Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE - Domestic Violence - § 1045. Relief available; duration of orders, modification and termination | 10 Del.C. § 1045 | DE ST TI 10 § 1045 | Delaware amended its law on protection orders in domestic violence situations to include protection of pets in 2023. Per subsection (a)(12), a court may "[g]rant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any companion animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by the petitioner, the respondent, or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the companion animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the companion animal." | Statute |
| Sample Post |
Sample Post of Dog Map
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Policy | ||
| Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources v. Whitetail Bluff, LLC | 25 N.E.3d 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 416786 (Ind. Ct. App., 2015) | Appellee established a business that allowed for "high fence" hunting, which refers to hunting wild animals on property that is enclosed by a fence, of privately-owned whitetail deer. The pivotal question in this appeals case was whether the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) was correct in asserting that the current statutory scheme prohibited this practice, and therefore allowed the agency to promulgate rules effectuating that prohibition. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that IDNR did not have the power to regulate fish and wildlife that were legally owned or held in captivity under a license. The IDNR therefore went beyond its express powers conferred upon it by the General Assembly when it promulgated rules that prohibited "high fence" hunting. The lower court's grant of summary judgment to the appellee was affirmed. | Case |
| MO - Initiatives - Proposition B (dog breeders) | Proposition B (2010) |
This 2010 ballot measure asked whether Missouri law shall be amended to: require large-scale dog breeding operations to provide each dog under their care with sufficient food, clean water, housing and space; necessary veterinary care; regular exercise and adequate rest between breeding cycles; prohibit any breeder from having more than 50 breeding dogs for the purpose of selling their puppies as pets; and create a misdemeanor crime of puppy mill cruelty” for any violations. It was passed in 2010 by 51.6% of voters. |
Statute | |
| DC - Impoundment - § 8-1805. Impoundment | DC CODE § 8-1805 | DC ST § 8-1805 | Under this law, the Mayor shall make a prompt and reasonable attempt to locate and notify the owner of the impounded animal, including scanning the animal for a microchip. The Mayor shall deem abandoned any animal impounded and not redeemed by its owner within 7 days of impoundment if such animal is wearing identification. Any animal impounded not wearing identification shall be deemed abandoned if not redeemed by its owner within 5 days of impoundment. An animal deemed abandoned shall become the property of the District of Columbia and may be adopted or disposed of in a humane manner. | Statute |
| US - Fisheries - Packwood-Magnuson Amendment | 16 USC 1801 - 1803 | The aim of this statute is the development of United States' controlled fishing conservation and management program designed to prevent overfishing and to rebuild depleted stock. | Statute | |
| In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litigation-MDL No. 2165 | 704 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. Ct. App.,2013) | 2013 WL 45871 (D.C. Cir. Ct. App.,2013) |
After parties in a lawsuit over listing species as endangered or threatened agreed upon a settlement, the Safari Club motioned to intervene because the settlement might affect three species that the club's members hunt. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right because the club lacked Article III standing and denied a permissive intervention because it would cause undue delay and prejudice to the parties; the court then approved the settlement and the club appealed. The appeals court affirmed the lower court's decision that the club lacked Article III standing for intervening as of right. The appeals court, however, in view of uncertainty whether Article III standing was required for permissive intervention, declined to exercise pendant appellate jurisdiction over the permissive intervention appeal. |
Case |
| Viva! v. Adidas | 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 (Cal., 2007) | 2007 WL 2080000 (Cal. 2007), 41 Cal.4th 929 | Viva, an animal protective organization, filed action against Adidas shoe retailer alleging that it was violating a state statute banning the import of products made from Australian kangaroo hide into California. On cross motions for summary judgment, the original court sided with Adidas, on the ground that state statute was preempted by federal Endangered Species Act of 1973. The appeals court affirmed, however the California Superior Court reversed, holding that the state statute was not preempted by federal law. | Case |
| Reicksview Farms, L.L.C. v. Kiehne | 541 F. Supp. 3d 935 (N.D. Iowa 2021) | This case is brought by a farm in the business of raising and breeding pigs. Plaintiff brought suit against a veterinarian and veterinary clinic for several claims, including malpractice. Plaintiff alleges defendant failed to oversee and perform testing for Mhp, leading plaintiff to unknowingly transfer infected pigs to other farms resulting in monetary damages. Defendants moved for summary judgment and were denied, with the court holding that the two year statute of limitations for veterinary malpractice claims does not apply, and the five year statute of limitations for unwritten contract applies. | Case | |
| OR - Police Animal - 682.410. Emergency transportation for treatment of police dogs injured in the line of duty | O.R.S. § 682.410 | OR ST § 682.410 | Under this Oregon law from 2021, an emergency medical services provider may provide emergency transportation for treatment to a police dog that is injured in the line of duty, provided that such transportation for treatment does not delay or otherwise interfere with the emergency transportation for treatment of any human. | Statute |
