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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
MA - Cat of commonwealth - Chapter 2. Arms, Great Seal and Other Emblems of the Commonwealth. M.G.L.A. 2 § 30 MA ST 2 § 30 The Tabby cat shall be the official cat of the Massachusetts commonwealth. Statute
Arrington v. Arrington 613 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)

A divorcing couple agreed to visitation of their dog, which the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree, appointing wife as the dog's managing conservator.  Husband appealed because he had not been appointed managing conservator; the appellate court stated that dogs are personal property, and the office of managing conservator had been created for human children.  While the court held that dogs are personal property under the law, it also stated that visitation of dogs should be allowed.

Case
Gerofsky v. Passaic County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 870 A.2d 704 (N.J. 2005) 376 N.J.Super. 405

The President of the New Jersey SPCA brought an action to have several county SPCA certificates of authority revoked.  The county SPCAs brought a counterclaim alleging the revocation was beyond the state SPCA's statutory authority.  The trial court revoked one county's certificate of authority, but the Court of Appeals held the revocation was an abuse of discretion.

Case
CA - Research animals - Group 5. Care of Laboratory Animals Cal. Admin. Code tit. 17, § 1150 -1159 17 CCR §§ 1150 -1159 This set of regulations establishes certification requirements for research facilities that use live animals in experiments, sets minimum standards of care for research animals, and addresses the requirements for filing complaints with the Department of Public Health. Administrative
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018) 85 ERC 2299, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 517, 2018 WL 385682 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed. Case
MS - Veterinarian License - Chapter 39. Veterinarians. Mississippi Veterinary Practice Act. Miss. Code Ann. § 73-39-77 MS ST § 73-39-77 (formerly MS ST § 73-39-19) This Mississippi statutes provides the terms under which a veterinarian can lose his or her license to practice veterinary medicine. Statute
ID - Exotic - Chapter 39. Importation or Possession of Deleterious Exotic Animals I.C. § 25-3901 - 3905 ID ST § 25-3901 - 3905 In Idaho, all apes and other nonhuman primates are classified as “deleterious exotic animals,” which are dangerous to the environment, livestock, agriculture, or wildlife of the state. According to Idaho’s legislature, it is in the public interest to strictly regulate the importation and possession of those animals. Statute
Edmondson v. Oklahoma 91 P.3d 605 (Okla. 2004) 2004 OK 23 (2004)

Petitioners sought relief from a temporary injunction for the Respondents, which prevented petitioners from enforcing the statute banning cockfighting.  The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the statute did not violate the Oklahoma State Constitution, and was not unconstitutionally overbroad.  Relief granted for petitioners.

Case
People v. Leach Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2006 WL 2683727 (Mich.App.)

Defendant's conviction arises from the killing of a rabbit during the execution of a civil court order at defendant's home on April 15, 2004. Because the court did not find MCL 750.50b unconstitutionally vague and further found sufficient evidence in support of defendant's conviction, defendant's conviction was affirmed. The evidence showed that defendant killed the rabbit in a display of anger arising from the execution of a court; thus, the terms, "[m]alicious", "willful", and "without just cause" are sufficiently specific terms with commonly understood meanings such that enforcement of the statute will not be arbitrary or discriminatory."

Case
State v. Hershey 401 P.3d 256 ( Or. Ct. App.,2017) 286 Or.App. 824 , 2017 WL 3045807 In this Oregon case, defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree animal neglect. Specifically, defendant argues the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The evidence was obtained when the local sheriff (Glerup) entered defendant's property to administer emergency aid to defendant's cattle. During testimony in the motion to suppress, Glerup testified that he first received a call from defendant's neighbors who reported that the cattle appeared to be "starving." That neighbor even called defendant, who assured her that the cattle "were okay" and being cared for by a hired person. Sheriff Glerup called that individual who stated he had not been hired and defendant had been gone a week. The sheriff subsequently received a call that the cattle were in need of immediate aid and in poor condition. These conditions prompted the warrantless search. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress where the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. In doing so, defendant contends that the case establishing that the emergency aid doctrine applies to animals (Fessenden) was wrongly decided. This argument was dispensed by the court because it was not properly preserved at trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that the state failed to satisfy the requirements for the emergency aid exception. In reviewing defendant's claim, the court noted that in Fessenden, the emergency aid doctrine justifies warrantless activity, “when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals . . ." In this case, the court found that the officer's belief that immediate aid was necessary where the cattle appeared to be "near death" was reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress; defendant's conviction was affirmed. Case

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