Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alternatives Research & Development Foundation v. Glickman | 101 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.,2000) |
In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and APHIS violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of “animal” under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on Lujan , defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA. |
Case | |
| Storms v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. | 120 P.3d 126 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2005) | 129 Wash.App. 820; 31 NDLR P 98 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2005) |
This Washington discrimination case was brought by a dog owner (Storms) with psychiatric conditions against a store and its managers who refused to allow her to stay in store with her alleged service dog. The dog was trained to put herself between Storms and other people so as to keep an open area around Storms and alleviate her anxiety (a symptom of her post-traumatic stress syndrome). The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against Fred Meyer for refusing to allow her to shop accompanied by her dog. Testimony showed that Brandy had been specifically trained to help Storms with her particular disability by placing herself in between Storms and others in a way that alleviated her anxiety, which was further corroborated by testimony that Brandy engaged in such behavior. Thus, evidence showed that the defendants' violated RCW 49.60.215 by not allowing Storms to do her own shopping within the store because she was accompanied by a service animal. |
Case |
| Cascadia Wildlands v. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife | 455 P.3d 950 (Or.App., 2019) | 300 Or.App. 648 (Or.App., 2019) | Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission ("Respondent") removed the species Canis lupus (gray wolf) from the list of species protected under the Oregon Endangered Species Act (OESA). Cascadia Wildlands, Center for Biological Diversity, and Oregon Wild ("Petitioners") sought judicial review of the amendment to Oregon law. The Petitioners contended that the decision to delist exceeded the commission’s statutory authority and did not comply with applicable rulemaking procedures. After the Petitioners filed their petition, the Oregon legislature passed House Bill 4040 which ratified the administrative rule that the Respondent promulgated delisting the gray wolf. The Respondents argued that the passage of the bill made the Petitioners' petition for judicial review moot. The Petitioners argued that the Oregon law ratifying the administrative rule had no legal effect and was merely an expression of legislative agreement. The Court held that the legislature using the word “ratify” in the statute indicated that they intended to confirm that the Commission’s rule delisting the gray wolf was legally satisfied, therefore, rendering judicial review moot. The Petitioners also contended that the statute violated the separation of powers because the statute performed an entirely judicial function by neither appealing nor amending the statute. Petitioners asserted that evaluating whether a particular agency satisfied requirements of law is a fact-specific inquiry which is reserved for the court. The Court held that the statute did not violate the separation of powers. The Court ultimately held that the Petitioners' rule challenge was moot. The petition for judicial review was ultimately dismissed. | Case |
| RI - Shark - § 20-1-29. Trade in shark fins | Gen.Laws 1956, § 20-1-29 | RI ST § 20-1-29 | This Rhode Island law, effective in 2017, prohibits the possession, sale, offering for sale, trading, or distribution of shark fin. “Shark fin” means the raw, dried, or otherwise processed detached fin or the raw, dried, or otherwise processed detached tail of a shark. Even if a person holds a license to take sharks, he or she must immediately destroy any shark fin separated from the shark unless used by the person for the purposes of taxidermy and subsequent display. Violation incurs a fine or not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 imprisonment of up to 90 days, or both. | Statute |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-3. Prior ordinances preserved | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-3 | RI ST § 4-13-3 | This Rhode Island statute provides that nothing in the state laws concerning dogs shall be construed as to repeal any ordinance concerning dogs, which has been passed by any town or city council. | Statute |
| NC - Fur/Dealer Licenses - Chapter 113. Conservation and Development. | N.C.G.S.A. § 113-273 | NC ST § 113-273 | Defines "dealer" and all rules applicable to obtaining a dealer license. Defines "fur-dealer license" and "fur dealers" as those involved in the lawful buying and selling of wild animals or their skins, pelts, or fur. Defines "controlled hunting preserve operator licenses," "game bird propagation licenses," "furbearer propagation licenses" and "taxidermy licenses." | Statute |
| Jaeger v. Cellco Partnership | Slip Copy, 2010 WL 965730 (D.Conn.,2010) |
The Connecticut Siting Council granted Cellco Partnership a Certificate allowing the company to build a cell tower in Falls Village, Connecticut. Dina Jaeger brought suit against Cellco and the Council to prevent the building of the cell tower. In her complaint, Jaeger cited the harmful effects of radio frequency emissions (RF emissions), and alleged violations of the International Migratory Bird Treaty, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), the Telecommunications Act (TCA), and the 10 th and 14 th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants moved to dismiss Jaeger's claims on various grounds, including that the Council was preempted from considering the environmental effects of RF emissions under the TCA. The Court found in favor of the Defendants, holding that the TCA preempts local and state regulation of cell towers solely on the basis of RF emissions. |
Case | |
| Allen v. Camp | 70 So. 290 (Ala.App. 1915) | 14 Ala.App. 341 (1915) |
Defendant shot and killed Plaintiff's dog, which had bitten Defendant's daughter several days earlier, for the purpose of sending the dog's head to a laboratory for examination for rabies. The Court of Appeals of Alabama found that Plaintiff's wife's injuries were too remote to be compensable, when the wife was not home at the time of the incident and became excited and hysterical upon hearing of the incident several hours later. The Appeals Court also held that although one may protect himself or his family from injury by a dog or other animal when on his own private property or on public property, the destruction of an animal is wrongful when the danger of attack and subsequent injury by that animal no longer exists, and where the animal is not trespassing. |
Case |
| Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n | 03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006) | 2006 WL 2009061 (Pa.Cmwlth.) |
A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order. |
Case |
| Bolivia - Cruelty - Ley 700, 2015 | Ley 700, 2015 | Ley 700, is the animal cruelty statute of Bolivia. This law lays out the rules for the defense of animals against cruelty committed by humans. Animals are considered part of mother earth, and therefore, their life has to be defended and respected. This law punishes physical, psychological, emotional and sexual mistreatment, and prohibits the breeding of domestic animals for commercial purposes. It also prohibits sport hunting and overworking animals, especially those of an older age. | Statute |