Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| England and Wales - Cruelty - Animal Welfare Act 2006 | Animal Welfare Act of 2006 | An Act establishing penalties for engaging in certain activities that are considered detrimental to animal welfare. Activities that constitute offenses include: causing an animal unnecessary suffering, mutilating an animal’s body, docking a dog’s tail (with certain limited exceptions), administering a poisonous or injurious substance to an animal, and engaging in or attending animal fighting. Nothing in the Act applies to anything lawfully done under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 or to anything which occurs in the normal course of fishing. | Statute | ||
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner, v. Robert J. STEVENS |
The Third Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 48, the federal law that criminalizes depictions of animal cruelty, is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. This brief by Stevens opposes the United States' petition for certiorari. Cert. was granted in April of 2009 by the U.S. Supreme Court. |
Pleading | |||
| Physicians Committee For Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc. | 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004) | 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 04 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4705, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6501 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004) |
In this California case, PCRM, a nonprofit health-advocacy organization, filed suit for injunctive relief against Tyson alleging that the company made false and deceptive representations about chicken products that it sold to consumers in California. The complaint alleges that Tyson engaged in two advertising campaigns, which disseminated false and deceptive statements about its products in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500. Tyson filed a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statute. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the amendment to the anti-SLAPP statute, which was enacted while the appeal was pending did not apply to actions against sellers of goods as to the representations about or promotions of those goods. Further, by holding that Tyson was not entitled to invoke the anti-SLAPP remedy, the court stated that it did not compromise or prejudice Tyson’s right to raise First Amendment issues in defense of PCRM's suit . |
Case | |
| State v. Hackett | 502 P.3d 228 (2021) | 315 Or.App. 360, 2021 WL 4987629 (Or.App., 2021) | Defendant was convicted of second-degree animal abuse, among other crimes. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) and imposed fines (in addition to incarceration) without first determining his ability to pay. The conviction was supported by testimony at trial from two witnesses, a mother and her daughter. The daughter was visiting her mother and heard a dog "yike" in pain outside while she was at her mother's house. She thought a dog may have been hit by a car, so she went outside where she observed defendant and his dog Bosco. The dog was whimpering and laying in submission as the defendant hit the dog. Then, after going inside briefly to call police, the witness returned outside to see defendant was "just going to town and beating the dog" and throwing rocks at the dog to the point where the witness was concerned for the dog's life. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred on the second-degree animal abuse charge because the evidence did not permit a rational inference that Bosco experienced "substantial pain" as required by the statute. The court, in a matter of first impression, examined whether Bosco experienced substantial pain. Both the state and defendant acknowledged that appellate courts have not yet interpreted the meaning of "substantial pain" for animal victims, so both parties rely on cases involving human victims. Defendant suggests that Bosco did not experience a significant duration of pain to permit a finding of substantial pain. The court disagreed, analogizing with cases where a human victim could not testify concerning the pain. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Bosco's pain was not "fleeting" or "momentary." Not only did the witnesses see the defendant kick and pelt the dog with rocks, but one witness left to phone police and returned to find the defendant still abusing the dog. As to the fines, the court found that the trial court did err in ordering payment of fines within 30-days without making an assessment of defendant's ability to pay. Thus, the the trial court did not err in denying defendant's MJOA, but the matter was remanded for entry of judgment that omitted the "due in 30 days" for the fines. | Case | |
| Animal Law Index Volume 3 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 3 (1997)INTRODUCTIONOBSTACLES TO LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? |
Policy | |||
| AZ - Exotic Wildlife - Article 4. Live Wildlife | A.A.C. R12-4-401 to 430 | AZ ADC R12-4-401 to 430 | These Arizona regulations define “captive live wildlife” as live wildlife that is held in captivity, physically restrained, confined, impaired, or deterred to prevent it from escaping to the wild or moving freely in the wild. The regulations provides that no individual shall import or export any live wildlife into or out of the state. An individual may take wildlife from the wild alive under a valid Arizona hunting or fishing license only if there is a Commission Order that prescribes a live bag and possession limit for that wildlife and the individual possesses the appropriate license. However, no person may possess restricted live wildlife without a valid permit. The statute also provides a comprehensive list of all mammals that are considered restricted live wildlife. An individual who holds a special license listed in R12-4-409(A) shall keep all wildlife in a facility according to the captivity standards prescribed under R12-4-428 or as otherwise required under this Article. A special license holder subject to the provisions of this Section shall comply with the minimum standards for humane treatment prescribed by this Section. | Administrative | |
| UT - Abandonment - § 58-28-601. Animal abandonment | U.C.A. 1953 § 58-28-601 | UT ST § 58-28-601 | This Utah statute provides that any animal abandoned at a veterinarian's office for a period of ten days may be sold or placed in the custody of the nearest humane society or county dog pound after giving notice to the owner. If no humane society or dog pound is located in the county, the animal may be disposed of in a humane manner. | Statute | |
| AU - Nature Conservation Act 1980 ( ACT) | Nature Conservation Act 1980 |
An Act to make provision for the protection and conservation of native animals and native plants, and for the preservation of areas for those purposes.
The Act creates the office of Conservator of Flora and Fauna and the
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Statute | ||
| KS - Leawood - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance §§ 2-101, 2-109 - 2-110 | LEAWOOD, KS., CITY CODE §§ 2-101, 2-109 - 2-110 (2000) |
In Leawood, Kansas, it is unlawful to own, keep or harbor any dangerous animal (including pit bulls), with exceptions made for holders of a special permit. Entities such as zoos, circuses, veterinary hospitals, etc, may obtain a permit for display or exhibition purposes, but no person may keep any dangerous animal as a pet. Any dangerous animal not in compliance may be seized and impounded, or even killed. The owner will be responsible for any expenses incurred, in addition to any fine that might be imposed for violating the ordinance. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Longhi v. APHIS | 165 F3d 1057 (6th Cir. 1999) |
APHIS was unsuccessful in asserting that an applicant who is part of one license as a partnership can not apply for another as a corporation. |
Case |