Results

Displaying 6161 - 6170 of 6637
Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
U.S. v. Gardner 244 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2001) 2001 DJCAR 1533

Defendant first argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the government failed to plead and prove two essential jurisdictional elements for a 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) violation--namely, that Mr. Gardner was not an Indian and that the crime affected interstate commerce.  The court found the non- Indian status of the defendant is not an essential element of jurisdiction for a 16 U.S.C. § 3372 violation.  It is only necessary to plead and prove an interstate commerce nexus where § 3372(a)(2) is implicated.  The Court reverses because the jury instructions did not sufficiently instruct the jury as to how it should consider uncorroborated accomplice testimony.

Case
Prays v. Perryman 262 Cal.Rptr. 180 (Cal.App.2.Dist.) 213 Cal.App.3d 1133 (Cal.App.2.Dist.)

In an action by a commercial pet groomer against a dog owner for injuries suffered by a dog bite, the trial court found as a matter of law that plaintiff had assumed the risk of a dog bite, and on that basis granted summary judgment in defendant's favor. At the time plaintiff was bitten, she had not yet begun to groom the dog and, in fact, had expressed to defendant her concern whether it was safe for her to do so since the dog was excited and growling. The Court of Appeal reversed. Assuming the veterinarian's rule extended to pet groomers, making the defense of assumption of risk available, it held that plaintiff had not as a matter of law assumed the risk of being bitten since, at the time of the bite, the dog was still under the exclusive control of defendant, who had uncaged it and was holding it on a leash.

Case
IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE MAHARASHTRA ANIMAL PRESERVATION ACT, 1976 9 of 1977 The Act, specific to the western Indian state of Maharashtra, prohibits cow slaughter. Persons may also not slaughter other bovines such as bulls, bullocks, female buffaloes and buffalo calves without obtaining a certificate from the 'competent authority'. These animals may be slaughtered only at specified places. Committing an offence under the Act may lead to fines or imprisonment. Statute
LA - Reptiles - § 632.5.1. Constrictors and poisonous snakes LSA-R.S. 56:632.5.1 LA R.S. 56:632.5.1 This Louisiana law provides that certain species of constrictor snakes in excess of eight feet long and venomous snakes shall only be allowed by permit issued by the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries except for animals kept by animal sanctuaries, zoos, aquariums, wildlife research centers, scientific organizations, and medical research facilities as defined in the Animal Welfare Act. Violation of the provisions of this Section or rules adopted pursuant thereto shall constitute a class three violation. Statute
Donations

Donations

This site is a public library that requires considerable resources to keep current and to grow. Your donations to the site would be greatly appreciated. A gift to the Web Center may be eligible for tax deductibility.

Basic page
Canada - Nova Scotia Statutes - Animal Protection Act SNS 2008, c 33 This set of laws replaces the Animal Cruelty Prevention Act. The Act outlines the establishment and powers of the Nova Scotia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. In addition, the Act also provides that no person shall cause an animal to be in distress. First and second time violators face up to $5,000 in fines and in default of payment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both fine and imprisonment. A third offense would result in a fine of up to $10,000 and in default of payment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both fine and imprisonment. The courts can also prohibit the ownership of animals and may impose a lifetime ban on owning animals. Statute
NM - Santa Fe County - Impounding Horses- Chapter 95: Animals (Secs. 95.24, 95.75 - 95.78) Santa Fe County, New Mexico Code of Ordinances sections 95.24, 95.75 - 95.86 (2013)

Under these Santa Fe County, New Mexico ordinances, if an animal control officer finds that a horse has been abused as stated in these provisions, then the officer will issue the owner a citation and may place the horse in the custody of a caretaker. Furthermore, these ordinances provide provisions on how the owner can petition a court   to return an impounded horse, as well as the fees and penalties a horse owner may face for violating these ordinances.

Local Ordinance
Maldonado v. Fontanes 568 F.3d 263 (C.A.1 (Puerto Rico),2009) 2009 WL 1547737 (C.A.1 (Puerto Rico))

At issue in this particular opinion is the interlocutory appeal of the Mayor of Barceloneta, Puerto Rico based on the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. This case was initially brought after two successive raids on public housing complexes, within ten days of the Municipality of Barceloneta assuming control of the public housing complexes from the Puerto Rico Public Housing Administration on October 1, 2007. Prior to the raid, the residents, mostly Spanish-speakers, were given notice of the new "no pet policy," which were written in English. During the raids, plaintiffs' pets were seized and then killed by either being slammed against the side of a van or thrown off a 50-foot bridge. This First Circuit affirmed the denial of the Mayor's motion for qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims. However, it reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the Mayor as to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims and ordered those claims dismissed.

Case
U.S. v. Jacobsen 466 US 109 (1984)

Defendants were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota of possession of an illegal substance with intent to distribute, and they appealed. This case discussed searches and seizures and the Fourth Amendment.

Case
City of Onida v. Brandt 959 N.W.2d 297 (S.D., 2021) 2021 S.D. 27 The City of Onida (the City) filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking authorization from the circuit court to euthanize two dogs owned by the Appellants as “vicious animals” under Onida ordinances or, alternatively, based upon a determination that the dogs were dangerous under state law (SDCL 7-12-29). The circuit court concluded the City could not require the dogs to be euthanized under the ordinance but found that the requirements of SDCL 7-12-29 were met. Appellants appeal the circuit court's order directing the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs pursuant under state law. In 2020, the appellants' dogs attacked a neighbor's smaller dog just outside of the neighbor's door to their home. The attack caused numerous bite wounds and internal injuries to the smaller dog who eventually died. Prior to this event, there were two other incidents where appellants' dog rushed up to a woman working outside her house barking aggressively and another incident involving the same neighbor's dog who was the victim in the instant case. The sheriff was summoned for the prior incidents, although no formal action was taken and appellants beefed up measures to keep the dogs in their yard. After the attack on the neighbor's dog, the sheriff formally declared the dogs "vicious animals" under the city's ordinance and obtained a TRO to remove the dogs to keep them at a nearby kennel until further disposition from the court. Ultimately, the City filed a petition for declaratory judgment requesting authorization for euthanasia of the dogs. Alternatively, the City sought a determination of dangerousness under SDCL 7-12-29 and requested an order allowing the sheriff to dispose of the dogs. The court found Appellants violated SDCL 40-34-2 by owning a “dog that chases, worries, injures, or kills any ... domestic animal ....” The court further found under the Ordinance that the dogs were improperly unleashed and running at large within city limits and that the dogs were “vicious animals.” However, the court determined the City could not require Appellants to euthanize the dogs under the Ordinance because no “vicious animal” notice had been given to Appellants prior to the fatal attack on the neighbors’ dog. However, the court found that Appellants’ dogs were dangerous under SDCL 7-12-29 and authorized the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs. The circuit court stayed the order pending this appeal. On appeal, the appellants challenge the City's authority to request that the Sheriff dispose of the dogs under SDCL 7-12-29 after the circuit court denied such relief under the Ordinance. Appellants also argue that the circuit court erred in determining the dogs were dangerous and authorizing the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs under SDCL 7-12-29 in absence of a showing that the Department of Health had been consulted. The Supreme Court held that presented on appeal is whether the circuit court could order the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs under SDCL 7-12-29. SDCL 7-12-29 allows a sheriff to take possession of any animal suspected of being dangerous, continue to hold the animal until a formal determination of dangerousness can be made, and dispose of the animal through humane means if it is determined to be dangerous. Appellants claim that the court improperly used a "hybrid" application of both state and local law. This Court disagreed, finding that appellants presented no authority that the sheriff could not act under state law as opposed to city law. Appellants’ second argument is that circuit court erred by entering an order to permit the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs under the statute without first requiring consultation with the Department of Health for the purpose of rabies control. The Court agreed that the text of SDCL 7-12-29 includes both public safety and public health considerations that requires a formal consultation. However, the Court found this error to be harmless and the failure to consult with the Department of Health had any effect on the court's decision, or that it harmed the substantial rights of the Appellants. In fact, it was stipulated that both dogs were vaccinated against rabies and no continuing public health risk existed since the dog victim died 12 months prior at the veterinarian. The Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ordering that “the Sheriff may now dispose of [Appellants’ two dogs] through humane euthanasia.” Case

Pages