Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CITIZENS' RAPID-TRANSIT CO. v. DEW | 45 S.W. 790 (Tenn. 1898) | 40 L.R.A. 518, 100 Tenn. 317, 16 Pickle 317, 66 Am.St.Rep. 754 (1898) |
In 1898, this court affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that, "Large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and they are extensively the subjects of trade and traffic. They are the negro's associates, and often his only property, the poor man's friend, and the rich man's companion, and the protection of women and children, hearthstones and hen roosts. In the earlier law books it was said that "dog law" was as hard to define as was "dog Latin." But that day has passed, and dogs have now a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." |
Case | |
| State v. Davidson | Slip Copy, 2006 WL 763082 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.), 2006-Ohio-1458 |
In this Ohio case, defendant was convicted of 10 counts of cruelty to animals resulting from her neglect of several dogs and horses in her barn. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient where the prosecution witness did not state the dogs were "malnourished" and said that a couple were reasonably healthy. The appellate court disagreed, finding that defendant mischaracterized the veterinarian's testimony and that there was no requirement to prove malnourishment. Further, the dog warden testified that she did not find any food or water in the barn and that the animals' bowls were covered with mud and feces. |
Case | ||
| MA - Exotic pets - 9.01: Exemption List | 321 MA ADC 9.01 | 321 CMR 9.01 | This section exempts some animals from Massachusetts' exotic pet ban. The animals that have been added to this license-exemption list include boas and pythons, skinks, parrots, hedgehogs, chinchillas, and flying squirrels, among others. | Administrative | |
| TN - Dog, dangerous, felon - § 39-17-1363. Violent felony conviction; custody or control of dogs; application | T. C. A. § 39-17-1363 | TN ST § 39-17-1363 | Under this Tennessee law, it is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to knowingly own, possess, have custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog for a period of ten years after such person has been released from custody following completion of sentence. Additionally, it is an offense for any convicted violent felon to own or have custody of a dog that is not microchipped or spayed/neutered. This section shall only apply if a person's conviction for a violent felony occurs on or after July 1, 2010. | Statute | |
| WA - Vehicle - 46.61.660. Carrying persons or animals on outside part of vehicle | West's RCWA 46.61.660 | WA ST 46.61.660 | This Washington law states that it is illegal to transport any living animal on the running board, fenders, hood, or other outside part of any vehicle unless suitable harness, cage or enclosure is provided that protects the animal from being thrown. | Statute | |
| NJ - Dog Bite - Chapter 19. Dogs, Taxation and Liability for Injuries Caused by | N. J. S. A. 4:19-16 | NJ ST 4:19-16 | This New Jersey statute provides that the owner of any dog that bites a person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. | Statute | |
| MA - Cat of commonwealth - Chapter 2. Arms, Great Seal and Other Emblems of the Commonwealth. | M.G.L.A. 2 § 30 | MA ST 2 § 30 | The Tabby cat shall be the official cat of the Massachusetts commonwealth. | Statute | |
| Arrington v. Arrington | 613 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) |
A divorcing couple agreed to visitation of their dog, which the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree, appointing wife as the dog's managing conservator. Husband appealed because he had not been appointed managing conservator; the appellate court stated that dogs are personal property, and the office of managing conservator had been created for human children. While the court held that dogs are personal property under the law, it also stated that visitation of dogs should be allowed. |
Case | ||
| Gerofsky v. Passaic County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | 870 A.2d 704 (N.J. 2005) | 376 N.J.Super. 405 |
The President of the New Jersey SPCA brought an action to have several county SPCA certificates of authority revoked. The county SPCAs brought a counterclaim alleging the revocation was beyond the state SPCA's statutory authority. The trial court revoked one county's certificate of authority, but the Court of Appeals held the revocation was an abuse of discretion. |
Case | |
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium | 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018) | 85 ERC 2299, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 517, 2018 WL 385682 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) | PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed. | Case |