Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Maikhio | 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 (Cal. 2011) | 2011 WL 2437645 (Cal. 2011); 51 Cal.4th 1074 (2011) |
Defendant was charged with possession of a spiny lobster during closed season and failure to exhibit his catch as required by a statute. The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizes a warden to demand that a person who is or has recently been fishing or hunting to display his catch; the Fourth Amendment does not preclude a warden from briefly stopping a person. The warden's knowledge that the defendant lied in claiming he had caught nothing established probable cause to search his vehicle. By denying that he had caught anything, defendant failed to display his catch upon demand. |
Case |
| Caswell v. People | 536 P.3d 323 (Colo., 2023) | 2023 CO 50 (Colo., 2023) | This case concerns several charges of animal cruelty against petitioner Caswell. A welfare check was conducted by a deputy at the Lincoln County Sheriff’s office in response to a report on Ms. Caswell. After two welfare checks were conducted, the deputies executed a search warrant at the Caswell residence, resulting in the seizure of sixty animals. These animals lacked sufficient food or water, were kept in enclosed spaces filled with feces and urine, and many of the animals were underweight or had untreated medical problems. Respondent, the People of the State of Colorado, charged Ms. Caswell with forty-three class six counts of cruelty to animals, which were charged as felonies because Ms. Caswell had prior convictions of misdemeanor animal cruelty on her record. The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts and sentenced her to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention. An appeal followed and the holding was affirmed. Petitioner filed for certiorari and the Supreme Court of Colorado granted. Here, petitioner argues that the use of her prior convictions for animal cruelty to enhance her charges to felonies violates the Sixth Amendment and article II of the Colorado Constitution. The court first considered whether the legislature meant to make the statutory provision used to enhance Caswell’s sentence as an element versus a sentence enhancer. The court here listed five factors to consider whether a fact is an element or sentencing factor: (1) the statute's language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) the risk of unfairness, (4) the severity of the sentence, and (5) the statute's legislative history. Four of these five factors signaled a legislative intent to designate it a sentence enhancer, so the court concluded that the legislature intended to designate the fact of prior convictions as a sentence enhancer rather than an element. The court also concluded that the sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment or article II of the Colorado Constitution, and affirmed the holding of the lower court. | Case |
| IN - Animal Sacrifice - RAJASTHAN ANIMALS AND BIRDS SACRIFICES (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1975 | Act No. 21 of 1975 | The law, specific to the North Indian state of Rajasthan, prohibits the sacrifice of animals and birds in temples or places of public religious worship. No person shall sacrifice an animal or birds or officiate at such a sacrifice—doing so is a criminal offence and violators may be imprisoned or fined. The Executive Magistrate may issue a prohibitory order if they receive information from a police officer that an animal sacrifice is going to be made | Statute | |
| CA - Abandonment - § 597f. Failure to care for animals; duty of peace or humane officers; | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597f (repealed) | CA PENAL § 597f | (Repealed in 2022). Every owner of any animal, who permits the animal to be without proper care and attention, shall, on conviction, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. It shall be the duty of any peace officer, officer of the humane society, or officer of a pound or animal regulation department of a public agency, to take possession of the animal so abandoned or neglected and care for the animal until it is redeemed by the owner. Every sick, disabled, infirm, or crippled animal, except a dog or cat, may, if after due search no owner can be found therefor, be killed by the officer. all injured cats and dogs found without their owners in a public place directly to a veterinarian known by the officer or agency to be a veterinarian that ordinarily treats dogs and cats for a determination of whether the animal shall be immediately and humanely destroyed or shall be hospitalized under proper care and given emergency treatment. | Statute |
| Canada - New Brunswick Statutes. Sheep Protection Act | R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-7, s. 1 - 6 | This set of New Brunswick laws comprises the Sheep Protection Act. Under the Act, where a sheep is killed or injured by a dog, the owner of the sheep may, within forty-eight hours, notify the Minister. The Minister then appoints an investigator who reports his or her findings back to the Minister. The Minister may then recover the expenses of the investigation from the owner of the dog, and may order the destruction of the dog. | Statute | |
| Moreland v. Marion County, Miss. | 2008 WL 4551443 (S.D.Miss.) |
Plaintiff brought action against Marion County (“County”) and several animal control officers (“Officers”) in their official capacities, after the Officers crossed county lines and confiscated several dogs that appeared severely dehydrated and malnourished, and euthanized at least one dog. On Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Hattiesburg Division held that since there was no evidence to indicate that Defendants’ actions were anything more than negligence not rising to the level of reckless disregard, Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants should be dismissed. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, finding that the record did not support a finding of a pattern of inadequate training rising to the level of deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequence, and that the Officers’ actions could not be found to be a known or obvious result of the County’s training. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. |
Case | |
| In the Matter of: Akiko Kawahara, Respondent | 1980 WL 26513 (N.O.A.A.) | 2 O.R.W. 340 (1980) |
The principle issue in this case is whether the planned stopover of a few hours in Kennedy Airport in New York constitutes an "importation" within the meaning of the MMPA. The respondent in this case was employed by a business dealing in the international trade of animals and was attempting to bring four dolphins captured off the coast of Argentina back to Japan. The respondent only landed the dolphins in New York as a stopover on their way to Tokyo, but the court found that there was no requirement of knowledge or specific intent under the MMPA to constitute civil violations. |
Case |
| Brisson v. These Guys New York Deli Corp. | Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2023 WL 370990 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2023) | The Superior Court of Connecticut considers defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress arising from the death of their pet dog. Plaintiffs argue that previous Connecticut case law (Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395) left open the question of whether courts could consider a claim for emotional distress damages due to the loss of a pet. The incident giving rise to the litigation occurred in 2021, where a driver for the defendants' company ran over plaintiffs' pet dog while making a delivery. The complaint states that one of the plaintiffs directly witnessed the driver speed down the driveway and kill the dog by dragging. The court began its analysis by first observing a dog is chattel and is unambiguously defined as personal property in the state. Myers left often the issue of recovery of damages when a "bystander" owner witnesses a "fatal injury." The court then examined the factors articulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court for recovery of emotional damages by a bystander. In doing so, the court here determined that the relationship between a pet and its owner does not meet the "closely related" element articulated by the Supreme Court. The court stated: "Absent appellate clarification that this factor includes other relationships, including the one at issue here between a pet owner and pet, this court cannot conclude that such a relationship is sufficiently like the close human relationships required under Clohessy." The court noted that it agreed with defendants that allowing plaintiffs' claim would amount to creating a new cause of action without legislative or appellate authority. Defendants' motion to strike was granted. | Case | |
| Australia - Welfare - Animal Welfare Act 1992 | A1992-45 | An Act for the promotion of animal welfare, and for related purposes. | Statute | |
| International Convention for the Protection of Animals |
A proposed umbrella treaty to deal with all aspects of animal issues. Topics covered in the protocols include, transportation of animal, methods of taking wildlife, care of exhibited wildlife and protection from cruel treatment. |
Treaty |