Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ID - Wildlife - Chapter 7. Captive Wildlife | I.C. § 36-701 to 716 | ID ST § 36-701 to 716 | This section comprises Idaho's captive wildlife provisions. Under the law, no person shall engage in any propagation or hold in captivity any species of big game animal found wild in this state, unless the person has been issued a license or permit by the director. All other species of mammals, birds or reptiles that are found in the wild in this state and are not species of special concern or threatened and endangered species, may be held in captivity without permit so long as the possessor retains proof that such wildlife was lawfully obtained. The laws concerning commercial wildlife farms are also included in this section. Additionally, there is also a section on the transition of wolves from federal to state management (36-715). | Statute | |
| D. Sociedad Protectora de Cocheros de Viña del Mar y otros con Ilustre Municipalidad de Viña del Mar - Chile (2015) | 491-2015 | The ‘Sociedad Protectora de Cocheros de Viña del Mar’ and the owners of ‘Coches Victoria’ filed a complaint or ‘acción de protección’ against Viña del Mar and its Mayor, arguing that municipal decree Nº 11.349, 2014 and the ordinance for the transportation of Passengers in Victoria carriages in Viña del Mar were arbitrary an illegal. The plaintiffs requested the modification of many clauses of the ordinance such as those related to the restriction of schedules and routes, the social evaluation of carriage owners, the requirement of specific technical characteristics for carriages, and the limitation on the number of carriages that a person could own. The Plaintiffs argued that the clauses affected the general interest of the community and the rights of the plaintiffs and their families such as the right to equality, the right against discrimination in the economy, the right to physical and emotional integrity, the right to privacy, and the right to property. The city argued that the statute of limitations had already expired, and that additionally, it had the authority to regulate transportation. Furthermore, the city stated that the ordinance was enacted with the purpose of improving passenger safety and the well-being of the horses. The court ruled in favor of the city, upholding its authority to regulate transportation and finding that the ordinance did not violate any of the constitutional rights alleged by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the ordinance was upheld. | Case | ||
| Cat Champion Corp. v. Jean Marie Primrose | 149 P.3d 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) | 210 Or.App. 206 (2006) |
A woman had 11 cats which were in a state of neglect and were taken away from her and put with a cat protection agency. Criminal charges were dropped against the woman when it was found she was mentally ill and incapable of taking care of herself or her cats. The court found it could grant the cat protection agency ownership over the cats so they could be put up for adoption, even though the woman had not been criminal charged, and had not forfeited her cats. |
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| Swanson v. Tackling | 335 Ga. App. 810 (2016) | 2016 WL 718465 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) | This is an interlocutory appeal by the dog owners (the Swansons) in a personal injury lawsuit for a dog bite. The court in this case overruled the lower court’s ruling that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgement after defendant’s dog bit a child but the dog had never shown a propensity to injure anyone prior to the incident. Plaintiff was suing defendant after defendant’s dog bit plaintiff’s child on the arm and head. Plaintiff argued that defendant is responsible for the injuries caused by the dog because the defendant neglected to properly restrain the dog. The court reversed the lower court’s decision and held in favor of defendant, stating that there was no evidence that was presented to indicate that defendant could have or should have known that the dog would act in this way towards the child. In order to prevail, the plaintiff needed to present evidence that the dog had acted in a similar way in the past. | Case | |
| TX- Circus, entertainment animals - Subchapter B. Care of Animals by Circuses, Carnivals, and Zoos | 25 TX ADC § 169.41 - 169.48 | 25 TAC § 169.41 to .48 (§§ 169.41 to 169.48. Repealed eff. Nov. 13, 2016) | [Note: §§ 169.41 to 169.48 were repealed eff. Nov. 13, 2016. This information is provided for historical purposes only.] This set of regulations sets license conditions and fees for circuses, carnivals, and zoos that are regulated by the Department of Health Services and establishes standards regarding the care of animals maintained by those facilities. All circuses, carnivals, and zoos that are regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture under the Federal Animal Welfare Act are exempt from these regulations. | Administrative | |
| Koivisto v. Davis | 745 N.W.2d 824 (Mich.App., 2008) | 2008 WL 81559 (Mich.App.), 277 Mich.App. 492 (2008) |
Defendants, the Macaks, owned two dogs being boarded at Chieftan Kennels. Plaintiff was outside on her deck when the dogs entered her property and attacked her cats, one of which died later from its injuries. The plaintiff rushed to defend the cats and suffered multiple bites from the dogs. The trial court held that the plaintiff had “provoked” the dogs. The Court of Appeals reversed. “The dogs were already provoked and, in fact, were in a state of attack, for whatever reason when plaintiff responded to their behaviors while on her own property.” |
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| NV - Leash Law - Chapter 503. Hunting, Fishing and Trapping; Miscellaneous Protective Measures | N.R.S. 503.631, 636 | NV ST 503.631, 636 | This Nevada statute makes it illegal to permit such dog to run at large if such dog is actively tracking, pursuing, harassing, attacking or killing any wildlife in a state-owned wildlife management area. | Statute | |
| Hewitt v. Palmer Veterinary Clinic, PC | 35 N.Y.3d 541, 159 N.E.3d 228 (2020) | No. 28, 134 N.Y.S.3d 312, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 05975, 2020 WL 6163313 (N.Y., Oct. 22, 2020) | This is an action for negligence and premises-liability brought by a plaintiff, who was attacked by another patron's dog in the waiting room of defendant veterinary clinic. Plaintiff alleges defendant had a duty to provide a safe waiting area, which was breached by allowing the aggressive dog to attack her. Defendants allege that it had no knowledge of the dog's prior aggressive tendencies, and moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted defendants motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The court found that a lack of notice of the dog's vicious propensities does not alleviate defendant's liability to provide a safe waiting area, and modified the lower court's granting of summary judgment. | Case | |
| US - Food Animal - Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter | 7 USC 1901 - 1907 | These statutory sections comprise what is commonly termed the Humane Slaughter Act. Included in these sections are Congress' statement that livestock must be slaughtered in a humane manner to prevent needless suffering, research methods on humane methods of slaughter, the nonapplicability of these statutes to religious or ritual slaughter, and the investigation into the care of nonambulatory livestock. | Statute | ||
| People v. Jornov | 65 A.D.3d 363, 881 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2009) | 2009 WL 1887134 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.), 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 05430 |
This New York case stems from an attack on Philip Mueller and his dog by Defendant-Appellant Jornov's "two pit bull-terrier mixed breed dogs.” During proceedings in City Court, the court determined that defendant's dogs were dangerous dogs and directed that they be euthanized. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the finding that the dogs were dangerous under Agriculture and Markets Law § 121 and Agriculture and Markets Law § 350[5] because there was clear and convincing evidence that the dogs attacked a companion animal and behaved in a manner that a reasonable person would believe posed a serious and imminent threat of serious physical injury or death. However, under the amended version of the statute, a judge or justice may not automatically direct humane euthanasia or permanent confinement of a dangerous dog where none of the aggravating circumstances are present. |
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