Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Juelfs v. Gough | 41 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2002) | In this case, the husband and wife had agreed to shared ownership of their dog, which the lower court incorporated into its order.Based on danger the dog faced by other dogs in the wife’s home and increased contention between the parties, the lower court next gave the husband custody with an order for the wife’s visitation, and finally awarded sole custody to the husband. The state’s Supreme Court affirmed the modified order. | Case | |
| Farm Sanctuary v. United States Department of Agriculture | 545 F. Supp. 3d 50 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) | Plaintiffs (nonprofit organizations working to protect animals, people, and environments from industrial animal agriculture) filed suit against the USDA and FSIS challenging the implementation of the Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (Oct. 11, 2019) ("Slaughter Rule”). Plaintiffs contend that the rule allows nearly all pigs in the U.S. to be slaughtered as "unlimited speeds," thereby posing risks to animal welfare and consumer safety. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was later amended to add a claim that challenges Defendants' failure to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory or "downed" pigs in the rule. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs have no standing to sue. Plaintiffs contend that they have been injured by Defendants' implementation of the Slaughter Rule. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of the high-speed slaughter rule directly conflicts with their organizational missions and redirects resources to counteracting the Slaughter Rule instead of other activities like rescue of animals and advocacy. Some of the plaintiff organizations further allege that their members include consumers who eat pork products and are concerned about the increased health risks they face from consuming products from pigs who have not been adequately inspected as well as impacts to the environment from increased slaughter. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the FSIS is not consistent in its treatment of downed pigs versus downed cattle, and that downed pigs are inhumanely forced to rise/stand for slaughter resulting in potential exposure to the public of disease and other public health risks. The court first took up Defendants argument that Plaintiffs lack both organizational and associational standing. The Court has reviewed the amended complaint in light of this Second Circuit precedent and finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they have been forced to divert resources from mission-critical activities to oppose the Slaughter Rule. In other words, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ unlawful practices have impaired and frustrated their ability to engage in mission-related activities and caused a consequent drain on their limited resources, which “constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests" sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Taking Plaintiffs allegations in their pleadings as true, the Court finds that the amended complaint contains allegations sufficient to support organizational standing. Having found that Plaintiffs have organization standing, the Court need not reach the issue of associational standing. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Finally, as to the 2020 Action concerning the downed pigs, the Court found that The Court reaches the same conclusion it did in the 2019 Action: that at this stage of the case, Plaintiffs have alleged organizational standing. The Court notes that several other Plaintiffs have submitted declarations from their members, which further explain how those organizations have sustained an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they provide additional services beyond mere issue advocacy, that these services have been impaired by Defendants’ actions, and that they have been forced to shift their resources away from those services to oppose the slaughter of downed pigs. Defendants' motions to dismiss were denied. | Case | |
| Agreement APHIS v. FEI | This agreement was entered into by APHIS and Feld Entertainment, Inc. (FEI). FEI is an exhibitor under the Animal Welfare Act and was issued non-compliance reports after numerous inspections. In this agreement, FEI paid $270,000 to the US Treasurer and had to develop and implement annual training to all of its personnel who worked with animals. The agreement also contains provisions that APHIS would not take action against FEI if FEI followed the agreement. | Pleading | ||
| New York Consolidated Laws 1938: Sections 180-196 | N.Y. Penal Law §§ 180-196 (Consol. 1938) | Article 16, entitled "Animals", concerns New York's Law about the treatment of animals from 1938. The act covers such topics as poisoning of animals to abandoning diseased or injured animals. In addition, the act provides definitions in section 180. | Statute | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency | 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005) | 2005 WL 2001100 (9th Cir.), 60 ERC 2025, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,172, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7480, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,216 |
Several public interest groups brought actions challenging Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to transfer Clean Water Act (CWA) pollution permitting program for Arizona to that State. Under federal law, a state may take over the Clean Water Act pollution permitting program in its state from the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) if it applies to do so and meets the applicable standards. When deciding whether to transfer permitting authority, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued, and the EPA relied on, a Biological Opinion premised on the proposition that the EPA lacked the authority to take into account the impact of that decision on endangered species and their habitat. The plaintiffs in this case challenge the EPA's transfer decision, particularly its reliance on the Biological Opinion's proposition regarding the EPA's limited authority. The court held that the EPA did have the authority to consider jeopardy to listed species in making the transfer decision, and erred in determining otherwise. For that reason among others, the EPA's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded to the EPA. |
Case |
| CA - Initiatives - Proposition 2 (farm cruelty) | 2008 Proposition 2 | This 2008 California initiative measure would add to the Health & Safety Code with a law entitled, "The Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act." Specifically, the proposed law requires that calves raised for veal, egg-laying hens and pregnant pigs be confined only in ways that allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely. Exceptions are made for transportation, rodeos, fairs, 4-H programs, lawful slaughter, research and veterinary purposes. The law provides misdemeanor penalties, including a fine not to exceed $1,000 and/or imprisonment in jail for up to 180 days and would go into effect on January 1, 2015. It was approved in November 2008 by a margin of 63% to 37%. | Statute | |
| WI - Rabies - 95.21. Rabies control program | W. S. A. 95.21 | WI ST 95.21 | Except as provided in s. 174.054 or sub. (9)(d), the owner of a dog shall have the dog vaccinated against rabies by a veterinarian or, if a veterinarian is physically present at the location the vaccine is administered, by a veterinary technician, at no later than 5 months of age and revaccinated within one year after the initial vaccination. The owner of a dog shall have the dog revaccinated against rabies before the date that the immunization expires as stated on the certificate of vaccination or, if no date is specified, within 3 years after the previous vaccination. The owner shall attach the rabies vaccination tag or a substitute tag to a collar and a collar with the tag attached shall be kept on the dog at all times. | Statute |
| Vick, Michael - Associated Materials (2007, 2008) |
The following contains links to the materials associated with Michael Vick's federal and state indictments for dogfighting. |
Pleading | ||
| Frye v. County of Butte | 221 Cal.App.4th 1051 (2013), 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 928 (2013) | 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 12, 929, 2013 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15, 539 |
After several administrative, trial court, and appeals hearings, the California court of appeals upheld a county’s decision to seize the plaintiffs’ horses for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 597.1(f). Notably, the appeals court failed to extend the law of the case, which generally provides that a prior appellate court ruling on the law governs further proceedings in the case, to prior trial court rulings. The appeals court also held that the trial court’s "Statement of Decision" resolved all issues set before it, despite certain remedies remaining unresolved and the court’s oversight of the plaintiffs' constitutionality complaint, and was therefore an appealable judgment. The appeals court also found the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend the appeals deadline with its document titled "Judgment." |
Case |
| Zelenka v. Pratte | 912 N.W.2d 723 (Neb. 2018) | 300 Neb. 100 (2018) | Pratte and Zelenka were in a relationship up until their separation in 2015. Zelenka moved out of the residence that they had shared, however, he was unable to retrieve several items of personal property one of which was a French bulldog named Pavlov. Zelenka filed a complaint against Pratte alleging conversion. Zelenka contended that Pavlov was given to him as a birthday gift from Pratte. The district court ordered Pratte to return Pavlov to Zelenka and the rest of the personal property to remain with Pratte. Pratte appealed and Zelenka cross-appealed. The Supreme Court of Nebraska found that although the parties styled their complaint as one for conversion, the parties tried the action as one for replevin and treated the case in all respects as if replevin had been raised in the pleadings, therefore, the Court treated the action as one in which replevin had been raised in the pleadings. The Court ultimately found the following: Zelenka met his burden of proving that Pavlov was a gift from Pratte; Pratte failed to meet his burden of proving that the Niche leather couch, Niche lamps, and French bulldog lamp were gifts from Zelenka; and that those three items should be returned to Zelenka. As for the other items of personal property, the Court found that there was no basis to set aside the district court’s finding that Zelenka failed to meet his burden of proving ownership. The Court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. | Case |