Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reicksview Farms, L.L.C. v. Kiehne | 541 F. Supp. 3d 935 (N.D. Iowa 2021) | This case is brought by a farm in the business of raising and breeding pigs. Plaintiff brought suit against a veterinarian and veterinary clinic for several claims, including malpractice. Plaintiff alleges defendant failed to oversee and perform testing for Mhp, leading plaintiff to unknowingly transfer infected pigs to other farms resulting in monetary damages. Defendants moved for summary judgment and were denied, with the court holding that the two year statute of limitations for veterinary malpractice claims does not apply, and the five year statute of limitations for unwritten contract applies. | Case | |
| OR - Police Animal - 682.410. Emergency transportation for treatment of police dogs injured in the line of duty | O.R.S. § 682.410 | OR ST § 682.410 | Under this Oregon law from 2021, an emergency medical services provider may provide emergency transportation for treatment to a police dog that is injured in the line of duty, provided that such transportation for treatment does not delay or otherwise interfere with the emergency transportation for treatment of any human. | Statute |
| U.S. v. Chevron USA, Inc. | 2009 WL 3645170 (Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.) | After 35 dead Brown Pelicans were discovered in the space between the inner wall of the caisson and the outer wall of a wellhead, Chevron was charged with a violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. But, the Court held that the MBTA was clearly not intended to apply to commercial ventures where, occasionally, protected species might be incidentally killed as a result of totally legal and permissible activities. Therefore, at the plea hearing the Court refused to accept the plea of guilty from Chevron. | Case | |
| WA - Lien, cruelty - 60.56.025. Lien created for care of animal seized by law enforcement officer | West's RCWA 60.56.025 | WA ST 60.56.025 | This Washington law states that if a law enforcement officer authorizes removal of an animal pursuant to chapter 16.52 RCW, the person or entity receiving the animal and aiding in its care or restoration to health shall have a lien upon the animal for the cost of feeding, pasturing, and caring otherwise for the animal. | Statute |
| TX - Dallas - Dallas City Code. Volume I. Chapter 7. Animals. | Sec. 7-1.1 - Sec. 7-8.3 |
This comprises Dallas, Texas' animal control and dangerous dog ordinances. Among the provisions is a requirement that an owner of an animal restrain the animal at all times in a fenced yard, in an enclosed pen or structure, or by a tether or leash. Other provisions of interest include an anti-trapping provision; a section that prohibits the carrying or transporting of an animal within the open bed of any moving pickup; and limitations on the number of dogs or cats that residents can maintain based on the size of the lot and proximity to other dwellings. Dallas has a mandatory spay/neuter requirement; an owner of a dog or cat commits an offense if the animal is not spayed or neutered once over six months old (subject to certain exemptions). Further, a person commits an offense if he or she breeds a dog or cat without a valid intact animal permit for the dog or cat. Other provisions include the keeping of prohibited animals, the keeping of roosters, and noise disturbances by animals. |
Local Ordinance | |
| NV - Research - 598.993. Prohibition on import, sale or offer for sale of cosmetic products tested on animals; exceptions; | N.R.S. 598.993 | N. R. S. 598.993, NV ST 598.993 | This Nevada law, enacted in 2020, states that a manufacturer shall not import for profit, sell or offer for sale in this State any cosmetic for which the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that animal testing was conducted or contracted by or on behalf of the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer if the animal testing was conducted on or after January 1, 2020. Limited exceptions exist. A violation of this section constitutes a deceptive trade practice for the purposes of NRS 598.0903 to 598.0999, inclusive. | Statute |
| Hines v. Quillivan | 982 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2020) | This case asks whether a veterinarian in Texas has a right to engage in telemedicine for a pet he has not physically examined. The plaintiff challenged Texas' physical-examination requirement that prohibits veterinarians from offering individualized advice to pet owners unless the vet previously examined the animal. Dr. Ronald Hines, a licensed veterinarian in Texas, stopped practicing in-person veterinary medicine in 2002 due to his age and other ailments. He then transitioned to a practice based remotely through the Internet. In 2012, the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (the Board) investigated Hines and found he had violated state law. The Board ordered him to cease providing veterinary advice electronically without first physically examining the animal. In 2013, Dr. Hines filed suit against the Board members claiming that the physical-examination requirement violated his First Amendment, equal-protection, and substantive-due-process rights. The district court then granted the motion to dismiss by the Board and the Court of Appeals found Hines failed to state a claim on appeal. Since that 2015 opinion, Texas revised its medical doctor laws, allowing them to engage in telemedicine, but did not do the same for veterinary practice laws. In addition to that change, a United States Supreme Court held that statements made by medical doctors could now be deemed "professional speech" (the "NIFLA" case). As a result of these changes, Hines brought the present suit arguing that the changes in Texas' telemedicine laws and the NIFLA case enabled him to pursue a new equal-protection claim and First Amendment claim. With regard to his protected speech claim, this Court found that subsequent caselaw does entitle Hines' claim to greater judicial scrutiny than his previous case allowed. Thus, remand to the district court to make the initial evaluation of whether Hines' conduct or speech is being regulated is required. On the equal-protection argument, the court found that Hines presents an argument slightly different than his previous one. In essence, Hines argued in the prior appeal that the he physical-examination requirement treated veterinarians engaging in telemedicine differently than other veterinarians. Here, Hines argues that changes to the medical doctor licensing laws treats medical doctors differently than veterinarians in the state with respect to telemedicine. Using a rational-basis review, the court held that it is rational to distinguish between human and animal medicine because of the differences in training, schooling, and overall practice of the professions. The court found the state's proffered reason that animals cannot communicate their symptoms as humans can ordinarily was a persuasive rational basis (although both Hines and the Dissent note that some humans like infants are unable to speak similar to animals and yet are allowed to be treated via telemedicine). The court found the services provided by both professions are not interchangeable and thus, the physical-examination requirement is not a protectionist measure for medical doctors. Ultimately, the court left it to the Texas legislature to expand any telemedicine changes to the veterinary practice code. The action was affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. | Case | |
| TX - Fighting - § 42.10. Dog Fighting. | V. T. C. A., Penal Code § 42.10 | TX PENAL § 42.10 | Texas criminal statute that prohibits dog fighting. Actions ranging from causing a dog to fight with another to attending a dog fight as a spectator are prohibited. To constitute an offense, one must demonstrate the requisite intent of intentionally or knowingly. | Statute |
| Posnien v. Rogers | 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975) |
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence in the diagnosis and the treatment of plaintiff's brood mare, which resulted in the mare's infertility. Plaintiff was required to show that Dr. Rogers did not exercise the care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled veterinarians doing the same type of work in the community, and that the failure to exercise the required skill and care was the cause of the injury. Experts testified at trial that the care exercised by Dr. Rogers met the standard of care of veterinarians practicing in the area, and had they been treating the mare, the treatment would not have differed substantially from that of Dr. Rogers. The Supreme Court held that the record is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that the care of Dr. Rogers did not meet the standard of care of other practitioners practicing in the community. |
Case | |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE HIMACHAL PRADESH PROHIBITION OF COW SLAUGHTER ACT, 1979 | 11 OF 1979 | The law, specific to the state of Himachal Pradesh, prohibits the slaughter of cows. No person may export cows for the purpose of slaughter. The law bans the sale of beef. Committing an offence under this Act may lead to imprisonment or fines. | Statute |