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ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, SHY 38, INC. & HOPE SANCTUARY, Plaintiffs, v. LAURA KELLY & DEREK SCHMIDT, Defendants Slip Copy, No. CV 18-2657-KHV, 2020 WL 362626 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2020) The Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”), Center for Food Safety (“CFS”), Shy 38, Inc. and Hope Sanctuary are interest groups that aim to protect and advocate for animals and the environment. These interest groups filed suit on December 4, 2018 against the Governor and Attorney General of Kansas seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kansas Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protect Act was unconstitutional. The Act made it a crime to damage or destroy an animal facility or an animal, exercise control over an animal facility or animal from a facility, take photos or videos at an animal facility that that is not open to the public, and remain at an animal facility against the owner’s wishes. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ALDF desired to conduct an undercover investigation in Kansas but refrained from doing so out of fear of criminal prosecution under the Act. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Act violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. To be subject to criminal prosecution under subsection (a) of K.S.A. 47-1827, the ALDF investigator had to cause physical damage to an animal or the animal facility or its property. The Plaintiffs did not allege that the ALDF investigator intended to cause such physical damage so the ALDF investigator was not at risk of criminal prosecution under the provision and, therefore, ALDF did not demonstrate standing to challenge subsection (a). ALDF alleged sufficient injury to support standing to challenge subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the Act. CFS, Shy 38, and Hope Sanctuary also had standing to challenge those subsections. The Court found that subsections (b), (c), and (d) regulated speech rather than conduct and was content-based rather than neutral-based. The Court ultimately concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their claim that subsections (b), (c), and (d) violated the First Amendment. The Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their lack of standing claim for subsection (a) and K.S.A. 47-1828. Case
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, COMPLAINT FOR VALERIE BUCHANAN, JANE GARRISON, AND NANCY MEGNA DECLARATORY This action concerns a lawsuit filed by the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), et al, over the lack of action by the federal agency, the Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to adopt a policy on what constitutes appropriate conditions for primates in federally licensed or registered facilities. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the failure of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United State Department of Agriculture to make a final decision concerning the defendants' proposed “Policy On Environment Enhancement For Nonhuman Primates.” See 64 Fed. Reg. 38,145 (July 15, 1999) (Policy). APHIS determined at least seven years ago that APHIS enforcement officials and the regulated community urgently need such a policy to insure that primates are housed in “physical environments adequate to promote the[ir] psychological well-being,” as required by the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). 7 U.S.C. § 2143. By failing to make a final decision on the proposed Policy, defendants are violating the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143, and are unreasonably delaying and/or unlawfully withholding agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Pleading
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, a California corporation, CHIMPANZEE COLLABORATORY, SARAH BAECKLER, AMAZING ANIMAL ACTORS, INC., a Ca Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that defendants, individuals and companies who use non-human primates in television and movie productions, engage in physical and psychological abuse of chimpanzees. According to plaintiffs, the abuse has been going on for years and includes violent beatings with sticks and other implements. Plaintiffs raise their first cause of action under the federal Endangered Species Act, contending that defendant's harassment, beating, and brutalization of the chimpanzees constitutes a "taking" under the ESA. Plaintiffs also raise causes of action under California law for specific recovery of property (e.g., the primates), conversion, violations under the California Business Code, and violations under the cruelty provisions of the California Penal Code. Pleading
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Woodley 640 S.E.2d 777; 2007 WL 475329 (N.C.App., 2007) 181 N.C.App. 594 (2007)

In this North Carolina Case, Barbara and Robert Woodley (defendants) appeal from an injunction forfeiting all rights in the animals possessed by defendants and the removal of the animals from defendants' control, and an order granting temporary custody of the animals to the Animal Legal Defense Fund. On 23 December 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions under North Carolina's Civil Remedy for Protection of Animals statute (Section 19A). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 19A-1 et seq. (2005). Plaintiff alleged that defendants abused and neglected a large number of dogs (as well as some birds) in their possession. On appeal, defendants argue that Section 19A is unconstitutional in that it purports to grant standing to persons who have suffered no injury, and that it violates Article IV, Section 13 of the N.C. Constitution by granting standing through statute. The court held that Article IV, Section 13 merely “abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity," rather than placing limitations on the legislature's ability to create actions by statute, contrary to defendants' interpretation.

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Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman 469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir.(Cal.), 2006) 2006 WL 3375347 (9th Cir.(Cal.)), 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10, 733

Plaintiffs, who include the Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), the Animal Welfare Institute ("AWI"), and three individuals, challenged the United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to comply with the federal Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"). Plaintiffs challenge the decision not to adopt the Draft Policy under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") as arbitrary and capricious. The district court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' suit because it determined that the USDA's decision did not constitute reviewable final agency action. This court disagreed, finding that at least one of the plaintiffs has standing under Article III of the Constitution. Further, the court concluded that the district court has authority under the APA to review the USDA's decision not to adopt the Draft Policy. Opinion Vacated on Rehearing en Banc by Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman , 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir., 2007).

Case
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007) 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6427

Plaintiffs, who include the Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), the Animal Welfare Institute ("AWI"), and three individuals, challenged the United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to comply with the federal Animal Welfare Act ("AWA").  The district court granted USDA's motion to dismiss, to which the ALDF timely appealed. Over a vigorous dissent, an appeals court panel reversed the district court's decision. After a sua sponte call, however, a majority of active judges voted to rehear the case en banc. Yet, before the rehearing occurred, the parties had reached a settlement and had agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice provided that the panel's opinion and judgment were vacated. The majority of the en banc panel agreed to vacate the panel's opinion and judgment with prejudice, but Judge Thomas filed the dissenting opinion.

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Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Agriculture 2016 WL 7235624 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2016)

Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

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Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 789 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2015) 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1261 Animal Advocacy Organizations argued the district court erred in ruling United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)'s decision to renew an exhibitor’s license did not violate the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). According to the organizations, the USDA may not renew a license when USDA knows an exhibitor is noncompliant with any animal welfare standards on the anniversary of the day USDA originally issued the license. The 11th Circuit, however, found it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the organizations' challenge to the renewal under the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the USDA's interpretation—which did not condition renewal on compliance with animal welfare standards on the anniversary of the license issuance date—was a reasonable one. The district court’s decision was therefore affirmed. Case
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 1191736 (C.D.Cal.)

The matter before the court concerns Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs (ALDF and others) petitioned the USDA and FSIS to promulgate regulations condemning force-fed foie gras as an adulterated food product under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”). FSIS refused to do so, concluding that foie gras was not adulterated or diseased; Plaintiffs then filed the instant lawsuit claiming that decision was arbitrary, capricious, and in violation of the APA. The Court determined that the instant action is not about promulgating rules, but about banning force-fed foie gras. Such a decision falls under the USDA's discretion by law.

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Animal Legal Defense Fund v. State, Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries 140 So.3d 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/25/13) 2012-0971 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/25/13), 2013 WL 1774638

The Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), along with others, filed a petition for injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus against the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fish (DWF) for permitting the exhibit of a real tiger ("Tony") at a truck stop owned by Michael Sandlin. An ordinance prohibiting the display of wild animals was in effect when Tony was acquired. Subsequent to that, the Louisiana legislature adopted a law that required those who legally held big cats who were "grandfathered in," obtain a permit from the DWF. After Tony's caretaker, Michael Sandlin was denied a DWF permit because he was not in compliance with the Parish ordinances, Sandlin sued the Parish. The Parish then carved out an exception for him in the ordinances and the DWF, through Secretary Barham, issued a state permit to Sandlin. ADLF and others sued, alleging that the permit violated Louisiana law and the renewal of the permit was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.  At the first trial court hearing, the trial court issued a judgment granting the preliminary and permanent injunction ordering DFW to revoke the permit, but the truck stop owner alleged he had not received notice of the hearing and therefore decided to intervene. Once the truck stop was allowed to intervene, a hearing on all pending issues was held, which resulted in the intervenors appealing the trial court’s judgment and the trial court’s denial for a new trial. On appeal here, the appeals court dismissed the appeal, in part, and affirmed, in part, the November 17, 2011 judgment of the trial court. With regard to the issue of standing for the injunction, this court found that the individual named plaintiffs (residents of Louisiana) had taxpayer standing, but the court did not find that plaintiff ALDF alleged and proved sufficient interest to sustain a right of action seeking an injunction against any unlawful conduct by DWF. That part of the November 17, 2011 judgment of the trial court was reversed. Further, the court found that, based on factual findings, there was no error in the trial court's legal conclusion that Michael Sandlin did not meet the legal requirements for a Potentially Dangerous Wild Quadruped permit, and that permanent injunctive relief, enjoining DWF from issuing Michael Sandlin future permits for Tony, was warranted. That part of the trial court judgment was affirmed.

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