Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Branstetter | 29 P.3d 1121 (Or. 2001) | 332 Or. 389 (Or. 2001) |
In a state prosecution for animal neglect, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the animals to a humane agency. An appeal by the owner of the animals was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the statutes controlling appealable judgments allowed the animal owner to appeal the forfeiture of the animals. |
Case |
| Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris | 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013) | 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv, 2013 WL 4615131 (9th Cir. 2013) |
Prior to California's Force Fed Birds law—which bans the sale of products that are the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size—coming into effect, two non-California entities produced foie gras that was sold at a California restaurant. When the law came into effect, all three entities sought to enjoin the state of California from enforcing the law; they argued the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court, however, denied their motion for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the preliminary injunction. |
Case |
| Animal Protection and Rescue League v. California | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 315709 (S.D.Cal.) |
Plaintiffs move for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to compel defendant City of San Diego to place a seasonal rope barrier at the La Jolla Children's Pool Beach to limit human interaction with harbor seals during pupping season. In denying the TRO, the court noted that plaintiffs failed to identify a single incident of harassment occurring since December 15, 2007 (the beginning of the pupping season) or any causal nexus between miscarriages and people walking up to the seals. While the parties agree placement of the barrier would not harm people and act as an effective tool, the court noted that the focus of irreparable harm is on the harm sought to be prevented not on the difficulty in carrying out the task. |
Case | |
| Commonwealth v. Arcelay | 190 A.3d 609 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 12, 2018) | 2018 PA Super 161, 2018 PA Super 161, 2018 WL 2927748 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 12, 2018) | The appellant Arcelay appeals his conviction for the summary offense of cruelty to animals after he left his two small Yorkie dogs were found inside of his vehicle on an 87 to 90 degree day for approximately two hours at Willow Grove Naval Air Station. The dogs were rescued from the car and survived (law enforcement gave the dogs water and placed them inside an air conditioned building). After receiving a citation for leaving the animals, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and appeared for the Magisterial Judge. He was found guilty and assessed fines and costs of $454.96. At a Summary Appeal de novo hearing, the officers who responded to the scene presented evidence, including testimony on the dogs being in the car for two hours and photographs of the area showing no shade was available. Appellant testified that he was retired from the Reserves and was at the base to set up for a family picnic. During the morning, he indicated that he checked on the dogs every fifteen minutes. Appellant testified that "he believes the public overreacts when they see dogs in a car" and he was upset that someone had gone into his vehicle to remove the dogs. The court ultimately found appellant guilty of the summary offense, but put appellant on a probation for three months in lieu of fines and costs, taking into account Appellant's lack income. On the instant appeal, appellant first questions whether the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to hear this matter since it occurred on a military installation. Appellant also raises whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law for the cruelty to animals conviction. As to the jurisdictional argument, the court here found the issuance of the summary citation at the military base was appropriate. The court observed that it is well-settled that military and non-military courts may exercise concurrent subject matter jurisdiction for criminal matters. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction, where his conduct in leaving the dogs in a closed car on a hot, summer day presented an unreasonable risk of harm. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| VT - Cruelty - § 5784. Forcible entry of motor vehicle to remove unattended child or animal | 12 V.S.A. § 5784 | VT ST T. 12 § 5784 | This Vermont law, enacted in 2016, provides that any person who forcibly enter a motor vehicle for the purpose of removing a child or animal from the motor vehicle shall not be subject to civil liability for damages arising from the forcible entry if certain steps are followed. | Statute |
| UT - Trusts - § 75-2-1001. Honorary trusts--Trusts for pets | U.C.A. 1953 § 75-2-1001 | UT ST § 75-2-1001 | This Utah statute provides that a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. Trusts under this section shall be liberally construed to presume against the merely precatory or honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out the general intent of the transferor. | Statute |
| NY - Exotic Pets - Chapter 69 Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 370 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 370 | This New York law provides that any person who owns or possesses a wild animal or reptile capable of inflicting bodily harm upon a human being, who fails to exercise due care in safeguarding the public from attack by such wild animal or reptile, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The punishment for violation is imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by both. The second part of the law imposes strict liability upon owners of dangerous wild animals. | Statute |
| Graham v. Notti | 196 P.3d 1070 (Wash.,2008) |
The court held that the adoption of a dog from an animal shelter was invalid unless the dog was found in "the city" pursuant to the shelter's contract with the local government. |
Case | |
| Faraci v. Urban | 101 A.D.3d 1753 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.) | 2012 WL 6720938 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.); 957 N.Y.S.2d 792 |
In this New York case, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries his son sustained after the child was bitten by a dog in a house owned by defendant Urban, but occupied by Defendant Buil (the dog's owner). Defendant Urban appeals an order denying her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant Urban failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that the dog did not have vicious tendencies because defendant's own submissions showed that the dog had previously growled at people coming to the door. However, summary judgment was appropriate here because the evidence failed to show that defendant knew or should have known of the dog's alleged vicious propensities. |
Case |
| Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, L.L.C. v. Department of Agriculture | 539 F.3d 492 (D.C.Cir., 2008) | 2008 WL 3980533 (C.A.D.C.) | Plaintiff, a supplier of beef products, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), after the USDA denied Plaintiff’s request to purchase Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) testing kits. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that the USDA has authority under the Virus Serum Toxin Act (VSTA) to regulate the use of biological products, the USDA’s interpretation of VSTA allowing the USDA to deny an import permit based on the product’s intended use was not inconsistent with the regulation and was therefore entitled to deference by the Court, the USDA’s interpretation of the word “treatment” as including diagnostic activities was entitled to deference, and that BSE testing is a diagnostic activity for purposes of VSTA. | Case |