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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
ID - Predator - Chapter 58. Protection of Natural Resources (wolf declaration) I.C. § 67-5801 - 5807 ID ST § 67-5801 - 5807 The purpose of Chapter 58 is to provide an orderly, comprehensive plan for the protection of the natural resources of the state and for the suppression of dangers or threats. Section 5806 the Idaho legislature finds and declares that the state's citizens, businesses, hunting, tourism and agricultural industries, private property and wildlife, are immediately and continuously threatened and harmed by the sustained presence and growing population of Canadian gray wolves in the state of Idaho. The legislature states that "a disaster emergency is in existence as a result of the introduction of Canadian gray wolves, which have caused and continue to threaten vast devastation of Idaho's social culture, economy and natural resources." Statute
Knowles Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Wills 360 So.2d 37 (Fla.App.,1978)

Dog owners brought negligence action against veterinarian and animal hospital after their dog suffered injuries while under the veterinarian's and the hospital's care. The Appeals Court held that the trial court did not err by allowing the jury to consider plaintiff-owners' mental pain and suffering, and that the jury could reasonably have viewed defendants' neglectful conduct resulting in the dog's injury to have amounted to great indifference to plaintiffs' property.

Case
Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 930 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2013) 2013 WL 1111285 (D.D.C.,2013)

Using the Administrative Procedures Act, the Sierra Club filed a suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) due to the USFWS's response to the Sierra Club's petition to revise critical habitat for the leatherback sea turtle; the Sierra Club also charged the USFWS with unlawfully delaying the designation of the Northeastern Ecological Corridor of Puerto Rico as critical habitat for the leatherback sea turtle. While both sides filed a motion for summary judgment, the District Court only granted the USFWS motion for summary judgment because the USFWS's 12–month determination was unreviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act.

Case
Siegert v. Crook County 266 P.3d 170 (Or.App., 2011) 2011 WL 5402078 (Or.App.); 246 Or.App. 500 (2011)

An individual appealed County Court’s decision to approve the location of a dog breeding kennel in a zone where such kennels were not permitted. The county interpreted the code that was in effect at the time the kennel began operating to allow dog breeding as animal husbandry, and thus permissible farm use. The Court of Appeals found the county's interpretation to be plausible.

Case
Commonwealth v. Szewczyk 53 N.E.3d 1286 (Mass.App.Ct.,2016) 89 Mass.App.Ct. 711 (2016) In this Massachusetts case, defendant was charged with animal cruelty after he shot a dog that had wandered onto his property with a pellet gun. The pellet was lodged in the dog’s leg and caused significant pain and discomfort to the dog. Following conviction, defendant appealed the District Court’s ruling arguing that the judge erred in denying three of his eleven requests for rulings of law.Specifically, defendant's principal argument was that he had a lawful purpose in shooting (to scare the dog off his property), his intent was justified (to insure his wife's safety on the property), and the pain inflicted by defendant shooting the dog does not fit the statutory meaning of "cruel." At the close of evidence, defendant submitted a written request for ruling under Mass. R.Crim. P.26 setting out these issues. The court held that the District Court judge correctly denied the three requests because they were clearly outside the scope of rule 26 because they called upon the judge as a fact finder to weigh the evidence presented at trial. Next, the court reviewed the facts of the case to determine whether or not a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, the court held that a rational trier of fact would have been able to find that defendant did commit animal cruelty by shooting the dog. The court focused on the fact that the defendant could have used other means to ensure that the dog did not enter the property again without causing pain and suffering to the dog by shooting the dog in the leg. The judgment was affirmed. Case
ME - Cat - Consolidated Cat Laws 7 M. R. S. A. § 3916 - 3919C; 1 M. R. S. A. § 217 ME ST T. 7 § 3916 - 3919C, 4041; ME ST T. 1 § 217 These statutes comprise Maine's cat laws. Among the provisions include rabies vaccination requirements, stray cat procedures, and the designation of the "state cat." Statute
US - Horses - Sale of Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros PL 108-447

These amendments to the Wild Horses Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1333, amended by Public Law 108-447, allow for the sale of animals for commercial purposes in some circumstances, specifically when the excess animal is more than 10 years old, or has been unsuccessfully offered for adoption on at least 3 occasions.  Once the excess animal is sold, it will no longer be considered a wild free-roaming horse or burro according to this Act.

Statute
Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Herbert 549 U.S. 1245 (2007) 450 F.3d 1082 (S.Ct. 2007)

Motion of Western Wildlife Conservancy, et al., for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

Case
Campbell v. Supervalu 2007 WL 891682 (N.D.Ind.) North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA. Case
Powell v. Adlerhorst Int'l, Inc. 2015 WL 6756126 (D. Or. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished) The plaintiff in this case brought suit after suffering a dog bite from a service dog that was purchased from defendant. The defendant was a corporation that purchased dogs from Europe and then sold them to police agencies to be used as service dogs. Plaintiff (a police officer with the Sherwood Police Department) filed suit asserting both a strict product liability and negligence claim for injuries sustained from dog bites. At issue here is whether the dog was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time the defendant sold it to the City of Sherwood. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the court denied the motion. The court ultimately held that a reasonable jury could find that defendant should have known about the dog’s aggressive behavior before selling it to plaintiff, thus making it liable for damages. Case

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