Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. | 376 So. 3d 178, writ granted sub nom. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/19/23) | 2022-0976 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/19/23); 2023 WL 6119352 (La.App. 1 Cir., 2023) | Plaintiff-appellee, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), began this case by issuing eight public records requests to defendant-appellant Louisiana State University (LSU). PETA made these records seeking veterinary care and disposition records for birds used in LSU’s laboratories. For the first seven of these requests, LSU did not produce the records, so PETA filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief pursuant to the Public Records Law. LSU denied PETA’s allegations and did not produce the records, so PETA made an eighth records request, which LSU responded to with an assertion that the requested records were exempt from disclosure. After a hearing, the trial court issued an oral ruling in favor of PETA and granted some of the records that PETA requested. LSU appealed. On appeal, the court considered whether the records sought by PETA were covered under the Public Records Law. The court first found that LSU qualifies as a research facility under the Animal Welfare Act, and needs to comply with federal law and maintain and produce records relating to research animals, so long as the records being sought would not be unduly burdensome to produce. The court held that the portions of the judgment ordering LSU to produce veterinary daily observation reports, veterinary daily health check records, and other veterinary records were affirmed. However, some of the information sought, including private communications between LSU employees, trapping records, and some videographic records, were considered unduly burdensome to compel LSU to produce. The court also amended a portion of one of the requests to make it more specific and narrow the documentation that LSU would need to produce. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, amended in part, and reversed in part. | Case |
| American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals et al v. Ringling Brothers, et al, |
This case involves the Ringling Brothers circus company’s mistreatment of elephants brought by the ASPCA. Plaintiffs alleged that the alleged routine beating, chaining, and other mistreatment amounted to an unlawful taking of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Judge rejects defendants’ motion to dismiss and order the case to proceed. |
Pleading | ||
| Night monkey in a soiled and rusty cage. | Slideshow Images | |||
| VA - Property - § 3.2-6585. Dogs and cats deemed personal property; rights relating thereto | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6585 | VA ST § 3.2-6585 | This Virginia statute provides that all dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property and may be the subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass. It further grants authority to animal control officers to seize a stolen dog or cat pending court action. | Statute |
| Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv. | 60 F.4th 16 (2d Cir. 2023) | In 2019, Plaintiff-Appellant the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“ASPCA”) sued Defendants-Appellees the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) alleging that APHIS followed a "policy or practice" of violating FOIA for failing to comply with requests for records related to the agency response to maintenance of animal welfare standards and licensing of animal dealers/exhibitors. This suit was prompted by APHIS' 2017 decommissioning of two public databases that allow users (including the ASPCA) to access records on commercial breeding facilities including inspection reports and photographs. APHIS contends that there was not a policy or practice that violated FOIA because it was corrected as the result of an intervening act of Congress, specifically, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020. In April of 2020, APHIS moved for summary judgment on the pleadings arguing that ASPCA failed to state a policy or practice claim related to the decommissioned databases and that it makes every effort to respond to FOIA requests within the statutory timeframe. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment on the pleadings, finding that while the decommissioning of the databases did indeed impair the ability of the ASPCA to receive prompt FOIA requests, ASPCA did not establish that the court must intervene to correct such a policy or practice and Congress already acted to correct the breakdown through the appropriations bill. On ASPCA's timely appeal here, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020 reversed the records access problems. While the ASPCA contended that there were certain records like photographs that were removed from the database, there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that such record requests would not be processed in the future. In essence, this court agreed that the intervening act of Congress by the change in law corrected the action. Thus, a broad order by the court mandating changes to the FOIA process would amount to an unlawful advisory opinion because there is no policy or practice currently occurring by APHIS. The district court's judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar | 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012) | 2012 WL 3538236 (D.C. Cir. 2012) |
In 1985, after scientists had found only 10 living squirrels, the Virginia northern flying squirrel was listed as endangered under the ESA. In 2006, after scientists had captured 1,063 squirrels, the FWS went through the procedure to delist the squirrel. Friends of Blackwater filed a complaint against the Secretary of Interior in district court, challenging the Secretary's rule to delist the squirrel. Subsequently, the Secretary of Interior appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The D.C. circuit court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the Secretary's determination the West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel was no longer endangered was neither arbitrary and capricious nor in violation of the Act. |
Case |
| MI - Food animal - § 750.477a Sale of unlabelled horse and dog meat | M.C.L.A. 750.477a | Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.477a (West) | This Michigan statute makes it a misdemeanor for an individual to knowingly sell any horse or dog meat unless it is plainly labelled. | Statute |
| AU - Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 (NSW) | Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 |
This Act deals with the exhibition of animals at marine or zoological parks, circuses and other places. It regulates the exhibition of all vertebrate animals in zoos, circuses or mobile displays regardless of whether they are native, exotic or domestic.
A person must have an approval to keep and exhibit an animal, and this is subject to qualifications, experience or any other term or condition that may be considered necessary |
Statute | |
| Shively v. Dye Creek Cattle Co. | 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 (Cal.App.3.Dist.) | 29 Cal.App.4th 1620 (Cal.App.3.Dist.) |
This California case concerned a personal injury action arising from a collision between the plaintiff's car and defendant's black Angus bull, which was lying on the highway at night. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In reversing this decision, the Court of Appeal held that the open range law does not itself define the duty owners of cattle owe nor does it exempt them from the duty of ordinary care. |
Case |
| Priebe v. Nelson | 140 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2006) | 39 Cal.4th 1112, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 553 |
A kennel worker who was bitten by a dog while the dog was in the care of the kennel sued the owner of the dog under a theory of strict liability under a statute and under the common law. The court found that the dog owner was not liable to the kennel worker because under the "veterinarian's rule," the kennel owner had assumed the risk of being bitten by the dog. |
Case |