Results
Displaying 6631 - 6639 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WA - Exotic Pet - Chapter 16.30. Dangerous Wild Animals | West's RCWA 16.30.005 - 900 | WA ST 16.30.005 - 900 | This Washington chapter passed in 2007 regulates the keeping of dangerous wild animals. By definition, a potentially dangerous wild animal includes, among others, lions, tigers, captive-bred cougars, jaguars, cheetahs, leopards, wolves, (but excluding wolf-hybrids), bears, hyenas, non-human primates, elephants, rhinoceroses, certain reptiles, and venomous snakes. A person shall not own, possess, keep, harbor, bring into the state, or have custody or control of a potentially dangerous wild animal. A person in legal possession of a potentially dangerous wild animal prior to July 22, 2007, and who is the legal possessor of the animal may keep possession of the animal for the remainder of the animal's life. | Statute |
| GA - Banks County - Chapter 14 (Article 3: Domestic Animals) & Appendix A: Zoning | The Code of Banks County, Georgia §§ 14-33, 14-34, 301, 501-503, 601-603, 701(A)-703(A), 701(B)-703(B) |
In Banks County, Georgia, the number of dogs a person may own depends on the zone in which the person's property is located. The following ordinances indicate the zones and the numbers, as well as provide additional restrictions on dogs located within certain zones.
|
Local Ordinance | |
| Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne | 472 F.3d 872 (D.C. Cir. 2006) | 2006 WL 3687107 (D.C. Cir.) |
A government agency was killing mute swans, because of their impact on the environment, and the plaintiffs sued, alleging that this action violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (that implements international treaties the United States has with Canada and Mexico). The Court found that the government agency may kill mute swans because the Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act, implemented in 2004, modified the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to allow for the killing of non-native birds. Mute swans are non-native to the United States because they were brought over from Europe. |
Case |
| Fallo Kattan Alberto c/ Estado Nacional. Año 1982 | 42.470/83 | Before the Argentina National Constitution of 1994, the attorney Alberto Kattan and Juan Schroder brought an action of amparo (protection of rights) against the national government to prevent the hunting of 14 Commerson's dolphins that had been authorized by the national government. The question was whether these people had a cause of action as they had not suffered any direct or personal harm. The court declared the action of amparo valid leaving the administrative authorizations that allowed the hunting of Commerson's dolphins without effect. | Case | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund, Wake County, A North Carolina Body Politic and Kelli Ferris, D.V.M., Plaintiffs v. Janie Conyers, Def | Plaintiffs in this case consist of the Wake County Animal Care, Control, and Adoption Center and the local chapter of the ALDF. They seek preliminary and permanent injunctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Secs. 19A-1 through 19A-4 against Defendant Janie Conyers, who was found to have 106 animals living in her house under deplorable conditions. Specifically, plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendant from acquiring any animals for 10 years after entry of judgment in this action. Plaintiffs also moved for an order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 19A-4 terminating all possessory interests in the animals seized and awarding custody and possessory rights to the ALDF. Most of the animals suffer from severe chronic oral and skin conditions due to neglect. Included in the documents are affidavits from veterinary professionals and the director of Wake County Animal, Care, Control, and Adoption Center concerning both the conditions of the animals seized and the estimated costs of care for those animals during the pendency of the litigation. | Pleading | ||
| TX - Horse - Sale of Horsemeat (Chapter 149. Sale of Horsemeat for Human Consumption) | V. T. C. A., Agriculture Code § 149.001 - 007 | TX AGRIC § 149.001 - 007 | These statutes prohibit the sale of horsemeat, the possession of horsemeat with the intent to sell, and the knowing transfer of horsemeat to a person who intends to sell it for human consumption. Horsemeat is defined as the flesh of an animal of the genus equus. Prima facie evidence of an offense is prescribed by these statues and includes, for example, the presence of horsemeat in a restaurant or cafe. The penalty for an offense may be a fine of up to a $1,000, confinement for not less than 30 days and not more than two years, or both a fine and confinement. | Statute |
| Rowley v. Murphy | [1964] 2 QB 43 | [1963] 3 WLR 1061; [1964] 1 All ER 50; 128 JP 88; 107 SJ 982 |
A deer being hunted with a pack of hounds jumped onto a road and fell under a stationery vehicle. Members of the hunt dragged the deer from under the vehicle to a nearby enclosure, where the Master of the hunt slit the deer's throat and killed it. The Divisional Court held that the Master could not be convicted of an offence of cruelty under the 1911 Act because, for the purposes of that Act, which protects only captive and domestic animals, a mere temporary inability to escape did not amount to a state of captivity. |
Case |
| VT - Trapping - § 4254c. Notice of trapping; dog or cat | 10 V.S.A. § 4254c | This Vermont law, effective January of 2019, states that a person who incidentally traps a dog or cat shall notify a fish and wildlife warden or the Department within 24 hours after discovery of the trapped dog or cat. The Department shall maintain records of all reports of incidentally trapped dogs or cats submitted under this section, and the reports shall include the disposition of each incidentally trapped dog or cat. | Statute | |
| Council of the State, Sentencia 22.592 of May 23, 2012 | Sentencia 22.592 of May 23, 2012 | Appeal, brought by the Plaintiff, who sought compensation for negligence on the part of the municipality of Anserma for the wrongful death of her husband, who died in the corrals of the slaughterhouse of Anserma when a bull charged him, causing him to fall and hit his head. The Plaintiff alleged that the slaughterhouse facilities were in poor condition, which was the cause of her husband’s death. If the facilities have been in good condition, he would not have had the accident. The court analyzed whether the damage was a result of the municipality's negligence as it did not maintained the facilities in a safe condition, or, if alternatively, it was an unfortunate accident not imputable to the Defendant. The court concluded that the Plaintiff did not present enough evidence to prove that the conditions of the facilities were the cause of the death of her husband. The court also found that the municipality was not in charge of the cattle in the slaughterhouse. Therefore, the damages were not imputable to the municipality. Furthermore, the court found the deceased was not an employee of the municipality, he was an independent employee that was hired by the slaughterhouse workers to assist them during the slaughter of cattle. The Court affirms the decision of the lower court and declares an exception of unconstitutionality of the expression “and if he alleges that he was not able to avoid the damage, he will not be heard.” of the Article 2354 of the Civil Code In its reasoning, the court determined that the accident was a result of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on the part of the deceased, and not a result of the behavior of the animal. The court addressed Article 2354 of the Civil Code, that established that the caretaker of a fierce animal that does not report any benefit for the owner will be responsible for the damages the animal may cause, but if he alleges that if the damages were unavoidable, he will not be heard. The court declared unconstitutional the line “ and if he alleges that he was not able to avoid the damage, he will not be heard.” The court stated that it was inappropriate to address this scenario that involves responsibility derived from the behavior of animals under the parameters in the Civil Code that treated animals as goods. As today, it was of common acceptance that animals are sentient beings. Animals just as disabled people and other beings had dignity in themselves. They have a vital purpose, so much that they can enter a direct and permanent relationship with humans. The court continues to say that without this idea, the notion of legal capacity and the recognition of fundamental rights for legal persons could not exist. Animals should not be compared to objects or things, as they have dignity. The court recognized that animals and other living beings have their own value, and that even if it is acceptable that they are used for the human’s own benefit, it does not prevent us from recognizing that they are living beings, endowed with own value, and therefore subject to some rights. | Case |