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Displaying 91 - 100 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R v. Menard | R v. Menard 1978 CarswellQue 25 | R v. Menard (1978) 43 C.C.C. (2d) 458 | The accused in R v. Menard had a business euthanizing animals by use of motor exhaust which caused pain and burns to the mucous membranes of the animals he was euthanizing. In a decision written by future Canadian Supreme Court Chief Justice, Lamer J. overturned a decision from the lower courts and reinstated the original conviction. Lamer J. statements about the animal-human relationship have been influential in Canadian Animal case law. | Case |
| Molenaar v. United Cattle Co. | 553 N.W.2d 424 (Minn.App., 1996) |
Plaintiff livestock owner sued defendant livestock owner for conversion after defendant knowingly took both its heifers and plaintiff's heifers from a livestock holding facility that defendant was suing for breach of contract. The District Court entered judgment after a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff but granted judgment notwithstanding verdict (JNOV) to defendant on punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held that punitive damages could be awarded even though defendant did not suffer personal injury and the evidence was sufficient to find defendant liable for conversion. This case established that a litigant may recover punitive damages for conversion of property if the conversion is in deliberate disregard of the rights or safety of others. |
Case | |
| OK - Dangerous dog - § 44. Definitions | 4 Okl. St. Ann. § 44 | OK ST T. 4 § 44 | This Oklahoma statute provides the definitions related to dangerous dog laws in the state, including dangerous dog, potentially dangerous dog, severe injury, and owner, among others. | Statute |
| State v. Beekman | State v. Beckman, 27 N.J.L. 124 (1858) |
The defendant was convicted, in the Somerset Oyer and Terminer, of malicious mischief. The indictment charges that the defendant unlawfully, willfully, and maliciously did wound one cow, of the value of $ 50, of the goods and chattels of J. C. T. The defendant appealed the conviction contending that the act charged in the indictment didn't constitute an indictable offence in this state. The Court held that the facts charged in this indictment constitute no indictable offence, and the Court of Over and Terminer should be advised accordingly. |
Case | |
| Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2024) | 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D.Mo., 2024) | Plaintiffs, a nonprofit advocacy organization and a plant-based meat alternative producer, filed this case to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the misrepresentation of a product as meat that is not derived from livestock or poultry. Plaintiffs bring four constitutional claims against the statute: violation of the First Amendment, violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, violation of Due Process, and Declaratory Judgment. For the First Amendment violation, plaintiffs specifically argue that the statute is an unlawful restriction on truthful commercial speech. However, the court finds that the statute does not restrict truthful commercial speech, since plaintiffs are still able to accurately indicate what sort of products they are selling to consumers. For the Dormant Commerce Clause argument, the court finds that the statute does not discriminate in purpose or effect, and that the statute passes the Pike balancing test. For the Due Process claim, the court finds that the statute provides sufficiently specific guidance to both the public and prosecutors as to what actions are prohibited, so it does not violate Due Process. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's claims and motion for summary judgment. | Case |
| Sentencia T-146/16 | Sentencia T-146/16 | Plaintiffs, a family that owned a howler monkey named "bebé" or "King Kong," filed "Amparo" seeking the protection of their rights to life and health, arguing that such rights had been violated by "Corporación Autónoma Regional de Cundinamarca's" (CAR) refusal to return "bebé" to his family. The plaintiffs alleged that "bebé" was a member of their family, and not having him affected the family's emotional and physical health. Finally, they argued that the sadness and depression were so severe that they took group therapy with a psychologist. The monkey was stolen from the family's property and rescued was assisted by "Corporación Autónoma Regional de Cundinamarca," who sent the monkey to "Fundación Bioandina." However, the defendants reported the monkey to be completely "humanized." He was so stressed that he did not eat and had to be relocated to the Medellin Zoo to be rehabilitated. The Second Chamber of Review of the Constitutional Court determined that wildlife is not subject to property by individuals and that the state of freedom of wildlife should be privileged. According to article 248 of the National Code of Renewable Natural Resources, the court stated that wildlife belongs to the nation. Therefore, the defendant's actions did not violate the family's well-being, as the forfeiture of wildlife is necessary to ensure their conservation protection as it is a constitutional mandate to protect biodiversity and environmental integrity. The court noted that the monkey had completed his rehabilitation process and had been reintroduced to his natural habitat. | Case | |
| TN - Ordinances - § 44-17-401. Use of electronic locating collars on dogs | T. C. A. § 44-17-401 | TN ST § 44-17-401 | This Tennessee statute provides that no agency or entity of state or local government shall enact, adopt, promulgate, or enforce any law, ordinance, rule, regulation, or other policy which restricts or prevents the owner of any dog from using an electronic locating collar to protect such dog from loss. | Statute |
| CA - Burro - § 53074.5. Undomesticated burros; removal by officer or employee of local | West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code § 53074.5 | CA GOVT § 53074.5 | This California law allows an officer or employee of a local animal control agency to remove an undomesticated burro that strays onto private land at the request of the landowner. Such officer can also remove an undomesticated burro that strays onto a public roadway to ensure public safety. | Statute |
| NJ - Pet Trusts - Trusts for care of domesticated animals | N.J.S.A. 3B:31-24 | NJ ST 3B:31-24 | A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Note: this section replaces the original law (3B:11-38) enacted in 2001 and repealed in 2016. | Statute |
| MT - Initiatives - Constitutional Amendment 41 | Constitutional Amendment 41 (2004) | This 2004 ballot measure was an amendment to the constitution proposed by the legislature. The 2003 Legislature submitted this proposal for a vote. It would amend the Montana Constitution by adding a provision specifically to recognize and preserve the opportunity of Montana citizens to harvest wild fish and wild game animals. The amendment specifies that this new provision does not create a right to trespass on private property or diminish any other private rights. This amendment is effective upon approval by the electorate. It was passed in 2004 by 80.6% of voters. | Statute |