Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IPPL v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc. | 799 F.2d 934 (1986) |
Private individuals and organizations brought action seeking to be named guardians of medical research animals seized from organization whose chief was convicted of state animal cruelty statute violations. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, John R. Hargrove, J., dismissed action, and individuals and organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) individuals and organizations lacked standing to bring action, and (2) Animal Welfare Act did not confer private cause of action. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act. |
Case | ||
| Decision N.°0507-12-EP, 2015 Shrimp Farm in Cayapas - Ecuador | CAUSA No. 0507-12-EP | In this case, the defendant, the Ministry of the Environment, appeals decisions from the lower court concerning the plaintiff's shrimp farm. The farm was located on a nature reserve, and the plaintiff sued for protective action, arguing that the Ministry's administrative resolution ordering the closing of the farm violated his property rights and due process. The lower court held in favor of the shrimp farm. The Ministry subsequently filed an Extraordinary Writ of Protection with the Constitutional Court, held that the lower court's decision had infringed upon the defendant's right to due process, invalidated the lower court's ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings. | Case | ||
| People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 797 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir., 2015) | 2015 WL 4727327 (D.C. Cir., 2015) | Ten years after the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) took steps to apply Animal Welfare Act (AWA) protections to birds, the task remained incomplete. The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) sued the USDA, arguing that its inaction amounted to agency action “unlawfully withheld,” in violation of section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The District Court granted the USDA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the USDA's enforcement decisions were committed by law to its discretion. On appeal, the court found PETA had standing, but had failed to plausibly allege that the USDA's decade-long inaction constituted agency action “unlawfully withheld” in violation of the APA. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, therefore affirmed the District Court's judgment of dismissal. For the District Court's opinion, see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 60 F.Supp.3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014). | Case | |
| Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y | 2014 WL 3579639 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 2014) | After the International Court of Justice ruled against Japan in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, Sea Shepherd moved to dismiss the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling regarding Sea Shepherd’s own actions in the Antarctic. Sea Shepherd claimed that because the Institute had announced that it would not engage in whaling in the 2014-15 season, its claim was moot. This argument, though, ignored the fact the Institute also stated that it plans to resume whaling in the future, leading the Court to dismiss the motion. | Case | ||
| GA - Fur - Article 2. Trapping, Trappers, and Fur Dealers | Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-60 to 73 | GA ST § 27-3-60 to 73 | Under these GA statutes, trappers and fur-dealers must be licensed. Trapping of fur-bearing animals is allowed during open trapping season. Traps must be inspected at least once every 24 hours. Trappers must dispatch fur-bearing animals caught in a trap and release domestic animals. It is legal to set traps to protect livestock and domestic animals from predators, but unlawful to trap upon the right of way of any public road or upon another's land. A violation of these statutes is a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| American Horse Protection Assoc. v. Andrus | 608 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1979) |
The court stated that the Secretary’s decision to remove 3,500 to 7,000 wild horses in order to maintain the horse population at a permanent level might qualify as “major” federal action and thus require an EIS before removal could occur. While the secretary has wide discretion under the WFRHBA, he has no discretion regarding compliance with NEPA. The court also held that the exercise of jurisdiction by two courts over public lands created no threat of conflicting decisions on range utilization, because the courts only determined whether the land use decision was an informed one. |
Case | ||
| CA - Birds - Part 2. Birds. | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 3500 - 3864 | CA FISH & G § 3500 - 3864 | These various sections are all related to the protection of birds in California. Within these sections, the Legislature has enumerated fully protected birds in the state, prohibited activities such as destroying bird nests and eggs, required licenses for duck hunting, and outlined several provisions to guide state efforts in preserving and rehabilitating the California Condor. | Statute | |
| Lyman v. Lanser | --- N.E.3d ----, 2024 WL 970217 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 7, 2024) | 103 Mass. App. Ct. 787 (2024) | This case is an appeal concerning an agreement to share possession of a dog between a couple that had ended their relationship. The lower court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court of appeals vacated the order, then this appeal followed. The parties purchased the dog together while they were still a couple, and agreed to share the dog if they broke up. After the relationship eventually ended, the couple shared the dog on a two week alternating basis. Eventually, one party maintained custody of the dog and denied the other party access to the dog, so plaintiff filed this action for conversion and breach of contract, seeking specific performance of the custody agreement for the dog. The court here found that the dog is jointly owned property, the lack of a written contract does not bar the plaintiff from specific performance, and that the judge's order of specific performance was a suitable remedy since monetary damages would not allow plaintiff access to his shared property. Therefore, the court reversed the order vacating the preliminary injunction and denied the defendant's petition for relief from the preliminary injunction. | Case | |
| US - Whales - Whaling Provisions; Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Quotas | FR Doc. 05-2001 | Docket No. 050114009-5009-01; I.D. 011105B |
NMFS announces the aboriginal subsistence whaling quota for bowhead whales, and other limitations deriving from regulations adopted at the 2002 Special Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). For 2005, the quota is 75 bowhead whales struck. This quota and other limitations will govern the harvest of bowhead whales by members of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC). |
Administrative | |
| Sentencia C-467/16 | Sentencia C-467/16 | This lawsuit seeks the unconstitutionality of articles 665 and 658 of the Civil Code that define "movable objects" and "real property by destination." The plaintiff alleges that these categorizations are against the Constitution's environmental orientation and international agreements. The court upheld the validity of these articles and stated that such categorizations were not against legally considering animals as sentient beings deserving of protection against pain and suffering. In other words, the protection of animals is not affected by this language. "Animals are included in the category of property because property rights may be exercised over them, and animals are often the subjects of legal transactions. Therefore, categorizing animals as property responds to a necessity and does not affect the regulation in other provisions to develop the duty to protect animals as sentient beings (Law 1774, 2016)." | Case |