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Displaying 6571 - 6580 of 6649
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MI - Lien - 570.185. Lien of mechanic, artisan, or tradesman for manufacture of goods or keeping or care of animals | M.C.L.A. 570.185 | MI ST 570.185 | This Michigan law states that when a person delivers any horse, mule, neat cattle, sheep, or swine to be kept or cared for to another person, that person shall have a lien thereon for the keeping and care of such animals, and may retain possession of the same until such charges are paid. | Statute | |
| Canada - Nova Scotia Statutes - Animal Protection Act | SNS 2008, c 33 | This set of laws replaces the Animal Cruelty Prevention Act. The Act outlines the establishment and powers of the Nova Scotia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. In addition, the Act also provides that no person shall cause an animal to be in distress. First and second time violators face up to $5,000 in fines and in default of payment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both fine and imprisonment. A third offense would result in a fine of up to $10,000 and in default of payment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both fine and imprisonment. The courts can also prohibit the ownership of animals and may impose a lifetime ban on owning animals. | Statute | ||
| Com. v. Zalesky | 906 N.E.2d 349, (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) | 74 Mass.App.Ct. 908; 2009 WL 1351751 (Mass.App.Ct.) |
In this Massachusetts case, the defendant was convicted of cruelty to an animal, in violation of G.L. c. 272, § 77. On appeal, the defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt; specifically, that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions exceeded what was necessary and appropriate to train the dog. A witness in this case saw defendant beat his dog with a plastic "whiffle" bat on the head about 10 times. The defendant told the officer who arrived on the scene that he had used the bat on previous occasions, and did so to “put the fear of God in [the] dog.” At trial, a veterinarian testified that the dog suffered no trauma from the bat, but probably experienced pain if struck repeatedly in that manner. The court found that defendant's behavior fell under the ambit of the statutes because his actions were cruel, regardless of whether defendant viewed them as such. Judgment affirmed.
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| Myanmar - Animal Welfare - Animal Health and Development Law | The State Law and Order Restoration Council Law No. 13/93 | This Myanmar Law, in English and Burmese, provides for livestock breeding, welfare, animal feed standards, the prevention and control of contagious diseases, inspections, trade, certificates and related fees, and the prevention of cruelty to animals. | Statute | ||
| NM - Santa Fe County - Impounding Horses- Chapter 95: Animals (Secs. 95.24, 95.75 - 95.78) | Santa Fe County, New Mexico Code of Ordinances sections 95.24, 95.75 - 95.86 (2013) |
Under these Santa Fe County, New Mexico ordinances, if an animal control officer finds that a horse has been abused as stated in these provisions, then the officer will issue the owner a citation and may place the horse in the custody of a caretaker. Furthermore, these ordinances provide provisions on how the owner can petition a court to return an impounded horse, as well as the fees and penalties a horse owner may face for violating these ordinances. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Washington Cty. | 163 A.3d 146 (Md., 2017) | 454 Md. 1, 2017 WL 2774606 (Md. June 27, 2017) | In this Maryland appeal, appellant Rohrer questions the authority of the Humane Society to act under CR § 10–615 (the law that allows an officer of a humane society to take possession of an animal from its owner). Rohrer also challenges the legal ownership of the animals in state custody. The seizure of Rohrer's animals began in 2014, when an anonymous tip led humane investigators to Rohrer's farm. Field officers and a local veterinarian observed cattle that were "extremely thin" on Rohrer's farm. These concerns led to a search warrant of appellant's property. Due to the presence of dead animal bodies intermingled with the living, high piles of animal feces, and goats with hooves so overgrown they could not walk, the Humane Society (HS) and Sheriff's office seized all the animals under the warrant. The actual "seizure" resulted in a transfer of some animals to foster farms and an agreement between HS and Rohrer to adequately care for remaining animals on the property. Rohrer was charged with 318 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty, eventually being found guilty on only 5 counts and sentenced to supervised probation. During the initial proceedings, Rohrer filed a "petition for return of seized animals" under CR § 10–615(d)(2). When the District Court gave conclusions on the petition, it lamented on the "lack of guidance" in the statute and noted that that the "statute really doesn't say" whether Rohrer would lose ownership of the animals. After the criminal trial, Rohrer again sought return of the animals after negotiations with the HS failed. The Circuit Court upheld the District Court's denial of the Petition for Return, finding the ruling was not clearly erroneous and it was not in the best interests of the animals to return to Rohrer. On a writ of certiorari to this court, Rohrer raises three issues: (1) can the HS seize an animal already in state custody from a search warrant; (2) must the seizure by the HS be justified by the conditions at the time of seizure or may it be based on previously observed conditions; and (3) how does a denial of a petition to return the animals affect the owner's property rights in the animals? In looking at prior codifications of the law as well as surrounding legislative history, the court first held that a HS officer may notify the owner of animal seized by the state in connection with a criminal warrant of its intent to take possession of the animal upon its release from state custody. Secondly, a HS officer may rely on previously-observed conditions to justify seizure under Section 10-615. The court noted that, similar to a search warrant, the factors justifying seizure can become weaker with time. So, when an owner files a petition for return, the HS has the burden of showing the court the seizure was necessary under the statute. In Rohrer's case, this Court found the District and Circuit Courts did not reach the question of whether the necessity supporting HS' possession of the animals continued. Since the animals were released after the criminal trial concluded, this Court stated that the District Court may now consider this question. Finally, the Court weighed in on whether the denial of a Petition for Return affects ownership interests. This Court declined to adopt the standard of "best interests" of the animals. Instead, the Court found that the function of the Petition for Return is to determine who has the right to temporarily possess an animal in question and this does not vest ownership rights in the animal if the petition is denied. This case was remanded to Circuit Court so that court can determine whether the final disposition of the criminal case and subsequent release of the animals held under the search warrant affects the disposition of Rohrer's Petition for Return of this animals. | Case | |
| Neita v. City of Chicago | 830 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 3905604 (7th Cir., 2016) | Vaughn Neita brought this suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law, alleging false arrest and illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment arising from an animal cruelty arrest. He was ultimately found not guilty on all counts by an Illinois judge. In 2012, Neita owned a dog-grooming business and rescue shelter. He brought two dogs to the Chicago Department of Animal Care and Control because one dog had attacked another dog in Neita's care and another dog had become ill after whelping a litter of puppies. When Neita arrived with the dogs, an animal control employee contacted police officers who then arrested Neita and searched his business premises, resulting in 13 counts of animal cruelty. With regard to this § 1983 action and Illinois state claims, while Neita amended his complaint twice, it was ultimately dismissed with prejudice for failure to adequately plead any constitutional violation. This appeal then followed. The Seventh Circuit held that to prevail on a false arrest claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for his or her arrest. Neita arrived at Animal Control to surrender two dogs that showed no signs of abuse or neglect without evidence that he mistreated either dog. Those statements in the amended complaint are sufficient to permit a false arrest claim to proceed. As to the claim of illegal searches, the court found that a plausible claim for false arrest also allowed his claim for an illegal search incident to his arrest to move forward. The dismissal of Neita's claims was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. | Case | |
| US - Cruelty - § 11.446 Cruelty to animals. | 25 C.F.R. § 11.446 | This regulation concerns acts of animal cruelty on Indian reservations or under the jurisdiction of tribal courts. According to § 11.446, a person commits a misdemeanor if he or she purposely or recklessly subjects any animal in his or her custody to cruel neglect; subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment; kills or injures any animal belonging to another without legal privilege or consent of the owner; or causes one animal to fight with another. | Administrative | ||
| French and Spanish Animal Laws |
French and Spanish Animal LawsFrance:1. Law of July 2,1850 relating to maltreatments on domestic animals Loi du 2 juillet 1850 relative aux mauvais traitements exercés envers les animaux domestiques . |
Policy | |||
| Carroll v. Rock | 469 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. App., 1996) | 220 Ga.App. 260 (1996) |
After plaintiff's cat escaped while at the defendant's animal hospital, Rock sued Dr. Carroll d/b/a The Animal Care Clinic for conversion or breach of bailment and emotional distress, seeking punitive damages and attorney fees. The court agreed with Carroll that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on punitive and vindictive damages, as vindictive or punitive damages are recoverable only when a defendant acts maliciously, wilfully, or with a wanton disregard of the rights of others. Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim also must fail because defendant's conduct was not outrageous or egregious. |
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