Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hendricks v. Barlow | 656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995) | 656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995) |
Landowners were held in violation of a zoning regulation, established under a Hendricks County ordinance, which forbade having wild animals residing on residential property. The trial court held that the county could not pass such a law, since it would be preempted by state and federal law. However, on appeal, this Court found that federal (the AWA) and state law did not preempt the County from passing such ordinances. The trial court erroneously attempted to interpret the law when it was not ambiguous, and, thus, preemption by state and federal law should not have been found. Thus, the zoning regulation was permitted. |
Case | |
| NY - Disaster - Article 2-B. State and Local Natural and Man-Made Disaster Preparedness. Agriculture and Markets Law. | McKinney's Executive Law § 22, 23; McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 410 - 411; McKinney's Public Authorities Law § 1264-a; McK.Unconsol.Laws § 6408-e | NY EXEC § 22, 23; NY AGRI & MKTS § 410 | In New York, disaster emergency plans must include utilization and coordination of programs to assist individuals with household pets and service animals. Particular emphasis must be on evacuation, shelter and transportation options following a disaster. | Statute | |
| IN RE: ROSIA LEE ENNES | 45 Agric. Dec. 540 (1986) | 1986 WL 74679 (U.S.D.A.) | Civil penalty of $1,000 against unlicensed dealer was appropriate under 7 USCS § 2149(b), and greater penalty could have been requested where although moderate size of kennel suggested modest penalty, selling hundreds of dogs without license over 40-month period was grave violation of Animal Welfare Act, violations were not committed in good faith since dogs were knowingly and intentionally sold without license after receiving 4 warnings, and even though dealer thought mistakenly that Department would not prosecute her for such violations and there was no history of previous violations, the hundreds of violations proven were sufficient to warrant severe sanction. | Case | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert | This complaint launches the first legal challenge to any ag-gag law in the United States. In it, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Amy Meyer, and others argue that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112 is unconstitutionally overbroad, constitutes content-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, is preempted by the federal False Claims Act, and violates animal protection groups’ equal protection and due process. | Pleading | |||
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking and Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental | 2001 WL 929542 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 01-20647 (2001) |
NMFS, upon application from the University of California San Diego, Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Scripps), is issuing regulations to govern the unintentional take of a small number of marine mammals incidental to the continued operation of a low frequency (LF) sound source by Scripps. |
Administrative | |
| Daniels v. Drake | 195 N.E.3d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), transfer denied, 208 N.E.3d 1250 (Ind. 2023) | Plaintiff Damon Daniels appeals from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Drakes. The incident stems from an unprovoked dog bite at defendants' home. The Drakes live on a large, rural property in Indiana with no neighbors. The Drakes own five dogs including "Max," a large Great Dane. Max would roam the property unrestrained. Daniels is a FedEx driver. In September of 2020, Daniels entered the property to deliver a package. Upon approaching the residence, Daniels honked his horn a couple times to get the attention of Lisa Drake. Daniels, who was still inside the vehicle, asked Lisa if Max was "okay," to which Lisa indicated a "thumbs up." However, after walking toward Lisa with the package, Max barked once and then bit Daniels in the abdomen. Daniels sustained puncture wounds, a one-centimeter laceration, swelling and a hematoma from the bite. Approximately two months later, Daniels filed the instant complaint seeking damages related to the dog bite. The Drakes filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that they did not have actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities prior to the bite. In response, Daniels contended that Great Danes have a "natural propensity" to be territorial, which is exacerbated by isolation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal here, the court explained that Indiana law states that knowledge of a dog's dangerous or vicious tendencies may not be inferred from a first-time, unprovoked bite, but that knowledge may be inferred where evidence shows that the particular breed to which the owner's dog belongs is known to exhibit such tendencies." While the court observed that the Drakes presented evidence of a lack of actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities, the expert who testified on Great Dane behavior presented evidence that Great Danes might behave with "territorial aggressive tendencies" in a given situation. The Drakes argued on appeal (for the first time) that this evidence by a canine behavioral expert was "immaterial" and cannot be used to show what lay people would know about Great Danes. The court was unpersuaded by the Drakes' novel argument, and this created a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, this court reversed the order granting summary judgment for the Drakes and remanded the case for further proceedings. | Case | ||
| MT - Wolves, gray - 87-1-901. Gray wolf management--rulemaking--reporting | MCA 87-1-901 | MT ST 87-1-901 | This statute provides that the wildlife commission shall establish by rule hunting and trapping seasons for wolves. In addition, the commission shall adopt rules to allow a landowner or the landowner's agent to take a wolf on the landowner's property at any time without the purchase of a Class E-1 or Class E-2 wolf license when the wolf is a potential threat to human safety, livestock, or dogs. | Statute | |
| RI - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 17. Humane Slaughter of Livestock | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-17-1 to 7 | RI ST § 4-17-1 to 7 | This section comprises Rhode Island's humane slaughter provisions. It begins first by declaring it to be the policy of the state that the slaughter of all livestock and the handling of livestock, in connection with slaughter, be carried out only by humane methods. A "humane method" is defined as a method through which the animal is rendered insensible to pain by mechanical, electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut; or a method in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith through which the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain. Any person who violates any provision of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred ($500) dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than one year. | Statute | |
| Hoesch v. Broward County | 53 So.3d 1177 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 2011) | 2011 WL 408882 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
A Broward County, Florida ordinance defines a dangerous dog as “any dog that . . . [h]as killed or caused the death of a domestic animal in one incident.” Plaintiff Brian Hoesch’s dog escaped from Hoesch’s backyard and attacked and killed a neighbor’s cat. Prior to this incident, the dog had never been declared “dangerous” by any governmental authority. Hoesch requested a hearing after Broward’s animal control division notified Hoesch of its intent to destroy his dog. After a judgment in favor of Broward County, Hoesch contends that both county ordinances conflict with state law, section 767.11(1)(b), which defines a “dangerous dog” as any dog that “[h]as more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal . . . .” The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, concluded “that Broward County ordinance sections 4-2(k)(2) and 4-12(j)(2) are null and void insofar as they conflict with state law.” |
Case | |
| NC - Licenses - § 130A-192. Animals not wearing required rabies vaccination tags | N.C.G.S.A. § 130A-192 | NC ST § 130A-192 | This North Carolina statute provides that the Animal Control Officer shall canvass the county to determine if there are any dogs or cats not wearing the required rabies vaccination tag. If the animal is wearing an owner identification tag, or if the Animal Control Officer otherwise knows who the owner is, the Animal Control Officer shall notify the owner in writing to have the animal vaccinated against rabies and to produce the required rabies vaccination certificate within three days. If the animal is not wearing an owner identification tag and the Animal Control Officer does not otherwise know who the owner is, the Animal Control Officer may impound the animal. The duration of the impoundment of these animals shall be established by the county board of commissioners, but the duration shall not be less than 72 hours. During the impoundment period, the Animal Control Officer shall make a reasonable effort to locate the owner of the animal. | Statute |