Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WI - Ordinances - 59.54. Public protection and safety | W. S. A. 59.54 | WI ST 59.54 | This Wisconsin statute provides that a local board may enact ordinances regulating the keeping, apprehension, impounding and destruction of dogs outside the corporate limits of any city or village, but such ordinances shall not conflict with ss. 174.01 and 174.042, and such ordinances may not apply in any town that has enacted an ordinance under s. 60.23(30). | Statute | |||||||
| Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee v. Lloyd | 2002 WL 31928523, 134 A Crim R 441 | 2002 NSWADT 284 |
Appeal of agency determination of veterinarian malpractice for failure to detect ring worms in a cat. Long case with full discussion of process of administrative hearing and the standards by which to decide if an action is malpractice. |
Case | |||||||
| Indiana v. Massachusetts | 202 L. Ed. 2d 564, 139 S. Ct. 859 (2019) | 139 S.Ct. 859 (Mem) (U.S.,2019) | A coalition of multiple states filed a lawsuit against Massachusetts in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thirteen states, Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, filed suit against the state of Massachusetts in response to the animal welfare laws created by Massachusetts Question 3. The states claimed to have direct standing to challenge the Massachusetts law because state agencies and instrumentalities own and operate farms that are subject to the Massachusetts law and wish to continue to sell products to other states, including Massachusetts. The states also claimed parens patriae standing on behalf of farmers and consumers within their borders that would be affected by the Massachusetts law. The plaintiff states filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court requesting that the Court declare the Massachusetts law unconstitutional. The Court denied the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint because hearing the case would not be an appropriate use of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court stated that, in order to resolve plaintiff’s challenge and address the issues of standing and the merits of the case, the Court would need to resolve complex factual disputes. The Court reasoned that such disputes are better suited to resolution in federal district court, not the U.S. Supreme Court. | Case | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 12 Núm 2 |
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Policy | |||||||||
| IL - Exotic pets - Act 68. Herptiles-Herps Act | 510 ILCS 68/1-1 to 510 ILCS 68/110–5 | IL ST CH 510 § 68/1-1 to IL ST CH 510 § 68/110–5 | Under the Herptiles-Herps Act reptiles and amphibians are exempt from the definition of “aquatic life” under the Fish and Aquatic Life Code. All rules and enforcement actions under the Illinois Conservation Law and the dangerous animals statutes related to reptiles and amphibians are now covered exclusively by this Act. | Statute | |||||||
| Auster v. Norwalk | 943 A.2d 391 (Conn. 2008) | 2008 WL 726289 (Conn. 2008) , 286 Conn. 152 (2008) |
Plaintiff, while on church premises, was bitten by a church employee's dog. Plaintiff seeks damages from church under the state dog bite statute, which imposes strict liability for damages on the dog's keeper. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in favor of the church, reasoning that a non-owner must be responsible for maintaining and controlling the dog at the time the damage is done in order to be held liable under the statute. |
Case | |||||||
| State v. Hartrampf | 847 P.2d 856 (Oregon 1993) | 118 Or.App. 237 (1993) |
Defendant appealed a conviction for attempted involvement in animal fighting, arguing that the statutes at issue were unconstitutionally vague. Since the defendant admitted he knowingly was among spectators at farm hosting a cockfighting event, the Court of Appeals held that a person of common intelligence could discern that defendant's conduct constituted a substantial step toward involvement in animal fighting. |
Case | |||||||
| U.S. v. Top Sky | 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976) |
Defendant alleged that his treaty-based hunting rights incorporate a right to sell eagles. The court disagreed, finding such an interpretation of those treaty rights contrary to Indian custom and religion. Court also holds that defendant lacks standing to raise a religious challenge to the BGEPA based on the religious rights of others. Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendant's overbreadth claim. For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case | ||||||||
| UT - Wolves - Chapter 29. Wolf Management Act | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-15-101 - 202 (formerly cited as U.C.A. 1953 § 23-29-101 - 102; § 23-29-201 - 202) | UT ST § 23A-15-101 - 202 (formerly cited as UT ST § 23-29-101 - 202) | Under the Utah Wolf Management Act, the division shall manage wolves to prevent the establishment of a viable pack in all areas of the state where the wolf is not listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act until the wolf is completely delisted under the act and removed from federal control in the entire state. | Statute | |||||||
| Texas Attorney General Letter Opinion 94-071 | Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. LO 94-071 |
Texas Attorney General Opinion regarding the issue of whether staged fights between penned hogs and dogs constitutes a criminal offense. The Assistant Attorney General deemed these staged fights as violating the criminal cruelty laws. |
Case |