Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Canada - Canada Federal Statutes. Criminal Code. Part VIII -- Offences Against the Person and Reputation. Criminal Negligence. | R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 219 - 221 | The statutory definition of criminal negligence involves doing any act or omitting to do a legal duty that shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. In alleged criminal cases, it is the State rather than the attack victim who lays the charges. | Statute | |
| JACQUELINE CONRAD, PlaintiffAppellant, v. SUSAN CATAPANO and JIM CATAPANO, DefendantsRespondents | Not Reported in A.3d 2013 WL 673463 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2013) |
Plaintiff was injured by defendants' dog after being knocked to the ground. The plaintiff had her dog over to defendants' house for a "doggie play date" and the dogs were running off-leash in the fenced yard.The lower court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of negligence and absolute liability, finding that the defendants had not prior knowledge of the dog's propensity to run into people. The Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to defendants' prior knowledge of the dog's proclivities to become "hyper" in the presence of other dogs. Thus, the decision to grant summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for trial. Notably, the Court did state that it shared "the motion judge's observation that plaintiff may well be comparatively at fault here for choosing to stand in the backyard while the three unleashed dogs ran around." |
Case | |
| People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. United States Dep't of Agric. & Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv. | 918 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2019) | 2019 WL 1212181 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2019) | The plaintiffs, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, sought documents from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”), the entity within the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) that administers the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”). The USDA took a large amount of documents off of its website relating to AWA compliance. The USDA claimed that the removal was for the purpose of removing certain personal information and although they did not say that the removal was temporary, the agency described the removal as provisional which suggests that it is temporary in nature. The plaintiffs filed suit asking for declaratory and injunctive relief and invoking a provision known as FOIA’s reading room provision (5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(2)). The provision requires that agencies make available for public inspection in an electronic format five categories of documents. The plaintiffs allege that the agency removed (1) research facility annual reports; (2) inspection reports; (3) lists of entities licensed under the AWA; and (4) regulatory correspondence and enforcement records that had not yet received final adjudication. Category 4 and the portion of category 2 consisting of animal inventories were dismissed and not discussed in this case. Categories 1-3 appeared to be reposted by the agency which is why the district court dismissed them as moot. The appeal centers on the reposted records and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims by the district court. Ultimately the Court held that for the reposted records featuring new redactions, the complaint was most plausibly read as requesting that USDA repost all information that those records contained before their takedown. The Court stated that the district court should proceed to the merits on remand. As to “voluntary cessation,” the Court affirmed the mootness dismissal as to the research reports but remanded for further explanation as to the inspection reports and the entity lists. If the agency unambiguously commits to continued posting of those documents, plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as moot, without discovery, even if USDA continues to regard its postings as voluntary. | Case |
| MD - Vehicles, unattended animals - § 21-1101. Unattended vehicle requirements | MD Code, Transportation, § 21-1101 | This Maryland law relates to unattended vehicles (i.e., a person must not leave a running motor vehicle unattended). When a cat or dog is left in the unattended vehicle of an on-duty law enforcement officer or an animal control officer, the provisions of that subsection do not apply to the law enforcement officer or the animal control officer. | Statute | |
| AL - Dog Fighting - Activities relating to fighting of dogs prohibited; violations; confiscation; | Ala. Code 1975 § 3-1-29 | AL ST § 3-1-29 | This Alabama statute constitutes the state's dogfighting law. Under the law, it is a class C felony for any person to own, possess, keep or train any dog with the intent that such dog shall be engaged in an exhibition of fighting with another dog; for amusement or gain, to cause any dog to fight with another dog, or cause any dogs to injure each other; or to permit any of the above acts. The law also makes it a class C felony to knowingly be present or be a spectator at dogfights. | Statute |
| Animal Law Volume 13 Part 2 Index |
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Policy | ||
| Dunham v. Kootenai County | 690 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Idaho, 2010) | 2010 WL 556803 (D.Idaho) |
This matter involves the Defendant Kootenai County's motion for summary judgment this federal civil rights case filed by Dunham. The facts underlying the case stem from 2008, when county animal control officers went to Dunham's residence to investigate complaints of possible animal cruelty. During their investigation, Defendants entered Dunham's property to ascertain the condition of the horses residing there in a round-pen. Despite the conditions of the horses which necessitated their removal and relocation to an equine rescue facility, Dunham was ultimately charged and found not guilty of charges of animal cruelty. Dunham claims that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they searched her property and seized her horses without a warrant. Defendants counter that the search was constitutional based on the open fields doctrine, and that the seizure was constitutional based on the plain view doctrine. Based on the open fields doctrine, the Court concluded that Dunham did not have an expectation of privacy in the searched area. |
Case |
| State v. Murphy | 10 A.3d 697 (Me.,2010) | 2010 ME 140; 2010 WL 5353130 (Me.) |
Defendant appeals her convictions for assault of an officer, refusing to submit to arrest, criminal use of an electronic weapon, and two counts of cruelty to animals. In October 2009, a state police trooper was dispatched to defendant's home to investigate complaints that she was keeping animals despite a lifetime ban imposed after her 2004 animal cruelty conviction. The appellate found each of her five claims frivolous, and instead directed its inquiry as to whether the trial court correctly refused recusal at defendant's request. This court found that the trial court acted with "commendable restraint and responsible concern for Murphy's fundamental rights," especially in light of defendant's outbursts and provocations. |
Case |
| Young v. California Fish and Game Commission | 24 Cal. App. 5th 1178 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (July 20, 2018), review denied (Sept. 26, 2018) | 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (July 20, 2018), review denied (Sept. 26, 2018) | Kele Young operated a wildlife preserve called Magic Jungle. Young received her first permit from the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in 1990 which was renewed each year thereafter. On August 8, 2013, Young filed her restricted species permit renewal application. On the application, Young stated that she was exempt from payment of the permit fee, application fee, and the inspection fee. Young’s permit was set to expire on November 9, 2013. The Department notified Young on July 14, 2014 that her renewal application was incomplete because the fee had not been paid. The Department agreed to waive the $56.14 permit fee and the $56.65 application fee, but the Department stated that she still had to pay the $227.91 inspection fee. Young was given 30 days to pay the fee. The Department ultimately denied Young’s renewal application. Young appealed to the Commission. The Commission found for the Department. Young then sought a writ of mandate to require the Department to perform its duty to determine whether justified reasons existed to grant or deny Young’s request for a waiver of certain restricted species permitting fees. The trial court denied Young’s writ and this appeal followed. Young failed to support many of her arguments by reference to the record or legal authority, therefore, the only issues that were reviewed were whether the Wildlife Agencies could refuse to waive the inspection fee without consideration of the justified reasons or whether it was in the best interests of the public to waive the fee and if reversal was warranted due to the trial court failing to issue a statement of decision. The Court of Appeals found that no statement of decision was required by the trial court because a statement of decision is only required as to issues of fact and the trial court stated that it was only deciding issues of law and that there was no dispute as to the facts. As for the inspection fee, the Court found that the regulations specifically provided for a waiver of the permit fee but did not contain any other language that would allow for a waiver of the inspection fee. The permit fee was separate from the inspection fee and nothing in the regulations entitled her to a waiver of the inspection fee nor granted the Department the authority to waive such fee. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition for writ of mandate. | Case |
| State Animal Anti-Cruelty Laws |
This map contains links to the animal anti-cruelty laws for all 50 states. Each state's set of laws contains a collection of relevant cruelty laws, including dogfighting, intentional cruelty, neglect/abandonment, and bestiality. |
State map |