Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Service Animal - § 600.2. Allowing dog to injure or kill guide, signal or service dog; punishment; restitution | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 600.2 | CA PENAL § 600.2 | It is unlawful for any person to permit any dog he or she owns or controls to injure or kill any service dog while the service dog is in discharge of its duties. A violation is an infraction punishable by a fine if the injury is caused by the person's failure to exercise ordinary care. A violation is a misdemeanor if the injury is caused by reckless disregard in the exercise of control over his or her dog. A violation in this case shall be punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. Upon conviction, the defendant shall make restitution, including veterinary bills and replacement costs. | Statute |
| EU - Research - Council Directive 86/609/EEC regarding the protection of animals used for experimental and other scientific purp | Council Directive 86/609/EEC |
The European Union has established a framework to protect animals used for experimental or scientific purposes by ensuring that they are adequately cared for and that no unnecessary pain or suffering is inflicted. |
Statute | |
| American Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Dade County, Fla. | 728 F.Supp. 1533 (S.D.Fla.,1989) |
Associations of dog owners sued Dade, County, Florida seeking declaratory judgment that an ordinance that regulated “pit bull” dogs was unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs contend that there is no such breed as a pit bull, but rather a three breeds that this ordinance has mistakenly lumped together. The District Court held that ordinance sufficiently defined “pit bull” dogs by specifically referencing three breeds recognized by kennel clubs, including a description of the characteristics of such dogs, and provided a mechanism for verification of whether a particular dog was included. The uncontradicted testimony of the various veterinarians reflected that most dog owners know the breed of their dog and that most dog owners look for and select a dog of a particular breed. |
Case | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Tuggle | 607 F.Supp.2d 1095 (D.Ariz.,2009) | 2009 WL 942833 (D.Ariz.) |
In this case, the Plaintiffs, WildEarth Guardians and the Rewilding Institute (Guardians) and the Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders) challenged procedures for wolf control actions as part of the Mexican wolf reintroduction project within the Blue Range Recovery Area (BRWRA) by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Plaintiffs claims centered on NEPA and ESA violations based on USFWS' adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding in 2003(MOU) and issuance of Standard Operating Procedure 13 (SOP). USFWS filed motions to dismiss these claims for lack of jurisdiction because they argued that neither the MOU nor SOP 13 was a final agency action. Here, the rights and responsibilities of the interested parties were spelled out in the 2003 MOU and SOP 13, similar to if USFWS had issued an interpretive rule covering wolf control measures. Thus, the Court found that the 2003 MOU and SOP 13 "mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process in respect to wolf control measures." The Court also found that the plaintiffs presented duplicate claims under the ESA and APA. USFWS's motion to dismiss was also denied as were the duplicative claims. |
Case |
| Law 287 of 2022 | Ley 287 de 2022 | Law 287, 2022 is the Panama's law that recognizes the Rights of Nature and the State's related obligations with such rights. | Statute | |
| Anne Arundel County v. Reeves | 252 A.3d 921 (Md., 2021) | 474 Md. 46 (Md., 2021) | This Maryland case examines the scope of compensatory damages available forf the tortious injury or death of a pet under Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 11-110, a law that allow pet owner to recover damages for the tort-based death or injury of their pet up to a capped level. The incident giving rise to this case occurred when Anne Arundel County Police Officer Rodney Price shot Micheal Reeves' dog in the front yard of Mr. Reeves' home. Officer Price was going door-to-door inquiring with residents after a recent spate of burglaries. Mr. Reeves' dog Vern burst from the front storm door and put his paw on the officer's forearm. While Officer Price stepped back and pushed the dog away, he testified that he did not vocalize any commands to the dog at that time, and, instead, decided to shoot the dog. Testimony by a veterinary pathologist at trial revealed that, if the dog were going for the officer's face as Price testified, this would have been improbable based on the dog's size as compared to the officer. Further, there was no dirt on that area of the officer's arm/chest nor any marks from the dog's paws. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Mr. Reeves for $10,000 for the trespass to chattel claim, and $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages for the gross negligence claim. The circuit court then reduced the gross negligence damages to $200,000 pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). CJP § 5-301 et seq. The circuit court also reduced the trespass to chattel damages to $7,500 pursuant to the then-applicable damages cap in CJP § 11-110.1. The Court of Special Appeals held in an unreported divided decision that the statute did not bar recovery of noneconomic damages. On appeal here, this court now holds that CJP § 11-110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by that statute and does not allow for recovery of noneconomic compensatory damages. And while the court found there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Officer Price was grossly negligent, it also held that Mr. Reeves could not recover these damages due to Maryland's single recovery rule. As a matter of first impression, this court found CJP § 11-110's plain language evinces an intent to exclude those things not expressed in the statute. In other words, because the legislature defined the specific types of compensatory damages it allows, it intended to exclude other forms of damages like noneconomic damages. Further, the court found the plaintiff's reading of the statute "illogical" because economic damages would be capped, but yet noneconomic damages would not be. Thus, it would be up to the General Assembly to expressly provide for noneconomic damages in amendments to the statute. The court ultimately concluded that the statute defines and caps the recovery of compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet and the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The dissent noted the majority decision created a "double anomaly" in Maryland law by capping damages for victims of a tortfeasor who kills their dog but allowing a fraudster who intentionally tricks a family into selling a painting of their dog unlimited damages. Further, the dissent argued the majority ignored both judicial and ethical trends regarding pets in society and disregards the legislative debate when the statute was re-enacted showing an intent to include higher damages amounts. | Case |
| Hoesch v. Broward County | 53 So.3d 1177 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 2011) | 2011 WL 408882 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
A Broward County, Florida ordinance defines a dangerous dog as “any dog that . . . [h]as killed or caused the death of a domestic animal in one incident.” Plaintiff Brian Hoesch’s dog escaped from Hoesch’s backyard and attacked and killed a neighbor’s cat. Prior to this incident, the dog had never been declared “dangerous” by any governmental authority. Hoesch requested a hearing after Broward’s animal control division notified Hoesch of its intent to destroy his dog. After a judgment in favor of Broward County, Hoesch contends that both county ordinances conflict with state law, section 767.11(1)(b), which defines a “dangerous dog” as any dog that “[h]as more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal . . . .” The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, concluded “that Broward County ordinance sections 4-2(k)(2) and 4-12(j)(2) are null and void insofar as they conflict with state law.” |
Case |
| U.S. v. Wahchumwah | 704 F.3d 606 (C.A.9 (Wash.)) | 2012 WL 5951624 (C.A.9 (Wash.)) |
After a government agent recorded a sale of eagle parts using a concealed audio visual device, the agent obtained a warrant and arrested the defendant for violating the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Upon appeal, the defendant challenged his jury conviction arguing two Constitutional violations, a Federal Rules of Evidence violation, and multiplicitous counts. The appeals court affirmed the jury conviction on all claims except the multiplicitous counts claim; this conviction was reversed. This opinion was Amended and Superseded on Denial of Rehearing by U.S. v. Wahchumwah , 710 F.3d 862 (9th Cir., 2012). |
Case |
| UT - Agriculture - Ch. 4 Eggs | U.C.A. 1953 §§ 4-4-101 - 108. | UT ST §§ 4-4-101 - 108 | This chapter of Utah law concerns the production and sale of eggs in the state. It establishes the standards for egg grading and what forms of rot and deformities render eggs illegal to sell in the state. It also mandates that egg producers in the state maintain records for examination by the department of health and human services in order to track the spread of foodborne illnesses. | Statute |
| Animal Law Researchers' Clinic |
The Animal Law Researchers' Clinic is a space for dialogue and learning for scholars and professionals of all ages, countries, genders and positions, with the common nexus of listening to one's own voice and that of other colleagues working in the field of Animal Law and related sciences. |
Policy |