Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Rehabilitation, wildlife - 68A-9.006. Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit. | 68 FL ADC 68A-9.006 | Rule 68A-9.006, F.A.C. | This Florida regulation sets forth the requirements to obtain a permit for wildlife rehabilitation. | Administrative | |
| Smith v. Kopynec | 119 So.3d 835 (La.App. 1 Cir.,2013) | 2012-1472 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13) |
The plaintiff appeals the lower court's dismissal of her claims against defendant-landowners and their insurers. The plaintiff was injured (for the second time) by the defendant-landowners' son's pitbull while walking past their home. While it was undisputed that the landowners did not own the dog, the issue was whether they had a duty to prevent the attack via "custodial liability." Here, the defendant-landowners asserted that they thought the son had gotten rid of the dog after it was confiscated and quarantined by animal control after it first attacked the plaintiff. Thus, this court found that defendant-landowners did not know of the dog's presence on their property and affirmed the trial court's order of summary judgment. |
Case | |
| ME - Hunting - § 11215. Use of motorized vehicle to kill, injure, or molest wild animals or wild birds | 12 M. R. S. A. § 11215 | ME ST T. 12 § 11215 | This Maine statute states that a person may not intentionally kill, injure or molest a wild animal or wild bird with a Motor vehicle, Motorboat, or Aircraft. A person who violates the statute commits a Class E crime. | Statute | |
| BARKING HOUND VILLAGE, LLC., et al. v. MONYAK, et al. | 299 Ga. 144, 787 S.E.2d 191 (Ga., 2016) | S15G1184, 2016 WL 3144352, (Ga. June 6, 2016) | In 2012, Plaintiffs Robert and Elizabeth Monyaks took their dogs Lola and Callie, for ten days to a kennel owned by Defendants Barking Hound Village, LLC (“BHV”) and managed by William Furman. Callie, had been prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug for arthritis pain. However, three days after picking up their dogs from BHV, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure and died in March 2013.The Monyaks sued BHV and Furman for damages alleging that while at the kennel Lola was administered toxic doses of the arthritis medication prescribed for Callie. BHV and Furman moved for summary judgment on all the Monyaks' claims asserting that the measure of damages for the death of a dog was capped at the dog's fair market value and the Monyaks failed to prove that Lola had any market value. The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet is the actual value of the dog to its owners rather than the dog’s fair market value. The court stated that the actual value of the animal could be demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred by its owners in treating injuries, as well as by other economic factors. However, evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value to its owners would not be admissible. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed in part and held that the damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another includes both the animal's fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he value of [a] dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown.” The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and found no error in the court's determination that Georgia precedent does not allow for the recovery of damages based on the sentimental value of personal property to its owner. | Case | |
| LA - Hunting, Trapping, and Fishing - Chapter 1. General Provisions for Wildlife and Fisheries. | LSA-R.S. 56:648 - 56:648.3 | This section comprises Louisiana's hunter harassment laws. Under R.S. 56:648.1, no person may engage in such activities as interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife, disturbing a wild animal or otherwise affecting its behavior with the intent to prevent or hinder lawful taking, disturb any hunter, trapper, or fisherman who is engaged in lawful taking, or enter or remain on state-managed lands/water or private lands/water with the intent to violate this section. Violation of the provisions of R.S. 56:648.1 constitutes a class two violation. The section allows the issuance of an injunction and recovery of actual damages by persons affected by such conduct. | Statute | ||
| DE - Trust for care of an animal - Chapter 35. Trusts | 12 Del.C. § 3555 | DE ST TI 12 § 3555 | Delaware enacted its pet trust law in 2006. A trust for the care of one or more specific animals living at the settlor's death is valid. The trust terminates upon the death of all animals living at the settlor's death and covered by the terms of the trust. | Statute | |
| New Jersey Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New Jersey Dept. of Agriculture | 2007 WL 486764 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2007) | Not Reported in A.2d |
This New Jersey case concerns several challenges to the adoption of livestock regulations by the state Department of Agriculture. Specifically, several animal welfare groups contended that several of the regulations were inhumane and in violation of the state’s legislative mandate to issue humane livestock standards. The Superior Court of New Jersey, appellate division, agreed with the Department, holding that the challenged regulations are consistent with the agency's legislative mandate, and are neither arbitrary, nor unreasonable. This Judgment was Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part by New Jersey Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New Jersey Dept. of Agriculture, 196 N.J. 366,955 A.2d 886 (N.J., 2008). |
Case | |
| Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray | 316 Ga.App. 193 (Ga.App. 2012) | 2012 WL 2125842 (Ga.App.) |
While either shadowing her aunt or during her first day working at the veterinary clinic, the plaintiff was bitten three times by a dog she had taken outside to exercise. Plaintiff subsequently filed numerous claims against the veterinary clinic, including: negligence; negligence per se; nuisance; and violation of a premise liability and a dangerous dog statute. After the lower court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, the defendant appealed to the Georgia appellate court. The appeals court stated that in a dog bite case, the plaintiff needed to produce evidence that the dog had a vicious propensity. Since the plaintiff failed to produce such evidence, the court held the defendant should have been granted a motion for summary judgment on its premise liability, nuisance, dangerous dog statute, and negligence per se claims. As for the negligence claim, the court held the defendant should have been granted a motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff was not aware of internal procedures to protect invitees and because the injuries were not proximately caused by negligent supervision. The lower court's judgment was therefore reversed. |
Case | |
| Roalstad v. City of Lafayette | 363 P.3d 790 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) | --- P.3d ---- 2015 WL 5895396 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) | The origins of this matter began when the City of Lafayette (City) charged Defendant/Appellant with violating its municipal ordinance regarding vicious animals. Defendant/Appellant requested a jury trial pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied the request. Defendant/Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of her C.R.C.P. 106 and declaratory judgment action in which she challenged the municipal court's denial of her request for a jury trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether the offense for which Defendant was charged under the City's ordinances was a “petty offense” under C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109, which would entitle her to a jury trial under that statute. Since the municipal ordinance imposed fines that met that definition and because it was not a crime at common law, the court concluded the offense met the definition of “petty offense;” Defendant/Appellant was therefore entitled to a jury trial in municipal court pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. Further, because the ordinance and the state Dangerous Dog law were counterparts and because the ordinance was criminal in nature, the vicious animal offense was not exempt from the “petty offense” definition. Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed. | Case | |
| TX - Police - Nonlethal responses to dog encounters | V.T.C.A., Occupations Code §§ 1701.253; 1701.261; 1701.402 | TX OCC §§ 1701.253; 1701.261; 1701.402 | These statutes require training for Texas law enforcement in nonlethal responses to encounters with dogs. As part of the minimum curriculum requirements, the commission shall require an officer licensed by the commission on or after January 1, 2016, to complete a canine encounter training program established by the commission under Section 1701.261.That section states that the commission shall establish a statewide comprehensive education and training program on canine encounters and canine behavior. The training program must consist of at least four hours of classroom instruction and practical training, developed and approved by the commission, that addresses the handling canine-related calls, anticipating unplanned encounters with canines, and using humane methods and tools in handling canine encounters. | Statute |