Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TN - Endangered Species - Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974 | T. C. A. § 70-8-101 to 112 | TN ST § 70-8-101 to 112 | These Tennessee statutes comprise the Tennessee Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974 and includes the legislative intent, definitions, and factors relevant to endangered species investigations. By statute, it is unlawful for any person to take, attempt to take, possess, transport, export, process, sell or offer for sale or ship nongame wildlife, or for any common or contract carrier knowingly to transport or receive for shipment nongame wildlife. Violation constitutes a Class B misdemeanor and incurs warrantless searches and seizure of the wildlife taken and the instrumentalities used in the taking. | Statute |
| NH - Licenses - Chapter 466. Dogs and Cats. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 466:30-a | NH ST § 466:30-a | This New Hampshire law provides that it is unlawful for any dog to run at large. "At large" is defined as "off the premises of the owner or keeper and not under the control of any person by means of personal presence and attention as will reasonably control the conduct of such dog, unless accompanied by the owner or custodian." Any authorized person may seize such at large dogs. | Statute |
| Nelson v. Lewis | 344 N.E.2d 268 (Ill.App. 1976) | 36 Ill.App.3d 130 (1976) |
Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct. The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation. The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts. Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously. |
Case |
| Hyland v. Borras | 719 A.2d 662 (N.J.Super.A.D., 1998) |
Plaintiff Heather Hyland brought this action for damages after defendants' dog, an American bulldog, trespassed onto plaintiff's property and attacked her ten year old shih tzu, causing serious injuries to the dog. Defendants appeal the award of "repair costs" ($2,500) in excess of the dog's market value or "replacement cost" ($500). In upholding the award, the court distinguished companion animals from other personal property, finding that market value fails to take into account the owner's relationship to the animal. |
Case | |
| Kimball v. Betts | 99 Wash. 348 (1918) | 169 P. 849 (1918) |
In an action for conversion of household goods kept for use and not for sale, it is not necessary to prove that such goods have no market value as a condition precedent to the right to introduce proof of actual value. If they have no market value, the measure of damages for their conversion is their value to the owner based on the actual money lost. |
Case |
| Thurber v. Apmann | 91 A.D.3d 1257 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 225395 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.); 936 N.Y.S.2d 789 |
In 2007, the plaintiff and defendant were walking their respective dogs when one of defendant's two dogs, a retired K-9 dog, attacked the plaintiff's dog. Plaintiff sued defendant for damages she received as a result. While each dog did received "handler protection" training (where a K-9 dog is trained to react to an aggressive attack on defendant while on duty), that situation had never arisen because the dogs acted in passive roles as explosive detection dogs. Plaintiff countered that the severity of the attack coupled with the dogs' breed and formal police training should have put defendant on notice of the dogs' vicious propensities. In affirming the summary judgment, this court found that the formal police training was not evidence of viciousness and there was no support to plaintiff's assertion that defendant kept the dogs as "guard dogs." |
Case |
| Central Park Sightseeing LLC v. New Yorkers for Clean, Livable & Safe Streets, Inc. | 157 A.D.3d 28, 66 N.Y.S.3d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) | 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 08619, 2017 WL 6043994 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 7, 2017) | This New York cases balances animal right protestors' First Amendment rights against the government's interest in preserving public safety and flow of traffic on public streets. Plaintiff here is a business that operates horse-drawn carriage rides in Central Park. Defendant is an animal rights organization that protests the horse-and-carriage industry, often demonstrating where carriage operators drop off and pick up customers. At issue, is the manner in which defendants conduct their protests in the designated horse-drawn carriage zones. Plaintiff's claim defendants harass and threaten customers and drivers, and create a public safety issue by chasing after carriages. The court granted a preliminary injunction that enjoined defendants from things like physically blocking or impeding persons from riding or disembarking from carriages, physically touching associated persons or horses, yelling or shouting at persons or horses, obstructing the progress of a carriage ride, and handing literature to a person situated within a horse carriage. The court found the plaintiffs also established a likelihood of success on an action for public nuisance and a showing of a "special injury" aimed at plaintiff's business. Finding the injunction was content-neutral, this reviewing court then considered whether the challenged portions of the injunction burden speech no more than is necessary to assert the significant government interest. The court agreed with defendant that the "floating buffer zone" of the original order would be difficult for a protestor to assess and would burden speech more than is necessary. Thus, this court modified the order to prohibit any person from knowingly approaching within nine feet of a person in the loading/unloading carriage zone (a “conversational distance," said the court). The court also noted that the First Amendment does not require that protestors be allowed to interrupt the flow of traffic or endanger the public in the delivery of speech. The court also limited language in the original order that extended the reach of the injunction to “anyone else who becomes aware of this [d]ecision and [o]rder.” The court changed to this to defendants and “those acting in concert with the named parties” The order from the Supreme Court, New York County was modified as specified in this decision. | Case |
| OR - Cruelty - Arrest warrants in cruelty matters (Chapter 133) | O. R. S. § 133.375 - 381 | OR ST § 133.375 - 381 | This set of Oregon laws relates to the arrest of those found violating the state's cruelty laws. Under the section, any person violating ORS 167.315 to 167.333, 167.340, 167.355, 167.365 or 167.428 may be arrested and held without warrant, in the same manner as in the case of persons found breaking the peace. Further, any peace officer who cares or provides for an animal pursuant to this section and any person into whose care an animal is delivered by a peace officer acting under this section shall be immune from civil or criminal liability based upon an allegation that such care was negligently provided. | Statute |
| MO - Rabies - Chapter 322. Protection Against Rabies | V. A. M. S. 322.090 - 322.145 | MO ST 322.090 - 322.145 | This chapter concerns laws preventing the transmission and control of rabies and other zoonotic diseases. Section 322.140 provides that if a county does not adopt rules and regulations pursuant to sections 322.090 to 322.130, whenever an animal bites or otherwise possibly transmits rabies or any zoonotic disease, the incident shall be immediately reported to the county health department. It also provides that the owner of an owner that bites is responsible for the costs associated with rabies testing and/or treatment. Further, the owner of an animal that bites or otherwise possibly transmitted rabies or any zoonotic disease shall be liable to an injured party for all damages done by the animal. | Statute |
| Pfeil v. Rogers | 757 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985) |
Where sheriffs deputies acted in accordance with applicable state laws, there was no violation of Fourth Amendment rights in the shooting of plaintiff's dogs. |
Case |