Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GA - Breeding - Chapter 40-13-13. Animal Protection | GA ADC 40-13-13-.01 to .09 | Ga Comp. R. & Regs. 40-13-13-.01 to .09 | There regulations set out the requirements for licensing animal shelters, pet dealers, kennels, and stable operators. They also provide provisions for controlling disease and shipping animals into the state. | Administrative | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar | 776 F.Supp.2d 1178 (D.Mont., 2011) | 2011 WL 1345670 (D.Mont.) |
The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service's 2009 Final Rule unlawfully delisted wolves in Idaho and Montana from the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Rule was vacated. The Court held that it had no authority to decide that it would be more equitable to ignore Congress' instruction on how an endangered species must be protected so that the wolves could be taken under the states' management plans. In addition, the Court held that it was inappropriate for the Court to approve a settlement at the expense of the Non–Settling Litigants' legal interests. |
Case | |
| Placey v. Placey | 51 So.3d 374 (Ala. Civ. App., 2010) | 2010 WL 2342397 (Ala. Civ. App.) |
The appellate court held that the Protection from Abuse Act authorized the trial court to determine and award ownership of Preston the dog in a domestic violence dispute between a mother and daughter. It then awarded ownership rights to the mother because took better care of the Preston and it was in his best interest. |
Case | |
| Rhode Island Public Laws 1857-1872: Chapter 912: An act for the prevention of cruelty to animals. | 1872 R.I. Pub. Laws 912 | A collection of the laws concerning cruelty to animals from Rhode Island for the years 1857-1872. The act covers such topics as bird fighting, cruelty to animals, enforcement of the act, and procedural issues concerning the act. | Statute | ||
| Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Tommy and Kiko v. | 31 N.Y.3d 1054, 100 N.E.3d 846 (2018) | 2018 WL 2107087 (Mem), 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 03309 | The petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project brought this appeal on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, who are two captive chimpanzees. The chimpanzees had been confined by their owners in small cages within a warehouse and a cement storefront in a crowded residential area, respectively. Petitioner sought leave to appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, which affirmed two judgments of the Supreme Court declining to sign orders to show cause to grant the chimpanzees habeas relief. The lower courts based their denial of habeas corpus for the chimpanzees on the dictionary definition for "person." The term “person” tends to lean towards an entity that is recognized by law as having most of the rights and duties of a human. The Appellate Division also reasoned that chimpanzees are not considered people because they lack the capacity to bear legal duties or to be held legally accountable for their actions. As a counter, the Petitioner argued that the same can be said for human infants or comatose human adults, yet no one would say that it is improper to seek a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of one of them. The Appellate Division therefore based their denial on the fact that chimpanzees are not a member of the human species. In the instant action, Court of Appeals of New York denied the motion for leave to appeal. In the concurring opinion, Judge Fahey states that the better approach is not to ask whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether it has the same rights and duties as a human being, but whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. The concurring opinion also found that the Appellate Division erred by misreading the case it relied on and holding that a habeas corpus challenge cannot be used to seek transfer; a habeas corpus challenge can be used to seek a transfer to another facility. Although Judge Fahey recognizes that Chimpanzees share at least 96% of their DNA with humans and are autonomous, intelligent creatures, he concurred with the Appellate Division’s decision to deny leave to appeal. However, he ultimately questioned whether the Court was right to deny leave in the first instance. | Case | |
| CO - Denver - Breed - Sec. 8-55. Pit bulls prohibited. | Sec. 8.55 |
This Denver, Colorado ordinance provides that it is unlawful for any person to own, possess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport, or sell within the city any pit bull. A pit bull is defined broadly as "any dog that is an American Pit Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, or any dog displaying the majority of physical traits of any one (1) or more of the above breeds, or any dog exhibiting those distinguishing characteristics which substantially conform to the standards established by the American Kennel Club or United Kennel Club for any of the above breeds." [emphasis added] A person who applied for and received a special pit bull license before August 7, 1989 (date of the publication of the ordinance) and who maintains the pit bull in compliance with the requirements of the ordinance may keep a pit bull. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Slavin v. United States | 2005 WL 742707 (8th Cir. 2005) |
An Arkansas woman who raises gamefowl brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the Animal Welfare Act which prohibits the interstate transportation of birds for the purposes of fighting. The trial court dismissed the woman's claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed holding the statute is not vague. |
Case | ||
| RI - Research - Chapter 27. Retirement of Research Dogs and Cats | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-27-1 - 2 | RI ST § 4-27-1 - 2 | This chapter, adopted in 2018, is the “Research Animal Retirement Act." A higher education research facility that receives public money must assess the health of a cat or dog to determine whether it is suitable for adoption once any testing or research on the animal has been completed. The facility must then make reasonable efforts to place those suitable dogs or cats through private adoption or adoption through a shelter or rescue. These efforts shall be made prior to euthanizing the dog or cat. | Statute | |
| Hoaward Stein, Susan Stein, Steven Glasser, Gail Glasser, Joel Hodes, Netiva Caftori, Eric Cooper, Norman Cooper v. Dr. Todd Pri | This Illinois action brings forth the claims of four sets of plaintiffs for various claims against defendant-veterinarian. While the specific facts concerning the alleged wrongdoings are not provided, it appears that defendant was a veterinarian who operated a medical center and animal boarding facility. Plaintiffs all raise four counts against defendant (breach of contract, negligence, malpractice, and bailment) for the deaths of their dogs. From each set of facts, the various plaintiffs allege that their dogs were in good health prior to boarding their dogs at defendant’s facility, and each dog subsequently died in its cage. In the negligence and malpractice counts, the plaintiffs note that defendants failed to provide an adequate environment to ensure the dogs’ safety, failed to provide adequate ventilation, failed to sterilize the boarding area after sick animals had been housed there, and then failed to properly preserve the companion animals to ensure accurate necropsies, among other things. All plaintiffs sought both actual damages for the loss of their companions as well as damages related to their “reasonable sentimental value.” | Pleading | |||
| Sentencia T-760, 2007 | Sentencia T-760/07 | The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) against Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas ‘CORPOCALDAS’, arguing that ‘CORPOCALDAS’ had violated the fundamental rights to health, personal integrity, life and human integrity of the Plaintiff’s wife, who became severely depressed when the Defendant confiscated an amazonian parrot she kept as her pet. The Plaintiff argued that the parrot was the only company the Plaintiff’s wife had for over five years, and that the confiscation of their parrot, was a violation of the Plaintiff's wife's fundamental rights. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that his wife was 65 years old, had raised the parrot that was never abused or neglected and who was allowed to move freely as her wings were never trimmed. The Plaintiff sought the the return of the parrot by the environmental authority ‘CORPOCALDAS’ to his wife, as well as the granting of the parrot’s title to her. The Court was able to find that the Plaintiff’s wife’s health was indeed diminished after the confiscation of the bird and the she had to undergo treatment as a result of it. However, the court found that the Plaintiffs were unable to provide evidence tending to prove that they had acquired the animal in a legal manner, as no permit, hunting license, or evidence that the parrot was obtained from a legal breeder were provided. The court determined that CORPOCALDAS did not overstep its responsibilities, as it is its duty to protect the wild fauna of the nation. Touching on the issue of whether the the fundamental rights of the plaintiff had been violated, the court concluded there was not such violation, as the environmental authority’s action was legal, reasonable, necessary and legitimate, and the Plaintiff did not obtained the parrot in accordance with the requirements legally established. In this case, the collective right to a healthy environment prevailed over the personal interest of the Plaintiff. The Constitutional Court affirmed the judgment of the ‘Juzgado Segundo Laboral del Circuito de Manizales’. | Case |