Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eastern Band Cherokee - Animal Control - Sec. 19.1, Animal Control Department | Eastern Band Cherokee, Sec. 19-19.1 |
This section of the Eastern Band Cherokee Code describes the purpose of the Tribe's Animal Control Department. The Eastern Band Cherokee Animal Control Code includes Sections 19.1 through 19.7. Each section addresses a different topic within the Tribe's animal control, ranging from administrative purposes to restrictions and regulations. |
Statute | ||
| ME - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | 17 M. R. S. A. § 1311 - 1316; 26 M. R. S. A. § 1420-A - 1420C; 7 M. R. S. A. § 3961-A; 5 M. R. S. A. § 4551 - 4555, 4582-A, 4592; 14 M. R. S. A. § 6030-G; 14 M. R. S. A. § 164-B | ME ST T. 17 § 1311 - 1316; ME ST T. 26 §§ 1420-A - 1420-C; ME ST T. 7 § 3961-A; ME ST T. 5 § 4551 - 4555, 4582-A, 4592; ME ST T. 14 § 6030-G; ME ST T. 14 § 164-B | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute | |
| CT - Equines - Transportation of Equines | CT ADC §§ 22-415-1 to 4 | Regs. Conn. State Agencies §§ 22-415-1 to 4 | These Connecticut regulations provide the requirements for transporting equines. Under the regulations, the use of double deck or possum belly vehicles to transport horses is strictly prohibited. | Administrative | |
| Animal Law Index Volume 19, Part 2 |
Animal Law Review Volume 19, Issue 2 (Spring 2013)
INTRODUCTIONCONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT: THE CONSTITUTION AND ANIMALS
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Policy | |||
| WA - Initiative - Initiative 1401, Trafficking of animal species threatened with extinction | Initiative 1401 (2015) | Initiative 1401 would amend several sections of the Washington code (RCW 77.15.085, 77.15.100, and 77.15.425; reenacting and amending RCW 77.08.010). This measure would prohibit sale, purchase, trading, or distribution of elephant, rhinoceros, tiger, lion, leopard, cheetah, pangolin, marine turtle, shark, or ray species listed as endangered or vulnerable in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species or the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s red list, including items made from listed species. Violations would be a gross misdemeanor or class-C felony. It would exempt certain distributions, including musical instruments and transfers for educational purposes. The measure passed by 71% voting "yes" for the initiative. | Statute | ||
| IL - Cruelty - Horse Mutilation Act | 720 ILCS 5/48-5 | IL ST CH 720 § 5/48-5 (FORMER ACT IL ST CH 720 § 315/0.01 - 1) | This act text prevents the docking of horses' tails. Violation results in a Class A misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| Kollman v. Vilsack | Slip Copy, No. 8:14-CV-1123-T-23TGW, 2016 WL 4702426 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2016) |
The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) (7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159) regulates the housing, sale, transport, treatment, and exhibition of animals. Defendants, United States Secretary of Agriculture, licensed Plaintiff, Lancelot Kollman, as an exhibitor under the AWA. However, after the death of two lions and Kollman’s failure to contest charges, the Secretary revoked Kollman's license. Still, Hawthorn, a company that holds an exhibitor license, hired Kollman to train a “tiger act” for performance at circuses throughout the United States. Hawthorn then asked Kollman to travel with the tigers and perform the act. However, the USDA received complaints about Kollman's participation in the act, despite having his license revoked. The USDA investigated and determined that Kollman was prohibited from exhibiting animals as an employee of Hawthorn. Kollman, sued Thomas J. Vilsack, the United States Secretary of Agriculture, and Chester A. Gipson, a deputy administrator of animal care. Kollman sued for a declaration that, at a circus maintained by his employer, Hawthorn Corporation, he could publicly perform the tiger act. The Defendants moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division, held that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment was Granted. The court reasoned that Kollman was barred from presenting animals on behalf of Hawthorn because regardless of his status as a Hawthorn employee, Section 2.10(c) of the Animal Welfare Act clearly prohibited Kollman, as an individual with a revoked license, from exhibiting an animal. Secondly, Section 2.10(c) was unambiguous. |
Case | ||
| Chadd v. U.S. | 794 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2015) | 2015 WL 4509174 (9th Cir., 2015) | The issue in this case was whether the United States may be sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for the actions of the National Park Service (NPS) relating to a mountain goat that attacked and killed a Park visitor. Wife of the visitor, on her own behalf and as representative of his estate, sued the NPS, claiming officials breached their duty of reasonable care by failing to destroy the goat in the years leading up to her husband’s death. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether an exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied. The court found the NPS’s management policies manual did not direct or mandate the NPS to take action to kill the mountain goat, and thus the NPS's management of the goat fell within the discretionary function exception. Further, the NPS’s decision to use non-lethal methods to manage a mountain was susceptible to policy analysis, which fell within the discretionary exception as well. The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed. Senior Circuit Judge Kleinfield filed a dissenting opinion. | Case | |
| FL - Dogs - Florida Dog /Dangerous Dog Laws | West's F. S. A. § 509.233; § 767.01 - 16; § 705.19; § 823.041; § 823.15 - 151; § 877.14 | FL ST § 509.233; §§ 767.01 - 16; § 705.19; § 823.041; § 823.15 - 151; § 877.14 | These Florida statutes outline the state's dog provisions, which mainly cover dangerous dog/dog bite laws. The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owners' knowledge of such viciousness. However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate cause of the biting incident reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the percentage that the bitten person's negligence contributed to the biting incident. If a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks or bites a person or a domestic animal without provocation, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. The dog will be impounded for a period of ten days during which time the owner of the dog may request a hearing. | Statute | |
| Hebert v. Broussard | 886 So.2d 666 (La.App. 3 Cir., 2004) | 2004 WL 2536810 (La.App. 3 Cir.) |
A dog that chased and pinned a man was shot by a police officer who had been called for assistance. The dog owner instituted an action against the police officer, the police chief and the city. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the police officer, police chief and city, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding the police officer was entitled to statutory immunity. |
Case |