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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6754
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Vance Crooked Arm | 788 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) | 2015 WL 3542707 (9th Cir. 2015) | A grand jury indicted Defendants on multiple counts of, among other things, knowingly and willfully conspiring to kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles, in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (Count I) and unlawfully trafficking in migratory bird parts (Count II – IV). On appeal, as at the district court, Defendants argued that the counts to which they pled guilty were improperly charged as felonies because it was only a misdemeanor under the MBTA to sell migratory bird feathers. The court concluded first, that even under Defendants' interpretation of the MBTA, Count I charged a felony; and, second, that in regard to Count II, the allegations stated a misdemeanor only, not a felony. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, as to Count I, but reversed in part as to Count II. The court also vacated the sentence on both Counts, vacated the felony conviction on Count II, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the Defendants were given the option to withdraw their guilty pleas with regard to Count II, or the district court might consider whether to resentence their convictions on that count as misdemeanors. | Case |
| MI - Natural Resources -Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. Natural Resources and Environmental Pro | MCL 324.1101 -1102 | MI ST 324.1101 - MI ST 324.1102 | These sections describe the ability of courts and the Commission to review the Department of Natural Resources decisions and the ability for the public to circulate and sign petitions. | Statute |
| FL - Hunting - Chapter 379. Fish and Wildlife Conservation. | West's F. S. A. § 379.105 | FL ST § 379.105 | This law represents the state's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, a person may not intentionally, within a publicly or privately owned wildlife management or fish management area or on any state-owned water body, interfere with or attempt to prevent the lawful taking of fish, game, or nongame animals by another or attempt to disturb wildlife or fish to prevent their lawful taking. Any person who violates this section commits a Level Two violation. | Statute |
| Berg v. Nguyen | 201 So. 3d 1185 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) | 2016 WL 100267 (Ala. Civ. App. Jan. 8, 2016) | This Alabama case involves the appeal of summary judgment on behalf of defendants in a personal injury dog bite case. The plaintiff here was bitten as she walked through a parking lot of the retail store adjacent to the residence where the dogs were kept. The dogs (six or seven pit bulls) were kept by defendants' tenants at the residence. Some of the dogs were kept in outdoor, chain-link kennels and others were allowed to remain in the fenced backyard. Plaintiff Berg filed a complaint against the Nguyens and their business under a theory of landlord-tenant liability for the dog bite. The lower court granted the Nguyens' motion for summary judgment, finding that Alabama law does not provide for landlord liability in this case. On appeal here, the court was persuaded by defendants' evidence that they did not know of the dog's dangerous propensity and were aware of only two occasions where animal control had been called. Further, there were only a few times Than Nguyen was aware the dogs were left unchained in the front yard. This was sufficient for the court to find that plaintiff did not meet her burden establishing that the Nguyens knew or should have known of any dangerous propensities of the dog that bit plaintiff. As to the issue of defendants' knowledge that pit bulls were "inherently dangerous," the court held that the Alabama Supreme Court in Humphries established that breed alone is insufficient to impute knowledge. Summary judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| Ley 2374 de 2024 - Esterilización obligatoria de los animales de compañía (Colombia) | Programa Nacional de Esterilizacion de Gatos y Perros | Esta ley crea un programa nacional de esterilización quirúrgica de perros y gatos como método ético de control seguro de la natalidad para reducir los riesgos para la salud pública asociados a los animales vagabundos, así como para reducir la cantidad de animales abandonados, que sufren y son maltratados. El Congreso busca proteger la fauna salvaje mediante este decreto. Las instituciones que realizan la esterilización deben llevar un registro e identificar a los animales que han sido esterilizados, así como prestar sus servicios "sin barreras" a las comunidades que, de otro modo, no podrían esterilizar a sus animales. El Congreso debatió los problemas de bienestar animal relacionados con el abandono y el maltrato, y que al disminuir el número de animales nacidos, se puede dañar a menos animales. Además, se ha demostrado que la esterilización aumenta la calidad y esperanza de vida de los animales esterilizados. | Statute | |
| IN - Equine Activity Statute - Chapter 5. Equine Activities | I.C. 34-31-5-1 to 5 | IN ST 34-31-5-1 to 5 | This Indiana statute states that an equine activity sponsor or equine professional is not liable for an injury to a participant or the death of a participant resulting from an inherent risk of equine activities. Liability is not limited by this statute where the equine professional knowingly provided faulty tack or equipment, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a known, dangerous latent condition, or if he or she commits an act or omission that constitutes reckless disregard for the safety of the participant or intentionally injures the participant. The statute also requires the visible displaying of warning signs or warnings provided in contracts that alert participants to the limitation of liability by law. | Statute |
| CO - Impoundment - Article 15. Regulation Under Police Power. | C. R. S. A. § 30-15-104 | CO ST § 30-15-104 | This Colorado statute immunizes the board of county commissioners or other local governing entity from liability associated with the impoundment of pet animals. Specifically, it states the board or anyone authorized to enforce a local ordinance shall not be held responsible for any accident or subsequent disease that may occur to the animal in connection with the administration of the resolution or ordinance. | Statute |
| In re: MARJORIE WALKER, d/b/a LINN CREEK KENNEL | 2006 WL 2439003 (U.S.D.A.) |
Judicial Officer affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision that Marjorie Walker, d/b/a Linn Creek Kennel, violated the regulations of the Animal Welfare Act. The Judicial Officer stated that the Animal Welfare Act provides factors that must be considered when deciding the amount of civil penalty, and that the ability to pay the penalty is not a factor. Respondent was ordered to cease and desist from violating the regulations and standards, pay a $14,300 civil penalty, and the license was revoked . |
Case | |
| Legal Impact for Chickens v. Case Farms, LLC | This reflects Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief. In a press release, Plaintiff Legal Impact for Chickens states, "[t]oday, one of the country’s largest poultry producers and a KFC supplier, Case Farms, was sued by animal-welfare charity Legal Impact for Chickens (LIC) in Burke County District Court for its pattern of gross mismanagement and animal cruelty. The complaint comes on the heels of a 2021 undercover investigation by animal advocacy group Animal Outlook, revealing a trend of cruel and deadly abuse at a Morganton, N.C. Case Farms hatchery that processes more than 200,000 chicks daily. LIC accuses Case Farms of violating both industry standards and North Carolina law." | Pleading | ||
| R v D.L. | R. v. D.L., 1999 ABPC 41 | In R v D.L. (1999 ABPC 41) the phrase “wilfully and without lawful excuse” found in s.446 was at issue. In this case, two individuals were charged under s. 445(a) s.446 (1)(a) for killing a cat after the cats’ owner told them to “get rid of it” which they took to mean kill it. The judge in this case found that having permission to kill an animal was not a sufficient “lawful excuse” and did not lawfully give the authority to cause unnecessary pain and suffering to the animal. The accused was found not guilty on count 1 and guilty on count 2. | Case |