Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ID - Dangerous Dogs running at large - Chapter 28. Dogs. | I.C. § 25-2805 | ID ST § 25-2805 | This Idaho statute provides that any person who lets his or her dog run at large after a complaint has been made to the sheriff shall be guilty of an infraction punishable as provided in section 18-113A, Idaho Code. Any person who lets his or her dog physically attack someone when not provoked shall be guilty of a misdemeanor in addition to any liability as provided in section 25-2806, Idaho Code. For a second or subsequent violation of this subsection, the court may, in the interest of public safety, order the owner to have the vicious dog destroyed or may direct the appropriate authorities to destroy the dog. | Statute |
| CA - Slaughter - § 598b. Animals commonly kept as pets or companions; use as food; violation; exceptions | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 598b | CA PENAL § 598b | This statute makes it a misdemeanor to possess, import into, or export from, California, sell, buy, give away, or accept any carcass of any animal commonly kept as a pet with the intent of using any part of that carcass for food. It is also a misdemeanor to possess, import, export, buy, sell, give away or accept a common pet animal with the intent of killing it for food. | Statute |
| Faulkner v. Watt | 661 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1981) |
Reaffirms that purpose of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) is to stabilize the livestock industry and protect the rights of sheep and cattle growers from interference and that the Secretary of the Interior may reasonably classify lands under the TGA as suitable for agriculture. |
Case | |
| Animal Welfare Institute v. Martin | 665 F.Supp.2d 19 (D.Me., 2009) | 2009 WL 3403128 (D.Me.) |
Plaintiffs in this case filed motions for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order to halt the commencement of the early coyote and fox trapping season in the state of Maine. Plaintiffs claim that the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (DIFW)Commissioner had violated the ESA by allowing trapping activities that “take” Canada lynx, a threatened species. The DIFW stated that the Court has already addressed a motion for preliminary injunction and an emergency motion for temporary restraining order, with no change to circumstances. In denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and TRO, the Court found that Plaintiffs had not sustained their burden to justify the extraordinary remedy of an injunction. Further, the Court found that the circumstances that led the Court to deny the Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order have not changed. |
Case |
| Causa Penal No. 15241-2022-00006 | Causa Penal No. 15241-2022-00006 | Following the Estrellita case (Constitutional Court decision No. 253-20-JH/22), in 2022, the owner of "Cuqui Brown," a two-fingered sloth filed a habeas corpus petition following his seizure by the authorities. In this case, the court denied the habeas corpus and held that the plaintiff violated "Cuqui Brown's" rights established in Estrellita's case. | Case | |
| Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Vilsack | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2015 WL 1432069 (D. Colo. 2015) | 2015 WL 1432069 (D. Colo. 2015) | In an amended complaint, Plaintiffs asserted four claims against Defendants relating to a May 7, 2013 United States Department of Agriculture inspection of Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. The claims included a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Inspector Defendants “because they acted under color of state law when they induced the deputies to cut the chains and enter the premises;” a declaratory judgment “declaring that [Defendant] Thompson inappropriately overrode the medical advice of [Plaintiff] Big Cats' veterinarians and declaring that, in the future, the USDA cannot force [Plaintiff] Sculac to choose between following the medical advice of his veterinarians and the mandates of a USDA inspector;” and a declaratory judgment that the USDA must follow its own regulations and that it cannot conduct a warrantless search of the Big Cats facility outside of ‘normal business hours' solely because an inspector ‘want [s] to’ or because an inspector subjectively ‘believe[s][it] necessary to determine the welfare status of the animals....' ” In addition to declaratory relief, Plaintiffs also sought compensatory and punitive damages, costs, expenses, and prejudgment interest. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. US Magistrate Judge issued a recommendation that, to the extent the Motion argued that the declaratory judgment claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing, the Motion be granted in part and denied in part and that the declaratory judgment claims asserted by Plaintiffs Nick Sculac, Julie Walker, and Jules Investment, Inc. be dismissed without prejudice. In all other aspects, the Magistrate recommended that the Motion be denied. A District Court judge approved and adopted these recommendations and denied defendant’s objections to the recommendations. | Case |
| Austria - Animal Welfare - Federal Animal Protection Act | Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich, Part I, No. 118, 28 September 2004, 21 pp. | The subject Federal Act, in English, aims at the protection of life and well-being of all animals based on man’s special responsibility for the animal as a fellow-creature. The Federal, Laender and Municipal authorities are obligated to create and deepen understanding for animal protection on the part of the public and in particular on the part of youth. In this Act, it is unlawful to inflict unjustified pain, suffering or injury on an animal or expose it to heavy fear, as well as to kill animals without reason. Interventions carried out for other than therapeutic or diagnostic purposes or for the expert marking of animals in accordance with legal regulations applicable, are prohibited and particulars are listed. | Statute | |
| US - Housing - Fair Housing. Subchapter I. Generally. Section 3602. Definitions. | 42 U.S.C.A. 3601 - 3604 | The following sections of the Fair Housing Act relate to "reasonable accommodations" for persons with a handicap or disability. In Section 3602, the definition of "handicap" includes a person with: (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. Section 3604 is the operative part of the law that makes it unlawful to discriminate because of a handicap in the sale or rental of a dwelling. Under subsection (3)(B), the law states that discrimination includes the refusal to make "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." | Statute | |
| AR - Pet Sales - Chapter 97. Retail Pet Stores. | A.C.A. §§ 4-97-101 to 109 | AR ST §§ 4-97-101 to 109 | This statutory section comprises the Arkansas Retail Pet Store Consumer Protection Act of 1991. The purpose of the act is to ensure that purchasers receive consumer animals that are physically and temperamentally sound, healthy, and fit as companions. The Act also provides a means by which the acquisition and care of those animals can be monitored. | Statute |
| Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. | 378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) | 59 ERC 1110, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,068, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7152, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9715 |
This is a record review case in which the Appellants, an assortment of environmental organizations, challenge six biological opinions (BiOps) issued by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The BiOps in question allowed for timber harvests in specified Northwest forests and also authorized incidental "takes" of the Northern spotted owl, a threatened species under the ESA. With regard to appellants' challenge of the jeopardy analysis under the ESA, the court concluded that the jeopardy analysis conducted by the FWS in the six BiOps at issue in this case was permissible and within the agency's discretion. However, the critical habitat analysis in the six BiOps was fatally flawed because it relied on an unlawful regulatory definition of "adverse modification." The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case to the district court to grant summary judgment to the Petitioners on the critical habitat inquiry. |
Case |