 1921, 16 of 1927, 17 of 1970, 12 of 1945, 22 of 1955 | This Ordinance, in English, details Sri Lanka's animal cruelty laws. It also provides provisions for starving animals, using disabled or ill animals for labor, killing animals with unnecessary cruelty, and permitting diseased animals to die in the street. This ordinance also gives the Minister the power to appoint infirmaries to treat and care for animals that are the victims of offenses committed under this ordinance; the owner of the animal is liable for the cost of caring for the infirmed animal. Any Magistrate, Superintendent, or Assistant Superintendent of Police, Judge of primary Court or the divisional Assistant Government Agent of a division may direct the immediate destruction of an animal who was a victim of an offense if in that person's opinion the animal's sufferings are such as to render such a direction proper. Offenders shall be fined or jailed depending on the seriousness of the offence. | Statute | |
| AZ - Domestic Violence - Chapter 36. Family Offenses. | A. R. S. § 13-3602 | AZ ST § 13-3602 | This Arizona law provides that, if a court issues an order of protection, the court may grant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody or control of any animal that is owned, possessed, leased, kept or held by the petitioner, the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or the respondent, and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, committing an act of cruelty or neglect in violation of section 13- 2910 or otherwise disposing of the animal (see (G)(7)). | Statute |
| Connecticut General Statutes: Chapter 333: Sections 6402-6405 | Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 6402-6405 (1918) | Sections 6402-6405 of Chapter 333 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers offences against humanity and morality. Specifically, the statutes cover following topics: animal cruelty, transportation of animals, and docking of horses. | Statute | |
| Dehart v. Town of Austin | 39 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1994) | 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30106 |
The breeder was in the business of buying, breeding, raising, and selling of exotic and wild animals. The town passed an ordinance making it unlawful to keep certain wild animals, and the breeder filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a local ordinance. On appeal, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the town because: (1) the ordinance was not preempted by the Animal Welfare Act; (2) the ordinance was not an impermissible attempt to regulate interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause; and (3) the town did not deprive him of his property interest in his federal and state licenses without due process. |
Case |
| Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Department of Agr. | 134 F.3d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) | 328 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,538 |
A nonprofit organization petitioned for review of the order of administrative law judge (ALJ) which denied organization's motion to intervene in administrative proceedings under Animal Welfare Act. The Court of Appeals held that the organization's failure to appeal administrative denial to judicial officer precluded judicial review of ALJ's actions. |
Case |
| ID - Ordinances - § 50-319. Animals at large--Regulation | I.C. § 50-319 | ID ST § 50-319 | This Idaho law gives the authority to the mayor and city council to do things like regulate the running at large of domesticated animals, to impound animals running at large, and to manage pounds for such animals. | Statute |
| ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, SHY 38, INC. & HOPE SANCTUARY, Plaintiffs, v. LAURA KELLY & DEREK SCHMIDT, Defendants | Slip Copy, No. CV 18-2657-KHV, 2020 WL 362626 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2020) | The Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”), Center for Food Safety (“CFS”), Shy 38, Inc. and Hope Sanctuary are interest groups that aim to protect and advocate for animals and the environment. These interest groups filed suit on December 4, 2018 against the Governor and Attorney General of Kansas seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kansas Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protect Act was unconstitutional. The Act made it a crime to damage or destroy an animal facility or an animal, exercise control over an animal facility or animal from a facility, take photos or videos at an animal facility that that is not open to the public, and remain at an animal facility against the owner’s wishes. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ALDF desired to conduct an undercover investigation in Kansas but refrained from doing so out of fear of criminal prosecution under the Act. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Act violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. To be subject to criminal prosecution under subsection (a) of K.S.A. 47-1827, the ALDF investigator had to cause physical damage to an animal or the animal facility or its property. The Plaintiffs did not allege that the ALDF investigator intended to cause such physical damage so the ALDF investigator was not at risk of criminal prosecution under the provision and, therefore, ALDF did not demonstrate standing to challenge subsection (a). ALDF alleged sufficient injury to support standing to challenge subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the Act. CFS, Shy 38, and Hope Sanctuary also had standing to challenge those subsections. The Court found that subsections (b), (c), and (d) regulated speech rather than conduct and was content-based rather than neutral-based. The Court ultimately concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their claim that subsections (b), (c), and (d) violated the First Amendment. The Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their lack of standing claim for subsection (a) and K.S.A. 47-1828. | Case |