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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OR - Pet Dealers - 609.520. Inspection of records; procedure for obtaining animal held by dealer; | O. R. S. § 609.520 | OR ST § 609.520 | This Oregon statute sets out the right of a person to inspect a pet dealer's business for the purpose of finding a lost companion animal. The statute also outlines acceptable methods to prove ownership and the procedure for resolving a dispute of ownership. | Statute |
| WV - Charleston - Chapter 10: Animals (Article IV. Urban Deer Management) | Code of the City of Charleston, West Virginia § 10-171 |
This Charleston, West Virginia ordinance allows a person to hunt deer within city limits, but only upon certain conditions. For instance, a person must obtain a permit from the city, must hunt only with a bow and arrow, and must hunt only on certain tracts of land—amongst other things—in order to be compliant with these provisions. A violation of this ordinance is a misdemeanor and may result in fines ranging from $10 to $500, imprisonment for up to 30 days, or both. Additionally, a violation may suspend or revoke a person's hunting permit. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Re Wildlife Protection Association of Australia Inc. and Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts | [2004] AATA 1383 |
The Minister for the Environment approved plans for the 'harvesting' of Kangaroos in South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland. The Tribunal found that the killing of joeys, where the mother was also killed, was sanctioned by the Model Code relating to kangaroos and that any licences issued under the plans authorised those killings. The Tribunal found that the likelihood of compliance with the code, which stipulated the manner of killing of kangaroos, would be in the range of 95-99%. The Tribunal approved each of the plans but made a recommendation that future plans should involve a greater element of public consultation. |
Case | |
| Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T - Ecuador | Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T | Este es el caso de cuatro gatos llamados Luna, Manchas, Sonic y Tiger y dos perros, Pantera y Noah que estaban dentro de las propiedades confiscadas por las autoridades en un caso de tráfico de drogas. El abogado Kevin Prendes Vivar presentó un recurso de habeas corpus en representación de los cuidadores de los animales, alegando que los animales estaban siendo retenidos ilegalmente por el "Secretario Técnico de Gestión Inmobiliaria del Sector Público" o "Inmobiliar", la agencia gubernamental que confiscó las propiedades. El demandante argumentó que los animales, como sujetos de derechos según la decisión de la Corte Constitucional 253-20-JH/22, estaban en un estado de soledad que los ponía en riesgo de problemas de salud y bienestar, ya que estos animales tenían un apego emocional a sus cuidadores. Los animales son seres sensibles diferentes de otros objetos, y su detrimento se refleja en su salud física y emocional, causando condiciones como depresión y ansiedad, condiciones que podrían poner fin potencialmente a su vida. Los animales estaban siendo retenidos por 'Inmobiliar', y los demandantes no habían recibido ninguna información sobre la condición de los animales. Además, los demandantes estaban preocupados por la condicion de los animales ya que no tenian conocimiento acerca de su alimentacion. Especialmente porque 'Inmobiliar' no tenía presupuesto para alimentar a los animales sujetos a confiscaciones. Según loa demandante, los animales eran miembros de su familia, y sus hijos sufrían sin ellos. El tribunal provincial de Guyanas concedió el habeas corpus, sosteniendo que los animales son sujetos de derechos, encontrando que 'Inmobiliar' había violado los derechos de los animales al considerarlos propiedad personal embargable. Por lo tanto, el tribunal determinó que su confiscación era ilegal, arbitraria e ilegítima. Para proteger sus derechos a la vida, la libertad y la integridad, ordenó a 'Inmobiliar' devolver los animales a sus cuidadores. En su análisis, el tribunal afirmó que, según el caso de Estrellita, los animales no deberían ser protegidos únicamente desde una perspectiva del ecosistema o desde la perspectiva de las necesidades humanas, sino más bien desde su individualidad y su valor intrínseco. El tribunal también instruyó a la entidad gubernamental a no considerar más a las "mascotas" como semovientes en futuros procedimientos judiciales, y a distribuir, a través del correo electrónico institucional, a todos sus funcionarios la decisión de la corte constitucional 253-20-JH/22, ordenándoles leerla y analizarla. Esta decisión fue apelada por 'Inmobiliar' y la sala especializada en lo penal de la Corte Provincial de Justicia de Guyanas anuló la decisión que otorgaba el habeas corpus a favor de los animales, afirmando que este mecanismo legal no era apropiado en el caso de animales domésticos. En su fallo, el tribunal ordenó la devolución de los animales a "Inmobiliar". Esta decisión ha sido enviada a la Corte Constitucional para su revisión. Si la corte la selecciona, decidirá si un recurso de habeas corpus es apropiado en casos relacionados específicamente con animales de compañía. | Case | |
| Sickel v. State | 363 P.3d 115 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 7873714 (Alaska Ct. App., 2015) | Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals under AS 11.61.140(a) after one of her horses was found starving, without shelter, and frozen to the ground (it later had to be euthanized). On appeal, defendant claims that she did not act with the requisite "criminal negligence" under the statute unless she had a duty of care to prevent the specified harm. The court noted that while the statute does not specify the exact nature of this duty to care for particular animals, common law fills the gap. In looking to similar laws and cases from other states, the court found that AS 11.61.140(a)(2) applies only to people who have assumed responsibility for the care of an animal, either as an owner or otherwise. The jury instructions taken as a whole and the prosecutor's argument and rebuttal demonstrated that Sickel assumed the duty of care with regard to the horses and was the person tending the horses in the last three days before the now-deceased horse collapsed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case |
| TX - Dangerous - § 822.0422. Reporting of Incident in Certain Counties and Municipalities | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.0422 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.0422 | This Texas statute outlines the procedures for reporting a dangerous dog incident in counties with a population of at least 2,800,000 in which an ordinance has been adopted pursuant to this section. It describes the reporting and seizure requirements should an owner fail to turn over an implicated dog. | Statute |
| NM - Wildlife - Article 15. Predatory Wild Animals and Rodent Pests | NMSA 1978, § 77-15-1 to 77-15-14 | NM ST §§ 77-15-1 to 77-15-14 | The New Mexico County Predatory Control Act deals with predatory wild animals and rodent pests. On federal lands, the federal government pays for rodent pest repression. On public federal or state lands, the state and federal cooperative funds pay for rodent pest repression. On private land, rodent pest repression is based on voluntary cooperation of owners, but if the owner fails, after written notice, to destroy the prairie dogs, the state rodent inspector is authorized to enter the lands and destroy the prairie dogs at the expense of the owner. Any person who interferes with the rodent inspector is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $100 to $500. | Statute |
| AR - Pine Bluff - Breed - Sec. 5-43. - Dangerous dog declaration/pit bull dogs restricted. | PINE BLUFF, AR., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 5-26, 5-27, 5-41 - 5-43 |
In Pine Bluffs, Arkansas, it is unlawful to keep any pit bull dog except as provided in section 54-3, with exceptions for pit bulls owned by local, state or federal agencies, used by law enforcement, or as a service animal by a handicapped or disabled person. Pit bulls must be registered, be vaccinated for rabies, be sterilized, and the owner must be at least 21 years old and keep liability insurance of $100,000. The dog must be properly confined with warning signs, and a leash and muzzle must be used.
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Local Ordinance | |
| Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co. | 241 P.2d 914 (Utah,1952) | 121 Utah 339 (1952) |
Plaintiffs sued defendant corporation for breach of warranty as to fitness of purpose of poultry feed concentrate after egg production dropped, hens became malnourished, and an unusual amount of picking and cannibalism developed. As to the issue of damages, the Supreme Court held instruction that plaintiff was entitled to damages in amount of market value of chickens destroyed and that provided formula by which market value of suitable replacements could be determined was correct. |
Case |
| Matter of S. A. B. | 531 P.3d 718, review denied sub nom. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. T. B., 371 Or. 476, 537 P.3d 939 (2023) | 326 Or.App. 192 (Or.App., 2023) | In this Ohio juvenile dependency case, a father appeals a juvenile court judgment ordering him to transfer the his dog to his child, claiming that the court lacked the authority to transfer possession of the dog. He also claims the dog is his personal property and not the child's. The child, who does not live with the father, suffers from panic attacks and has difficulty sleeping at night. The child's therapist testified that the child's mental health symptoms are exacerbated by "missing and worrying about the dog." The therapist testified that, because of the bond that child shares with the dog, the child's emotional support dog should be this particular dog. In contrast, the father claims the dog is legally his and provides a household benefit for him by keeping raccoons away from his chickens and deterring thieves from entering the property. The lower court found that the child shares a bond with the dog and having the dog as an emotional support animal would benefit the child. On appeal, the father argues that an emotional support animal does not fall within the statutory definition for "counseling" and, thus, the court's order was tantamount to giving away his property. In looking at the statute, the court noted that "counseling" is undefined and so looking at the plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate. As a result, the court found that the dictionary definition read with the policy goals of the chapter on jurisdiction of the juvenile court allowed the court to conclude that the term "counseling" includes the use of emotional support animals. The evidence in this case also shows that this particular dog is necessary as ". . . this particular dog is not just a pet, but rather is an emotional support animal for child, as evidenced by child's strong emotional bond with this particular dog and various testimony demonstrating that this particular dog will contribute to child's well-being by providing child with emotional stability and security." As to the property issue raised by the father, the court observed that courts routinely order parents to provide support for their children and this transfer of property did not abuse the court's discretion. Affirmed. | Case |