Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trimble v. State | 848 N.E.2d 278 (Ind., 2006) | 2006 WL 1413089 (Ind., 2006) |
In this Indiana case, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of cruelty to an animal and harboring a non-immunized dog. On rehearing, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant abandoned or neglected dog left in his care, so as to support conviction for cruelty to an animal. The court held that the evidence of Butchie's starved appearance, injured leg, and frost bitten extremities was sufficient to allow the trial judge to discount Trimble's testimony and infer that Trimble was responsible for feeding and caring for Butchie, and that he failed to do so. |
Case | |
| MI - Initiatives - Proposal 14-2, A REFERENDUM OF PUBLIC ACT 520 OF 2012, ESTABLISHING A HUNTING SEASON FOR WOLVES AND AUTHORIZING ANNUAL WOLF HUNTING SEASONS | Proposal 14-2 (2014) |
This is the second wolf-related ballot measure for the November 4, 2014 election that also operates as a veto referendum. If the proposal is approved, it would uphold Public Act 21 of 2013, which authorizes the Natural Resources Commission to directly designate game species (including wolves) and determine hunting seasons. In Michigan, a "Yes" vote on a veto referendum upholds the law and a "No" vote rejects the law. As a result, the referendum's supporters are campaigning for a "No" vote. |
Statute | ||
| CA - Circus - § 25989.1. Notice to animal control services agency of performances to be conducted | West's Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25989.1 | CA HLTH & S § 25989.1 | This California section provides that any traveling circus or carnival must notify entity that provides animal control services for a city, county, or city and county in which the traveling circus or carnival intends to perform of its intent to perform within that jurisdiction at least 14 days prior to the first performance in that city, county, or city and county. Violation results in a fine of $500 - 2,000 for a first violation, and $1,500 - 5,000 for any subsequent violation. | Statute | |
| US - Assistance animals, housing - Subpart D. Prohibition Against Discrimination Because of Handicap. | 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 - 205 | These regulations set out the definitions relating to housing discrimination under the Federal Fair Housing Act. | Administrative | ||
| New York Penal Law 1866: Chapter 682: Section 2 | N.Y. Rev. Stat. 682.2 (1866) | Chapter 682 from New York Penal Law of 1866 covers cruelty to animals. Section 2 from this chapter describes the offense entitled neglect of disabled animals. The law states the penalty for leaving a disabled or diseased animal to die on any state or city land. | Statute | ||
| Miller v. Peraino | 626 A.2d 637 (Pa.Super., 1993) | 426 Pa.Super. 189 (1993) |
The incident generating this dispute after two veterinary assistants claimed that Miller viciously beat plaintiff's dog Nera to death because he was having difficulty getting the dog from the basement recovery room to the waiting area upstairs where the dog would be picked up. The sole issue on this appeal is the dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from both the dog's death and the veterinarian's behavior during plaintiff's picketing of his business. Relying on both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and a prior decision inDaughen v. Fox, the court held that intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot legally be founded upon a veterinarian's behavior toward an animal. |
Case | |
| Slay v. Spell | 882 So.2d 254 (Miss. 2004) | 882 So.2d 254 (Miss. 2004) |
A slaughterhouse owner violated a Mississippi statute by failing to provide E. coli swab samples from hog carcasses for three weeks. The Circuit Court found in favor of the Mississippi Department of Commerce and the Court of appeals affirmed the decision. |
Case | |
| C., M. M. M. s/ Denuncia Maltrato Animal; seguidos contra E. P. S., D.N.I. N° X- Causa Tita | Fallo 481/2021 | This court decision has two important aspects, where the judge recognizes families as multispecies, and non-human animals as sentient beings and subjects of rights. The facts of this case arose from a fatal encounter between the police officer and "Tita," a Pitbull-mix family dog, in March 2020 in the Province of Chubut in Argentina. "Tita" attacked an on-duty police officer, and, when Tita was walking away, the officer shot her in front of her family. The injury was so severe that Tita had to ultimately be put down. The judge, in this case, found that Tita was a non-human person and a daughter to her human family, as she and other companion animals had adapted so well to the family life, that it had turned the family into a multispecies one. Therefore, the loss of Tita was an irreparable one. The judge further stated that in today's world animals are not "things," they are sentient beings and they have the right that their life is respected. The holding of the court was also based on the case of Sandra, the orangutan, and the Universal declaration of animal rights. The police officer was sentenced to one year of suspended imprisonment, professional disqualification for two years, and to pay the attorney and court fees for the crimes of abuse of authority and damages. However, he was acquitted of the animal cruelty charges. Update: In September 2022, the Chubut's criminal chamber of the Superior Court of Justice (the highest tribunal in the province) heard the case on appeal. The court affirmed the verdict of the Trelew’s criminal chamber that set aside the guilty verdict entered against the police officer. The highest tribunal found that, at the incident, Tita was unleashed and unmuzzled. Also, she was aggressive toward the officer, barking and charging at him before he shot her. The tribunal concluded that the officer found himself in imminent danger, which justified his actions, and therefore, he was not guilty as he acted to defend himself. The tribunal found that Sandra's case and the Universal declaration of animal rights did not apply to Tita's case because there were circumstances in which it is necessary to end the life of an animal, and Sandra’s case was brought up as a habeas corpus on behalf of a hominid primate. The recognition of “subject of rights” was granted to Sandra based on the genetic similarity of her species to humans, which is 97%, as opposed to canines’ which is only 75%. It is important to note that the tribunal did not say anything in regard to the status of Tita as a member of her multispecies family. | Case | ||
| U.S. v. Mitchell | 985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1993) |
Defendant, a zoologist working for the Department of Interior, was charged in nine count indictment taking and transporting animals in violation of foreign law under the Lacey Act among other violations. Defendant filed motion to dismiss and government filed motion to determine foreign law. The government alleged in Count 8 that in September of 1987, Mitchell transported the hides and horns of a Punjab urial (wild sheep) and a Chinkara gazelle out of Pakistan and into the United States knowing that the animals had been taken, possessed or transported in violation of Pakistani law; the Pakistani Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1950 and the Punjab Wildlife Act of 1974. The court rejected defendant's reading of the imports and exports law and found it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of the Punjab Wildlife Act as the Lacey Act impinges on whether defendant violated the portions of the law prohibiting possession of the animals without a permit. |
Case | ||
| Blankenship v. Commonwealth | 838 S.E.2d 568 (2020) | 71 Va.App. 608 (Va.App., 2020) | Brandon Scott Blankenship showed up at Wally Andrews’ home although Blankenship had previously been ordered not to come onto Andrews’ property. Blankenship stood outside on Andrews’ property and continued to curse at Andrews and threaten to kill him. Andrews called law enforcement and when they arrived, Blankenship continued his cursing and yelling at the officers. Every time the officers attempted to arrest Blankenship he would ball up his fists and take a fighting stance towards the officers. At some point the officers released a police K-9 named Titan after Blankenship took off running. Blankenship kicked and punched Titan until he backed off. Titan ended up with a digestive injury in which he would not eat and seemed lethargic. Blankenship was indicted for three counts of assault and battery on a law enforcement officer, one count of assault on a law enforcement animal, one count of assault and battery, one count of obstruction of justice, and one count of animal cruelty. The Court struck one count of assault and battery on a law enforcement officer, the count of assault on a law enforcement animal, and the count of obstruction to justice. Blankenship was convicted of the remaining four counts and he appealed assigning error to the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. The Court found that Blankenship’s overt acts demonstrated that he intended to place the law enforcement officers in fear of bodily harm which in turn caused the officers to actually and reasonably fear bodily harm. The totality of the circumstances supported Blankenship’s conviction of assault and battery on both the law enforcement officers and Andrews. As for the animal cruelty conviction, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence from which the circuit court could find that Blankenship voluntarily acted with a consciousness that inhumane injury or pain would result from punching and kicking Titan. Blankenship had no right to resist the lawful arrest and his actions against Titan were not necessary, therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support Blankenship’s conviction for animal cruelty. The Court ultimately affirmed and remanded the case. | Case |